The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that the future of warfare will be shaped not by large-scale artillery alone or by high-end airpower, but increasingly by scalable, mid-range one-way strike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) capable of delivering affordable precision at scale within the 30-300 km range. This operational depth has emerged as one of the most contested and strategically decisive areas in the contemporary battlespace. Yet it remains critically underserved by current weapon systems, because beyond the 40 km range of conventional artillery, militaries typically rely on airstrikes from fighter jets or ground-launched missiles to reach targets up to 300 km away. However, the high cost of precision-guided munitions means they cannot be used freely — commanders are forced to prioritise and strike selectively, not comprehensively. The Ukrainian experience reveals both the challenges and the opportunities that arise from this gap and underscores the growing necessity of developing a new class of unmanned systems purpose-built for this role.
In the initial phases of the conflict, the tactical zone near the Line of Contact (LOC), which extended up to 30 or 40 kilometres, was dominated by first-person view (FPV) drones and quadcopters used by land brigades and specialised UAV units (Samus, 2024 February 22). Ukraine achieved notable success here, denying Russian forces direct access to forward positions and significantly shaping the battlefield through decentralised drone operations. However, as brigades combine into corps-level formations, the battlespace expands into operational depth, stretching from 30 to 300 kilometres (Kaushal, 2025 February). It is within this range that the most vital operational-level enemy assets are concentrated: command and control (C2) centres, logistical hubs, major electronic warfare (EW) systems, echeloned ground-based air defence (GBAD) and army aviation elements. The ability to strike these assets is indispensable for disrupting the adversary’s immediate operations and constraining their capacity to reinforce, resupply, and direct frontline engagements.
Despite the strategic value of this zone, there are few effective and sustainable options to address it. Traditional artillery and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) are limited in range and accuracy, especially when required to remain safely behind the LOC. Air-delivered munitions, whether precision-guided bombs or cruise missiles, are expensive, vulnerable to enemy air defences, and often come with enabling conditions such as localised air superiority. Western militaries maintain a variety of assets capable of reaching 30-300 km targets, including surface-to-surface missiles, tactical aviation, and naval platforms, however, the operational conditions in Ukraine have revealed the limitations of these systems in high-intensity, contested environments. Precision munitions remain in limited supply, and aircraft must either accept unacceptable risks or avoid contested airspace altogether.
The limitations of current systems have forced Ukraine into a suboptimal operational posture. Unable to execute sustained strikes in operational depth, Ukrainian forces have focused on tactical-level engagements, often requiring greater effort and higher casualties. Their limited inventory of long-range strike assets, such as ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles, has been employed sparingly, often on fixed infrastructure targets for attritional purposes rather than decisive operational effects (Fenbert, 2025 March 13). Meanwhile, Ukrainian tactical aviation remains largely grounded due to the density and lethality of Russian GBAD and EW networks (Bronk, 2022, November 7). In this context, Ukraine’s long-range UAVs have struggled with survivability and targeting accuracy, as most lack FPV capability and are easily disrupted by Russian jamming.
The Ukrainian case reveals a broader structural challenge likely to confront any state engaged in high-intensity warfare against a peer or near-peer adversary: the ability to reliably strike and shape the battlespace at operational depth, across a wide area, contested by layered air defence and electromagnetic denial systems. A future force must expect to face adversaries who operate dispersed, redundant C2 networks, utilise mobile logistics and fire support assets, and maintain layered air denial with capable EW systems and tactical aviation. Breaking into such an environment with traditional systems alone is both economically and operationally unsustainable.
The answer lies in developing mid-range one-way strike UAVs, particularly fast, jet-powered drones purpose-built for operating in this 30-300 km range. These systems can deliver what conventional platforms cannot: precise, survivable, and scalable strike capacity in denied environments. Unlike missiles, which are expensive and limited in number, or manned aircraft, which are risk-heavy and reliant on favourable air conditions, these UAVs are attritable by design. In short, they offer “affordable precision mass,” providing commanders with tools that can be deployed in large numbers without strategic loss. Their role is not to replace missiles or aircraft, but to complement and enable them by shaping the operational depth, disrupting enemy infrastructure, softening air defences, and delaying reinforcements.
Jet-powered UAVs in this category are already becoming feasible, thanks to advancements in propulsion, navigation, and onboard autonomy. Small jet engines with thrust ratings between 45-200 kilogram-force can power lightweight platforms capable of speeds ranging from 250 km/h up to subsonic (Mach 0.9) velocities. These speeds enhance survivability against short-range air defence systems such as man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), while maintaining the ability to carry payloads between 10-30 kg. These drones can be designed for modularity, allowing mission-specific payloads such as fragmentation warheads, shaped charges, electronic countermeasures, or even loitering reconnaissance modules.
Key to their success is not only physical performance but also functional integration into the battlespace. To operate effectively in contested electromagnetic environments, these UAVs must incorporate resilient navigation systems, such as inertial measurement units or terrain-referenced guidance, and advanced terminal seekers, including laser, infrared, or visual recognition systems. Already, some tactical drones use onboard AI to autonomously identify and engage fixed targets; scaling this to higher-speed UAVs is a realistic near-term goal (Bondar, March 6, 2025). In communications-denied areas, such autonomy enables the UAV to complete missions independently, compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline and increasing operational tempo. These platforms could plug into existing kill chains such as F2T2EA (Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess), or even execute self-contained find-fix-finish cycles.
Mass is a central component of their value. Russia’s own military doctrine, as seen in Ukraine, has embraced mass, not just in terms of personnel but in redundancy across support systems, C2 networks, and logistics. Countering such a structure requires a similarly distributed and persistent strike capability. One-way strike UAVs that are cheap and numerous can impose asymmetric costs on enemy defences. Each interception of an approximately $20,000 drone with a $1 million missile is a net strategic win (Knights & Almeida, 2022 November 10). In saturation scenarios, air defence networks become overwhelmed, radar systems are forced to cycle off, and EW assets are spread thin. This creates windows of opportunity for more expensive and decisive systems, such as cruise missiles or tactical aircraft, to operate safely and effectively.
Beyond their direct strike role, these UAVs can serve as multipurpose enablers. They can act as decoys to confuse radar systems, force premature interceptor launches, or flood visual sensors. Drones can be used to perform counter-UAV operations, targeting long-range drones such as Russia’s Shahed series or denying enemy Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. In some cases, swarm tactics could be employed to isolate and destroy high-value mobile targets, such as air defence vehicles or mobile C2 nodes. The psychological impact of facing a persistent UAV threat within operational depth should also not be underestimated; it forces adversaries to remain mobile, interrupt operations, and allocate scarce resources to rear-area defence.
The implementation of such a capability demands both organisational and doctrinal change. Current force structures are often optimised for manned airpower and conventional artillery. Dedicated UAV strike units, organised, trained, and equipped to manage a diverse family of jet-powered drones, will be necessary. These units must integrate with joint fires, EW, and intelligence assets to maximise effectiveness. At the doctrinal level, air interdiction and counterland operations need to move beyond the assumption that air superiority is guaranteed. Instead, they should be designed for contested environments where autonomous and semi-autonomous systems can operate independently to shape the battlefield.
The future operating environment will be characterised by high-density threat systems, denied airspace, and rapid shifts in tactical and operational advantage. In such a context, flexibility and survivability will determine which forces succeed. Mid-range one-way strike UAVs offer a path toward greater operational freedom, allowing friendly forces to disrupt, degrade, and dislocate adversary operations without over-reliance on scarce or vulnerable high-end assets.
The war in Ukraine has exposed critical vulnerabilities in the way modern militaries approach operational depth. It has also revealed a path forward. By investing in fast, mid-range one-way jet-powered UAVs designed specifically for this range, armed forces can not only close a strategic gap but reframe how war is conducted across depth and time. These systems offer a convergence of affordability, precision, and persistence that few legacy platforms can match. As warfare continues to evolve toward greater decentralisation and multi-domain complexity, the integration of mid-range UAVs will not just enhance existing capabilities — it will redefine them.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
Bibliography
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