On 3 January 2026, the United States executed a lightning military operation against Venezuela, capturing President Nicolás Maduro and transporting him to New York. The operation stunned observers with its speed and apparent precision, reinforcing long-held perceptions of overwhelming American military superiority. Central to its success was the rapid suppression of Venezuela’s integrated air defence network, which allowed U.S. forces to operate with impunity in air operations.
Yet, while the capture of Maduro and his wife, along with the neutralisation of Venezuela’s air defences, can reasonably be described as a decisive battlefield success, they do not in themselves guarantee an American victory in the broader campaign against Venezuela.
American air power was on full display during the operation. Advanced F-22 and F-35 fighters, complemented by F/A-18 strike aircraft, EA-18 electronic warfare platforms, and B-1 bombers, formed a sophisticated, layered strike package. Together, they dismantled Venezuela’s air defence system, which relied heavily on Russian equipment such as the S-300, Buk-M2E, and S-125 Pechora-2M systems. Advanced Chinese radar and anti-aircraft components reportedly deployed by Venezuelan forces also proved ineffective. From a purely operational standpoint, the United States demonstrated its ability to detect, disrupt, and destroy a modern, integrated air defence network in short order.
However, modern war cannot be understood solely through the lens of tactical or operational success. Strategic analysis is often framed through the triad of “ends, ways, and means”.
“Ends” refer to the political objectives a state seeks to achieve, such as deterrence, regime change, influence, or resource access. “Ways” is used to describe the strategies and methods employed in reaching those objectives, ranging from diplomacy and economic pressure to cyber operations, information campaigns, and military force. “Means” encompasses the resources available, including military capabilities, intelligence, economic power, and alliances.
Success in modern combat depends not on excelling in just one of these areas, but an alignment of all three while managing escalation and integrating military and non-military tools in a complex conflict environment.
In the Venezuelan case, President Donald Trump had articulated the “ends” (strategic objective) of his administration with relative clarity: it aims to gain decisive influence over Venezuelan politics and securing access to its vast oil wealth. Venezuela possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves, estimated at over 300 billion barrels, making it an enduring strategic prize of value and importance.
The United States undoubtedly has the “means” to pursue these strategic objectives, including unmatched military power, advanced intelligence capabilities, and global reach. The country also demonstrated effective “ways” in the opening phase through a rapid, high-intensity military operation that achieved its immediate goals.
Yet, the alignment between ends, ways, and means begins to disintegrate once the initial strikes are over. The capture of Maduro and the silencing of Venezuelan air defences may tempt Washington to declare victory prematurely, if the collapse of Venezuelan air power equates to strategic dominance. That assumption would be dangerously premature.
Modern conflicts are not decided solely by the destruction of enemy systems or the removal of a single leader. They are decided by political outcomes, long-term stability, legitimacy, and the willingness of the intervening power to sustain economic, military, and human costs over time.
A central question remains: can the Trump administration effectively tap, manage, and control Venezuela’s vast oil infrastructure? Even if a new, U.S.-friendly government were installed in Caracas, securing oil wells, refineries, pipelines, and export terminals would almost certainly require American troops on the ground. This is where the real challenge begins.
What started as a campaign characterised by speed, precision, and technological dominance could now evolve into a grinding war of attrition, fought in environments where America’s advantages are reduced and its vulnerabilities exposed.
Moreover, some Venezuelans may resist what they perceive as foreign domination or neo-colonial control over national resources. Nationalism has a powerful mobilising effect, particularly when external forces are seen as occupiers rather than liberators.
Elements of the Venezuelan military and security forces have long prepared contingency plans to shift toward guerrilla warfare in the event of a foreign invasion. Such a transition would fundamentally alter the character of the conflict.
American military culture rightly emphasises innovation, speed, and information dominance. Yet history offers numerous examples where those strengths have proven insufficient in hostile geography.
The Vietnam War offers a sobering historical parallel. Despite overwhelming firepower and the use of more than five million tons of bombs, the United States failed to achieve its political objectives. Hanoi ultimately prevailed not because it matched American technology, but because it outlasted the United States and proved willing to endure immense suffering over time.
Venezuelan terrain is particularly challenging: nearly two-thirds of its land mass is covered by forests, jungles, and plantations. Such environments degrade sensors, limit large military units’ mobility, and provide ample concealment for irregular forces. An adversary willing to trade space for time can transform an initial defeat into a prolonged struggle that tests endurance rather than technology.
Local resistance forces employing guerrilla tactics could harass supply lines, sabotage oil facilities, and impose a constant security burden on American troops. Protecting critical infrastructure across vast, difficult terrain would stretch U.S. forces thin and increase political and financial costs at home. Faced with hostile local populations and unforgiving geography, any external power would find it increasingly difficult to exert control over Venezuela.
The lesson is not that technology is useless, but that it is contextual. Against adaptive opponents and harsh environments, even the most advanced tools require restraint, realism, and humility. The jungle has a long memory, and it has humbled great powers before.
While the first act of the Venezuelan campaign may favour the Trump administration and its superior firepower, the final outcome is more likely to favour those able to fight time and time again and to suffer what others cannot.
