Within the context of the Russia - Ukraine War, Moscow has significantly intensified the production and operational use of drones modeled on the Iranian Shahed platform through processes of "reverse engineering". The same type of drone has been employed by Tehran in attacks against Israel and the Gulf states beginning on 28 February 2026, targeting U.S. military bases and key economic assets across the region, including the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.
This escalating threat has compelled Ukraine to develop low-cost and multi-purpose defensive systems capable of intercepting large numbers of Russian drones launched in coordinated waves. Against this backdrop, the present analysis reviews the operational lessons derived from the Ukrainian experience and assesses how these insights could be adapted to strengthen the Gulf states’ capabilities in confronting Iranian drone attacks.
The Difficulty of Conventional Interception of Shahed-136B Drones
Ukrainian reports indicate that the Iranian Shahed-136B drone has undergone structural modifications that have enhanced its survivability. Among the most notable changes is the reinforcement of the engine compartment with protective armor to improve resistance against machine-gun fire.
Additionally, the fuel tanks, previously located in the wings, have been relocated to the drone’s central fuselage. In earlier versions, a single bullet striking either the wing or the engine could be sufficient to bring the drone down. However, following these modifications, the drone can now sustain multiple hits to its wings or body while still maintaining flight and continuing toward its designated target.
Consequently, the sole reliance on conventional machine-gun fire has become increasingly ineffective in countering the latest generation of these drones.
Integrated "Command and Control" Systems Powered byArtificial Intelligence
As drones become increasingly sophisticated, the need for effective counter-UAV solutions has become more pressing. In this context, hundreds of commercial, governmental, and military clients worldwide rely on the "Counter-UAS Command and Control (CUAS C2)" system developed by the company Dedrone to protect against the growing and persistent threat posed by drones.
The Dedrone system leverages Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (ML) technologies to conduct continuous and autonomous interrogation and verification of drones, ensuring that operators are alerted only to high-risk targets, known as "p-UAVs."
Moreover, the system provides a comprehensive capability to detect, track, identify, analyze, and mitigate drone-related threats. It can operate in field environments, airborne settings, or through cloud-based infrastructure, providing clients with a flexible and integrated architecture to counter the expanding drone threat.
Dedrone collects information from multiple sensors, analyzes the data, and initiates an appropriate response. Its software integrates with a wide range of detection technologies, making it sensor-agnostic. The platform, "DedroneTracker.AI" represents a machine-learning driven CUAS C2 solution that relies on multi-sensor fusion to deliver best-in-class real-time intelligence on more than 200 different drone types.
Ukraine’s growing success in detecting Iranian Shahed drones has largely stemmed from combining wide-area multi-spectral sensor coverage with effective tactics and technologies. In terms of equipment, Ukrainian forces have deployed a mix of mobile counter-drone air defense systems, short-range air defense integrated with electronic warfare, anti-aircraft guns such as the "ZU-23-2" and the German-made "Gepard", Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS) like "Stinger" and "Igla", as well as cost-effective laser-guided rockets such as the U.S. supplied "Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS)".
Electronic Jamming Techniques
Electronic warfare technologies, particularly "jamming" and "spoofing”, aim to neutralize the threat posed by drones. A drone that loses communication with its operator due to jamming, and simultaneously loses its positional navigation capability, will either crash or roam randomly until its battery is depleted.
However, the rapid advancement of jamming and spoofing technologies as effective counter-drone measures has pushed Ukraine to develop a visual navigation system supported by neural networks. This system enables drones to continue operating even when all radio and satellite navigation links are disrupted by jamming.
Testing of this system began in December 2025 as part of a broader shift toward "autonomous” drones capable of resisting electronic warfare interference. With tens of thousands of jamming devices now deployed along the front lines, such systems have become essential in countering drones that target not only soldiers but also armored vehicles, other drones, and industrial infrastructure.
The "Drone-Versus-Drone" Strategy as a Low-Cost Solution
According to the Ukrainian Air Force, one out of every three Russian aerial drone targets is now intercepted by unmanned interceptor drones rather than by missiles or traditional anti-aircraft guns. These drones have proven particularly effective in the capital Kyiv, where Ukrainian air command announced on 3 March 2026, that more than 70 per cent of Shahed drone interceptions in February 2026 were carried out by interceptor drones.
The economic logic behind this shift is significant. A Patriot missile costs more than $3 million, while a NASAMS missile (National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missiles) exceeds $1 million. In contrast, a Ukrainian interceptor drone costs only $3,000 to $5,000, compared with roughly $35,000 to manufacture a Shahed drone.
With a success rate exceeding 60 per cent, these interceptor drones have begun to reshape cost-exchange dynamics within Ukraine’s air defense architecture.
Their development coincided with a surge in Russian attacks using Iranian Shahed drones beginning in 2025, prompting Kyiv to dramatically expand production. Ukrainian authorities reported manufacturing 100,000 interceptor drones in 2025, increasing production capacity eightfold, and supplying front-line units with more than 1,500 drones per day during certain periods.
In February, these drones conducted approximately 6,300 interception sorties and shot down more than 1,500 Russian UAVs, making them a top procurement priority within Ukraine’s defense acquisition system.
Transferring the Ukrainian Experience and Gulf Security
Data released by Gulf defense ministries indicates that Iran relies more heavily on drones than on ballistic missiles in its attacks targeting Gulf states. The estimated number of drones launched toward the Gulf reached 1,493, compared with 551 missiles, based on statistics derived from official announcements by the defense ministries of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain between the morning of 28 February 2026 and the afternoon of 4 March 2026.
Attacks using Shahed drones rely primarily on the "drone swarming" tactic, in which dozens of drones are launched in synchronized waves to overwhelm air defense systems and force them to expend high-cost interceptor missiles, gradually exhausting defensive capacities-particularly in Gulf states that currently confront such threats at considerable financial cost.
Within the context of the ongoing Iranian confrontation, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated on Thursday, 5 March 2026, that his country had received a request from Washington to assist in addressing Iranian Shahed drones in the Middle East. Zelenskyy also announced that Ukraine would dispatch counter-drone specialists to Middle Eastern states at the request of the United States.
The Ukrainian experience demonstrates that confronting the growing threat of drones, particularly Iranian models, requires Gulf states to develop early-warning systems and strengthen critical infrastructure protection. It also underscores the importance of adopting low-cost defensive solutions that combine interceptor drones, electronic jamming, and artificial intelligence, thereby reducing reliance on expensive interceptor missiles.
