The international system is no longer anchored in predictability, international rules, or reliable security guarantees. Instead, it is evolving toward a power-centric order where hard security, economic coercion, and technological control shape the outcome. For the Gulf states and the Southeast Asian nations who are situated at the crossroads of global markets, trade routes, and geopolitical rivalry, this shift is not something can be taken lightly. It directly affects strategic autonomy, regime stability, economic resilience, and to certain extent, the state’s defence planning. This article reflects on the dominant themes and strategic signals observed across public sessions, private dialogues, and leadership engagements at the World Economic Forum (WEF) 2026. As WEF is not a decision-making body, it does not form any position based on its engagement forums and discussions. Since 1971, WEF has gathered academicians, political and business leaders, promoting ideas for societal impact. The gathering is highly regarded amongst experts for its sharing outcomes and for establishing cooperation.
During the presentation of the Global Risk Report 2026, seven global developments suggest that we are living in an uncertain and turbulent decade came to the fore (Global Risks Report 2026, pg. 2). In the context of hard power, it is worth to unpack: the erosion of external security guarantees and rise of unilateralism, the weaponisation of trade and economic interdependence, and the securitisation of advanced technologies, especially in artificial intelligence.
Unilateralism and the Erosion of External Security Guarantees
Discussions at WEF 2026 underscored the growing unpredictability of major powers, particularly the U.S. under the Trump 2.0 administration. From its coercive diplomacy to selective interventionism, global anxiety has become more severe in 2026, with US Operation Absolute Resolve over Venezuela. On January 3, 2026, US special operations forces conducted an Operation (named as Operation Absolute Resolve), to capture Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife for drug-trafficking charges. For the Gulf states which rely on external assurance, this has direct implications. The region has long relied on external deterrence architecture, particularly the US (ISPI 2024, pg. 73). However, in 2025 and the beginning of 2026, it has become clear that great powers (especially the US) is increasingly acting in a manner based on transactional calculations rather than alliance norms. The Trump administration repeatedly questioned the value of NATO and threatened to not defend allies who failed to meet defence expenditure target, treating security guarantee based on financial contributions, rather than mutual defence pact. What this means to the Gulf states, although they maintain alliance, security assurances are no longer fixed, instead they are contingent, negotiable, and interest based.
Weaponisation of Trade and Economic Interdependence
One of the most consequential insights from WEF 2026 is the role of trade and tariffs. These are no longer viewed as instruments for a state’s economic interest. From the perspective of international economy, tariffs are justified by state’s economic efficiency and by market correction. Instead, it is now being regarded as an extension of state’s national security. For countries relying on export, particularly exporting to the US, Trump 2.0 administration has imposed tariff revisions on all countries – a strategy driven from political motivation (Make America Great Again), regardless of long-established trade relations
Tariff revisions would disrupt the market, hurting manufacturers, as well as reliable suppliersThe disruption might be temporary and manageable for firms who have diversified their business models, however, firms who have not (especially the small and medium enterprises), would suffer greatly due to harsh tariffs. According to the Global Risk Report 2026, tariff fluctuation that is driven by geopolitical motives will be the number one concern in 2026 and beyond. From multinational corporation perspectives, firms will be able to grow when there is stability, predictability and to some extent, free market.
Trade will resume regardless. The underlying question is: under whose rules is international trade allowed to continue? Would it be by free market or countries’ intervention, by firms or governments, or would it be based on economic calculation or geopolitical motivation? The US tariff polemic will indicate global trade is now influenced by political alignment of superpower (US in this case) or countries who have major control.
Securitisation of AI
AI emerged as one of the most significant pillars in WEF 2026. Discussions on AI’s impact on employment are not new, WEF 2025 noted the inequality between those who are utilising it correctly and those who are utilising it incorrectly. IMF had warned that up to 40% of global jobs could be affected by AI and inequality is not only to be seen among human resources, but also extends to organisations and corporations. Despite global trends, a number of firms are yet to effectively scale AI across their operations, creating structural advantages for effective adopters and late adopters.
From a security perspective, AI still creates risks of undermining accountability, authenticity and trust between firms and end-users. In 2025, Deloitte Australia had to partially refund the Australian Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR), after it was found that the report contained AI-generated errorsThe question remains, even without proven error, how do we attribute authenticity to AI generated reports?
For Gulf security policy makers and researchers, challenges remain on the acceleration of AI adoption across defence, intelligence, and economic sectors, at the same time embedding governance and ethical utilisation to prevent abuse of technology. The UAE is actively embedding AI into most of its operation, having aspired to transform its public administration and become a global leader in AI by 2031.
For Southeast Asian security policy makers and researchers, challenges still lie in the inequality between those who are adopting AI efficiently and those who are late adopters. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s low-Human Development Index (HDI) countries, especially Cambodia and Laos, are still facing issues with internet access and undermine ASEAN’s vision for inclusive digital economy.
A Ruptured Structure or a Structure that is in Transition?
In the end, the central message of WEF 2026 is that the world is yet to enter an irreversible crisisInstead, it is in a structural transition which maximise the role of hard security considerations in the discussions of economy, technology and global trade. The trends that were discussed during the forum (unilateralism, weaponisation of trade, securitisation of AI) have led us to the need of having a collective response from governments, international organisations, multinational corporations, and SMEs to create a sustainable economic sphere for trade to prosper.
These trends reinforce a central strategic lesson i.e. states and corporate organisations can no longer rely on stability from the international system to thrive. Instead, the ability to adapt continuously, not stability, has become the new strategic anchor.
