The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) announced the formation of a new unit called the ‘Air Force’ in December 2025, hence increasing concerns over the use of drones and quadcopters in attacks, particularly in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province of Pakistan. Maulvi Saleem Haqqani has been appointed head of the newly established Air Force unit of TTP. Over the past few years TTP has demonstrated an emerging proficiency in the use of commercially available quadcopter drones. It is indeed a tactical shift in its capabilities and outreach. The trend mirrors a wider global pattern, where low-cost, commercially available drones are being repurposed by non-state actors from the Middle East to Eastern Europe, challenging traditional policing and counterinsurgency tactics.
TTP’s Demonstration of Drone Capabilities
The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was formed in December 2007 as an umbrella organization uniting numerous militant groups operating in Pakistan’s tribal borderland region, known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA). The group initially relied on traditional guerilla warfare methods such as ambushes, suicide bombings, roadside improvised explosive devices and targeted assassinations, which were well suited to the rugged terrain of Pakistan’s tribal areas. Recently, TTP has shifted to the use of modern technology and AI in its propaganda. While sticking to the guerilla warfare methods, Off-the-shelf availability, cost-effectiveness, and feasible retrofitting are making small drones the go-to weapon for TTP and appreciated by the leadership of the group as well. Beginning as reconnaissance tools, small drones have since been weaponized by militants. The first use was in 2024 in North Waziristan tribal district targeting security forces on the ground. In 2025, Pakistani military faced approximately 405 drone attacks by TTP and its affiliates. The majority, however, were repelled. The militants have also acquired anti-drone technology to ward off attacks by police and security forces.
Tactical Advantages of Drone Adoption for TTP
TTP affiliates have reportedly acquired Chinese commercial drones and quadcopters in Kabul, Afghanistan and tribal borderland regions in the black markets. They are also recruiting technicians and students to modify these drones to carry bombs or fire projectiles. While quadcopters have limited payload capacity, TTP has reportedly experimented with small explosive devises to be attached to drones. For instance, TTP weaponize the quadcopters with hand grenades, mortars and improvised explosive devices filled with ball bearings or pieces of iron to increase their lethality and impact. This was demonstrated in an attack in South Waziristan when a quadcopter drone was used for throwing explosives and killing three military personnel. Along with the actual damage on the ground, the psychological impact of drone usage by TTP on the security personnel can be extremely detrimental on their morale.
Along with their easy availability in informal markets, especially after the US withdrawal in 2021, drones have become easier for TTP to obtain. Commercial drones are small, quiet, and capable of low-altitude flight, thus difficult to detect using conventional radar systems. Moreover, vehicle-borne suicide attacks are costly and risky and using quadcopters is cheaper, therefore, they are used by TTP to enhance its explosive capabilities.
Additionally, the drones can be used for live footage of potential targets and of attacks from miles away. Such aerial surveillance allows militants to track troop movements, map patrol routes, and identify vulnerabilities in security perimeters. Most importantly, drones are leveraged for propaganda purposes. TTP’s social media videos clearly show the use of drones and small quadcopters to deliver explosives. Such footage shows the operational sophistication and reach of the TTP. By portraying themselves as technologically sophisticated and resilient, TTP can strengthen recruitment narrative and reinforce internal cohesion. Drone technology thus serves a dual purpose of operational enhancement and psychological influence over both supporters and opponents.
Implications for Counterinsurgency Campaign
The rapid adoption of drone technology by the TTP has been fueled by access to equipment in the informal markets in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In comparison, KP police adaptation to the drone threat was slow due to procedural requirements while attaining anti-drone technology, (which they recently attained). Earlier, police relied on snipers or improvised nets strung over police compounds to counter quadcopter drone attacks. But it is a fact that tackling this evolving threat will require more time and resource investment by Pakistan’s security forces. Advanced counter-drone technologies, such as electronic jammers or laser systems, are costly and require specialized training, hence making it challenging for both the police and military.
Moreover, the rugged terrain of the tribal borderland region makes the deployment of anti-drone jammers a logistical challenge. Most importantly, security forces in this region historically relied on checkpoints and control of roads and valleys. Low-cost drones allow TTP to bypass ground defense in its totality. They conduct aerial surveillance and strike from angles that terrain, forts, police stations and checkpoints were never designed to defend against. This erodes security forces core advantage of positional dominance.
The drone threat forces the police and army both to constantly assume that they are being watched or targeted from above. The constant stress, moreover, affects the patrolling of the security forces and reduces their operational tempo. They are required to divert manpower and resources to air-watch and concealment thus resulting in stretching already thin deployments across difficult terrain of mountainous tribal borderlands.
Amidst such a challenging scenario, adapting doctrine, technology and training of the security forces to address this threat is now essential for maintaining operational effectiveness and tactical edge against militants like TTP.
