13 March 2025
The current global context is characterized by growing uncertainty and instability driven by heightened geopolitical tensions and high-intensity conflicts. This dynamic is fueling profound transformation in the global order, characterized by the emergence of new centers of power, visible in the formation of new economic blocs and shifting geopolitical alliances. Simultaneously, non-traditional actors are emerging and exercising agency in global affairs.[i] In this regard, the African Union (AU) is increasingly asserting itself as an important actor in global security governance, seeking to shape a new world order that reflects African priorities and tackles the peace and security issues dogging the continent.
This INSIGHT reflects on how the AU is navigating this new geopolitical landscape, focusing on its efforts to promote African agency in crisis diplomacy and advocate for a more just and representative global security architecture. The insights are meant for policymakers and stakeholders seeking to understand and engage with the AU’s role in promoting peace and security not just in Africa, but beyond its borders.
The Global Condition and the AU’s Agency
Global conflict is rising at an alarming rate. According to Crisis Group’s Comfort Ero, “we are in the middle of a very violent decade…[and] the year ahead is unlikely to see much of a let up.”[ii] This surge in high-intensity conflicts has serious implications for Africa.
Data from ACLED’s 2024 Conflict Index and 2025 Watchlist shows that current levels of conflict have nearly doubled since 2020[iii]. In just the past three years, the proportion of the world engulfed by conflict has grown by 65 percent – equivalent to nearly double the size of India – according to the latest Conflict Intensity Index (CII). Ongoing conflicts in places like Ukraine, Myanmar, Yemen, and elsewhere are fueling instability and humanitarian crises. Within Africa, conflicts are intensifying in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, and in volatile regions like the Sahel, the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. These conflicts have become more complex and protracted, drawing in more non-state groups and external actors from various regions, including Europe, the Middle East, and West Asia. As new conflicts emerge, older ones persist with fewer reaching comprehensive peace settlements owing to increasingly complexities.[iv]
Simultaneously, traditional alliances and geopolitical dynamics are shifting, creating uncertainty in global trade. Economic nationalism and protectionism are on the rise, disrupting trade and investment flows, while driving up the cost of doing business to a 10-year high.[v] The rivalry between the US and China is also intensifying across economic, technological, and military domains, playing out in regions like the South China Sea and Africa, and increasing the risk of conflict escalation.
The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have further exacerbated geopolitical tensions, disrupting the post-Cold War security order and raising concerns about the effectiveness of existing multilateral institutions in addressing these crises. As warring parties and their allies increasingly disregard international law and norms, the United Nations (UN) - charged with maintaining international peace and security - appears unable of acting decisively, signaling a breakdown of the multilateral system.[vi] Despite the nature of security threats rapidly changing from what they were in 1945, the UN Security Council continues to use outdated mechanisms to deal with fast-evolving crisis.
The situation in Sudan is particularly desperate and further illustrates the regionalization of the crisis of a paralysed collective peace and security system. Hostilities which began in April 2023, have intensified after the Sudanes Armed Forces (SAF) and its allied forces launched multi-pronged offensives against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) beginning in late September 2024. Neither side has managed to gain a clear advantage but still they fight on, both believing they can improve their position on the battlefield rather than through negotiations. To date, there is no single inclusive, all encompassing and legitimate AU-led peace process on Sudan. The continental body has yet to bring all the parties to the negotiating table. In fact, it is the US, Swiss and Saudi Arabia governments that seem to be at the drivers’ seat of this conflict, co-convening negotiations and relegating the AU to the role of observer.
This mix of worrying conflict trends has led to the AU’s growing agency in the governance of peace and security. Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want remains the guiding policy document of the AU’s actions. It underlines seven (7) aspirations for the future, and fifteen (15) flagship programmes. The goal of Aspiration 4 is for mechanisms for peaceful prevention and resolution of conflicts to be functional at all levels, through dialogue-centred conflict prevention and resolution that would lead to all guns being silent in Africa by 2030.
This worrying context has prompted the AU to play a prominent conflict resolution role within the continent while also increasingly involved in conflicts beyond Africa's borders. Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want[vii] - a policy document with seven aspirations for Africa’s future and fifteen flagship programs - guides its actions. Aspiration 4 aims to establish functional mechanisms for the peaceful prevention and resolution of conflicts at all levels, through dialogue-centered approaches that would lead to the silencing of all guns in Africa by 2030. Aspiration 7 positions Africa as a strong and influential global actor. Taken together, the two aspirations reflect the AU’s ambition to become a leading voice in shaping a more peaceful and secure world. Its peace efforts in Ukraine and Gaza, alongside its push for the reform of the UN Security Council exemplify its positioning as a key player in the global governance of peace and security.
AU’s Response to Global Crises
Although the AU has struggled to address conflicts within Africa, its role as a global actor, envisioned in “Agenda 2063”, continues to gain recognition, particularly following its admission into the G20.[viii] Its involvement in peace negotiations in Ukraine and its efforts to shape a positive outcome of the situation in Gaza have underscored the AU’s relevance in the pursuit of global peace and stability.
This initiative was driven by the long-standing goal of meaningful African representation in global politics, as articulated in Agenda 2063's aspiration for the continent to become a significant player on the international stage. Prior efforts by major and emerging powers such as China, Turkey, and Indonesia toward a negotiated settlement had not yielded significant results. Unsurprisingly, the African delegation's proposed 10-point plan[ix] for de-escalating the war had little chance of persuading either Ukraine or Russia to agree to a ceasefire. Still, the mediation mission represented a significant shift in the AU’s approach to non-African security issues.[x] This is despite the mission being criticized for its lack of a clear footprint[xi], as AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki was not part of the delegation. Others have argued that the mission failed because Moscow rejected most of the proposals.[xii]
Learning from its ambiguous response to the Russia-Ukraine war, the AU has adopted a clearer position on the Gaza crisis, driven by the direct and indirect impacts already felt on Africa's economic, diplomatic, and security landscape.[xiii] AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat recognized the ‘International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people’ and condemned the violence, calling for an end to hostilities. He underscored the need for international cooperation to provide humanitarian assistance to Gazans and end the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, in line with international resolutions.[xiv]
The issue of the Israel-Palestine conflict received significant attention at the 37th AU Summit, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. African leaders condemned Israel's offensive and expressed support for South Africa's case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).[xv] They urged Israel to comply with the ICJ's decisions, lift its siege on the Gaza Strip, and implement a permanent ceasefire. An AU delegation also presented an oral submission at the ICJ hearings concerning the legal status of Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories.[xvi] The AU's efforts in support of Gaza in the face of Israel's aggression highlighted the potential role the AU and its member states could play in finding a political solution to the conflict, especially given that various international actors, notably the United States, were seen as enabling Israel's actions.
However, the AU's initiatives regarding the situations in Gaza and Ukraine were met with apprehension from many African citizens who believed the AU should prioritize preventing and resolving conflicts within Africa, particularly the ongoing crisis in Sudan. To date, there is no single inclusive, comprehensive, and legitimate AU peace process in Sudan. The continental body has yet to bring all parties to the negotiating table. Instead, the US, Swiss, and Saudi Arabian governments appear to be leading the efforts, co-convening negotiations and relegating the AU to an observer role.
Notwithstanding, the AU has made modest gains in promoting peace, security, and accountable governance in Africa by enacting relevant norms and frameworks, integrating youth and women in peacebuilding at the continental level, and playing a role in mediating a two-year long conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. Furthermore, the AU has made significant progress in mobilizing financial resources for its peace activities. The AU Peace Fund surpassed its USD 400 million target in July 2024, with commitments from private sector actors bringing the total to an estimated USD 610 million (as of September 2024).[xvii] This is a significant achievement toward financial autonomy for an institution heavily reliant on external donor funding.
Additionally, the African position on financing its peace support operations (PSOs) through the UN, advocated by the A3 (the three African members of the UN Security Council), led to the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 2719 (2023).[xviii] This successful negotiation of UNSCR 2719 will increase access to UN funding for AU-led PSOs, capped at 75%, and underscores the growing strength and importance of the AU-UN partnership in a rapidly changing global context. It signifies a shift towards greater burden-sharing and recognition of the distinctive role the AU can play in addressing peace and security challenges through peacekeeping.
AU and the case for UNSC Reform
In addition to its direct engagement in conflict resolution outside Africa, the AU is taking steps to reshape global peace and security governance in line with its aspiration to become a "strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner with a significant role in world affairs" (Aspiration 7, Agenda 2063).
The AU is a strong advocate for reforming global governance, including the UN Security Council and international financial institutions, and consistently challenges undue external interference in its member states' peace and security landscape.[xix] Although half of the Council's meetings and three-quarters of resolutions discussed pertain to Africa's peace and security context, the Council's composition remains unjust and exclusionary. With over 1.4 billion people (28% of the UN's membership), Africa has no permanent seat on the UNSC. It has also consistently expressed dissatisfaction with how the permanent members (P5) exert dominance over global politics through their increasing use of the veto power. The double standards applied in the face of crises in Ukraine and Gaza have raised questions about the UNSC's utility and relevance in dealing with emerging and complex conflicts in the 21st century.
Africa’s common position on UNSC reform is articulated in the Ezulwini Consensus[xx] and the Sirte Declaration,[xxi] both adopted by the African Union in 2005. The AU prioritizes equitable partnerships and shared responsibility in global peace and security governance. This includes advocating for two permanent seats for Africa with full privileges, including veto power, and five non-permanent seats on the Security Council. In August 2024, Sierra Leone used its UNSC presidency to reiterate these demands during a high-level debate, stating that “Africa wants the veto abolished; however, if UN Member States wish to retain the veto, it must extend it to all new permanent members as a matter of justice.”[xxii]
The AU’s leading role in driving UNSC reform is gaining worldwide support. Over 140 heads of state and government (the highest ever) called for UNSC reform during the recent UN General Assembly, demonstrating strong support for a representative and effective UN system with adequate, predictable and sustainable funding. The AU’s vision for Council reform has also found support among groupings of nations across the world such as the G4 (including Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan)[xxiii], the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)[xxiv], and BRICS[xxv] which held its recent summit in Kazan, Russia, aptly themed “Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security”. While UNSC reform proponents suggest different formulas, there is growing global consensus that the Security Council is failing to maintain international peace and security and requires practical reforms to improve its effectiveness, principled application of its mandate, and representation of the global community.[xxvi]
The eventual reform of the UN system - long overdue - would reflect current geopolitical realities, ensure increased and equitable representation, address historical injustice by granting more African seats, strengthen the Council’s legitimacy, and help curb the dwindling trust in international institutions. Within a rules-based international order, this African push for UNSC reform reinforces its commitment to a rules-based international order and multilateral solutions to global challenges, and is in the interest of all.
Shaping a Secure Future for All: The AU's Transformative Role
Twenty years after its formation and a decade after the launch of Agenda 2063, the African Union (AU) is redefining its roles and prerogatives as a foreign policy actor. Recognizing that peace and security challenges transcend borders, the AU is becoming more assertive in shaping outcomes. The common African position on the UN Security Council underscores the AU's legitimate aspirations to play a greater role in the governance of peace and security within an increasingly fragmented global order. Its involvement in mediating conflicts beyond Africa, such as in Gaza and Ukraine, demonstrates its growing ambition to take on a more prominent role in international affairs.
While engaging in global crisis diplomacy is important, the AU must prioritize addressing the root causes of conflict and instability within Africa. This requires a stronger commitment to conflict prevention, mediation, and peacebuilding efforts on the continent. The AU also needs to strengthen its institutional capacity, improve coordination mechanisms, and ensure adequate resources to effectively respond to crises and implement its peace and security agenda.
To project a stronger and more unified voice on global security issues, the AU must foster greater unity and coherence among its member states, who have exhibited internal divisions and a lack of consensus on appropriate responses to continental and international crises. Finally, the AU should continue building strategic partnerships with international organizations and coalitions like BRICS, the G4, CARICOM, and the Gulf Cooperation Council, while ensuring these collaborations are mutually beneficial and aligned with Africa's priorities. In this way, the AU can solidify its position as a leading voice in global security governance and c
[i] United Nations (Juy 2023). Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 9: A New Agenda for Peace, p. 3. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/08/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-peace-en.pdf]
[ii] Comfort Ero (20 November 2024). Comfort Ero offers three lessons for peacemaking in an unstable world. Available at: https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2024/11/20/comfort-ero-offers-three-lessons-for-peacemaking-in-an-unstable-world
[iii] ACLED (12 December 2024). Conflict Watchlist 2025. Available at: https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2025/
[iv] Kaamil Ahmed (21 November 2024). World’s conflict zones increased by two-thirds in past three years, report reveals. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/nov/21/world-conflict-zones-increased-by-two-thirds-past-three-years-report-ukraine-myanmar-middle-east-africa
[v] Verisk Maplecroft (November 2024). Political Risk Outlook. Available at: https://go.maplecroft.com/pro2024
[vi] Mo Ibrahim (25 November 2024). Multilateralism faces a toxic brew of debt, climate crisis and war. It’s time for a reboot. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/nov/25/global-stability-multilateral-international-development-association-seoul-conflict-climate-crisis-debt-bretton-woods-africa
[vii] African Union (2013). Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. Available at: https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview
[viii] Hubert Kinkoh and Ueli Staeger (28 February 2024). What kind of influence can Africa wield at the G20? Available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/what-kind-of-influence-can-africa-wield-at-the-g20
[ix] Oleksandr Ignatenko (16 June 2023). South African President Ramaphosa puts forward a 10-point peace plan, Zelenskyy responds. Available at: https://svidomi.in.ua/page/south-african-president-ramaphosa-puts-forward-a-10-point-peace-plan-zelenskyy-responds
[x] Denys Reva and Priyal Singh (23 June 2023). African peace mission: one step forward, one step back? Available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/african-peace-mission-one-step-forward-one-step-back
[xi] Hubert Kinkoh and Ueli Staeger (5 July 2023). Africa’s Ukraine-Russia mediation needed a clearer AU footprint. Available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-ukraine-russia-mediation-needed-a-clearer-au-footprint
[xii] Ulf Engel (2024). The State of the Union (pp. 32-63), In Ulf Engel (ed), Yearbook on the African Union (Vol. 40). Brill: Leiden/Boston.
[xiii] Hubert Kinkoh (10 July 2024). Why the African Union should weigh in on the Gaza crisis. Available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-the-african-union-should-weigh-in-on-the-gaza-crisis
[xiv] African Union (29 November 2023). Statement of H.E. Mr. Moussa Faki Mahamat Chairperson Of the African Union Commission, The International Day of Solidarity with The Palestinian People. Available at: https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20231129/moussa-faki-mahamats-statement-palestinian-solidarity-day
[xv] International Court of Justice (24 January 2024). Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel). Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf
[xvi] African Union (28 February 2024). The African Union Delivered its Oral Statement Before the International Court of Justice for the Palestine Advisory Opinion Proceedings. Available at: https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240228/african-union-delivered-its-oral-statement-international-court-justice
[xvii] PSC Report (11 September 2024). Sustaining the African Union’s Peace Fund. Available at: https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/sustaining-the-african-union-s-peace-fund
[xviii] UN Security Council (21 December 2023). Resolution 2719 (2023). Available at: https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/420/06/pdf/n2342006.pdf
[xix] AU PSC (14 AUGUST 2023). Communiqué of the Peace And Security Council’s 1168th Meeting [PSC/PR/COMM.1168 (2023)]. Available at: https://papsrepository.africa-union.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/1920/1168.comm_en.pdf?sequence=20&isAllowed=y
[xx] African Union (March 2005). The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus. Available at: https://old.centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/Ezulwini%20Consensus.pdf
[xxi] African Union (July 2005). The Sirte Declaratoin on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations. Available at: https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/286/Assembly%20AU%20Decl%202%20%28V%29%20_E.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
[xxii] United Nations (12 August 2024). Africa Has Provided Clear, Compelling Vision for Security Council Representation, Speakers Stress in Historic Debate on Enhancing Continent’s Participation. Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15788.doc.htm
[xxiii] Jan Niklas Rolf, Niall Juval Janssen, Max Liedtke (2021). Projecting General Assembly Voting Records onto an Enlarged Security Council: An Analysis of the G4 Reform Proposal. Global Policy, 2(3): 313-324.
[xxiv] Nand Bardouille (7 October 2024). What United Nations Reform Means for the Caribbean Community. Available at: https://www.stimson.org/2024/what-united-nations-reform-means-for-the-caribbean-community/
[xxv] BRICS (23 October 2024). Kazan Declaration: Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security. Available at: https://cdn.brics-russia2024.ru/upload/docs/Kazan_Declaration_FINAL.pdf?1729693488349783
[xxvi] United Nations (September 2024). Summit of the Future Outcome Documents: Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations. Available at: https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sotf-pact_for_the_future_adopted.pdf
