Rise and Rise of the BRICS
The term BRIC was coined in 2001 by the Goldman Sachs economist, Jim O’Neill, as a means of spotlighting the emerging economic power of Brazil, Russia, India and China.[1] In the years that followed, the group developed a shared consensus of promoting economic growth and reducing the dominance of the world’s international economic and financial institutions, especially that of the United States. The BRIC union was officially launched on the margins of the 2009 United Nations General Assembly, and one year later the acronym expanded by the letter ‘S’ to become the BRICS, reflecting South African membership.[2] In 2023, a further six countries were invited to join, with four, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, officially joining in January 2024. Argentina declined its invitation after the election of new President Javier Milei, and Saudi Arabia is still considering whether to join.[3] Indonesia increased the BRICS membership to 10 when it joined in January 2025.[4] The BRICS expansion has been welcomed by the existing membership, especially Russia, which is desperate for new friends since Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
To the surprise of Western observers, developing countries are queuing to join the BRICS, with reportedly more than 40 expressing an interest in membership.[5] This is likely due to the South’s frustration over deteriorating domestic growth and trading conditions, and the perception that the BRICS’ growing global influence represents a “coming-of-age” for the South and a genuine alternative to perceived U.S. hegemony. This narrative has now begun to act as a powerful legitimising tool for recruitment. To tap this potential the BRICS introduced an intermediate “partnership” status, a stepping stone to full membership, at its summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024.[6] Partner states are eligible to participate in BRICS Annual Summits and Foreign Ministers’ meetings and endorse Joint Declarations. At Kazan, 13 countries were invited to become BRICS partners, with nine — Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Nigeria — accepting and officially becoming BRICS partner countries on January 1, 2025.[7] The four remaining invitee countries — Algeria, Nigeria, Turkey, and Vietnam — had not given a formal response by the end of 2024.
In the present chaotic and unpredictable trading environment, the popularity of BRICS is perhaps unsurprising, not least because the group offers the economically vulnerable South nations an “oven-ready” sanctuary against Washington’s capricious and belligerent policies. The purpose of this Insight article is to examine the growing role, impact and anticipated intensification of influence of BRICS following the group’s significant recent expansion. Following this critical overview, the paper then evaluates the case of the UAE, one of the recent “middle powers” joining the BRICS. A conclusions section closes the study.
Polemics and Paradoxes
The BRICS’ development solution appeals to countries in the South for several reasons. The group represents a disconnect from Europe’s tainted colonial legacy and constant Western hectoring on human rights violations, but more importantly it could replace the U.S.-dominated international rules-based order, made up of organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation, with a new regime sympathetic to the “Global South.” The body has the potential to change the world, but such optimism needs to be managed, because while the BRICS has worked hard to burnish its credentials as a force for change, two major weaknesses are evident.
Firstly, the enhanced BRICS is a heterogeneous group of states exhibiting no obvious religious, cultural, ideological, economic, or geographical commonalities. Enmity has been more evident amongst members than amity, which is evident in the longstanding mistrust between the Gulf states and Iran, the bitter dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the latter’s newly constructed Renaissance Dam, or memories of the 1962 border war between India and China as well as the two countries’ opposing views over Pakistan. While Russia, Iran and China consistently adopt a hardline anti-Western posture, Brazil, Indonesia and India have pursued a more neutral diplomatic stance. These tensions may make unified and cohesive policy positions more difficult to achieve.
The second BRICS frailty is that over the last 14 years it has suffered from an enduring policy stasis, heavy on symbolism and light on substance. This criticism is fair, though the BRICS has nevertheless laid the ground for a growing latticework of intergovernmental cooperation leading to several agreements. For example, a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) was established in 2014, with initial funding of $100bn intended to provide liquidity for member states under financial stress.[8]A year later, the New Development Bank (NDB) was established, with a strategy to invest some 40% of project approvals in environmentally sustainable and climate mitigation projects in emerging and developing member countries, increasingly financed through local currencies.[9] There are also many work-in-progress projects that could enjoy increased momentum following the 2024-25 BRICS expansion. These projects include the toppling of the presently stressed U.S. dollar to create a unified BRICS currency, a proposal spearheaded by Brazil that has struggled to gain traction but has been revived amid speculation that the CRA could represent the basis for the common currency. BRICS has also pursued multi-currency trade, with some Chinese and Russian international transactions already being undertaken through the Yuan and Ruble, and other member states trading through local currencies. Other proposals that are being developed include: a zero-tariff policy for lesser-developed countries having diplomatic ties with Beijing,[10] and a BRICS Pay initiative, representing a direct challenge to the SWIFT international payments network, largely conducted in U.S. dollars.[11] More speculatively, BRICS may seek to affiliate the group with the Latin America free trade association, MERCOSUR, and in the future even ASEAN.[12]
Re-pivoting of 21st Century Geoeconomic Power?
For the BRICS to be seen as a viable alternative to the present trading system, economic power is essential, and this is what the group’s recent expansion has delivered. World Economic Forum data highlight that the BRICS 10 member and nine partner states account for 55% of the world’s population and 46% of global GDP.[13] Over the last decade, China and India alone have accounted for 47% of global growth.[14] In 2024, growth of BRICS nations averaged around 4% compared to barely 1% for G7 countries.[15] By 2026, the BRICS’ share of world trade is expected to surpass that of the G7.[16] This divergent growth trajectory is likely to continue, given that the BRICS comprise some of the fastest growing regions, including five of Africa’s largest economies as well as major economies in Central and Southeastern Asia. It is predicted that in 10-15 years’ time, China will become the world’s leading economic power, India will be third, Indonesia, number five, and partners Malaysia, Nigeria and Thailand will move up into the top 20.[17] Although the official BRICS narrative emphasises multilateralism, cooperation, and fair global development, the concern is that the group serves primarily as an instrument of China to project power and influence. China accounts for two-thirds of the group’s GDP and intra-BRICS trade.[18] The country is the primary trade partner of Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and also holds significant investments in these nations.[19] Most BRICS member states are directly or indirectly involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has reportedly already channelled an estimated $1tn into projects from Central Asia to Latin America, and could eventually total $8tn.[20] While not an official BRI member, Brazil, who took over the presidency of BRICS this year, has become a key partner due to its role as a central food supplier.[21] China achieves this through a combination of rhetoric and by using the BRICS as a special trade platform linked to the BRI.[22] A future, more formal, BRICS-BRI liaison will have profound implications on international trade and investment.
UAE, and the emergence of ‘Middle Powers’
The selective expansion of BRICS membership across 2024-25 reflects the group’s potential to change the international order, and its attraction is likely to increase following President Trump’s disruption of the global economy. The perception of economic bullying could fuel further alienation of the U.S. capitalist model, accelerating the emergence of “middle-powers” as crucial actors in an evolving multipolar landscape.
The term middle powers is imprecise and contested, but is generally interpreted to refer to states that sit below superpower status and wield significant economic and strategic influence.[23] Recently, there has been a growing acceptance that middle powers also include emerging states possessing strong economic influence through the holdings of resources, such as energy and critical minerals.[24] This interpretation reflects the composition of BRICS member and partner states. For instance, the two new recruits, Indonesia and Nigeria, possess the world’s fourth largest (280mn) and Africa’s largest (220mn) population, and both are enormously attractive markets for trade and investment in oil and gas.[25] BRICS, itself, includes five of the world’s top 10 crude oil producers, including Russia, which ranks third, China, fourth, Iran, seventh, the UAE, eighth, and Brazil, ninth.[26] BRICS countries are also major suppliers of critical minerals. Indonesia, for example, is the world’s largest nickel producer, with Russia ranking third, China seventh, Brazil eighth, and Cuba ninth.[27] BRICS countries are also among the world’s leading producers of iron ore, with Brazil ranking second, China third, India fourth, Russia fifth, South Africa eighth, Kazakhstan ninth, and Iran tenth.[28] BRICS members also play a dominant role in global copper production with China ranking third, Russia seventh, Indonesia ninth, and Kazakhstan twelfth.[29]
This growing resource strength suggests that middle powers like the UAE are developing the political and economic muscle to be heard on the international stage, and that membership in BRICS is an outlet to flex this muscle. In line with its reputation for considered and measured statecraft, Abu Dhabi’s decision to join BRICS was not a sudden whim, but the result of gradual efforts to strengthen economic and diplomatic ties with the group. Prior to its official membership in January 2024, the UAE had joined the NDB in October 2021, and in June 2023 participated in the Friends of BRICS Forum in Cape Town, held as part of the Foreign Ministers Meeting.[30] Two months later, the Abu Dhabi government received an invitation to join the BRICS. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.H. Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, stated:
“The UAE’s successful application to join the BRICS, forms part of [its] commitment to promote constructive dialogue through active platforms that represent the developing and emerging economies, and the country’s focus on long-term economic prosperity and maintaining balanced [italics added] strategic and economic relations – including with international organisations in an ever-evolving world order.” Significantly, his Highness went on to state… “The UAE has consistently championed the value of multilateralism in supporting peace, security and development globally.”[31]
The UAE views BRICS membership as generating diverse opportunities to enhance trade relations with the Global South. Indeed, as one of the few nations managing a sovereign wealth capital exceeding a trillion U.S. dollars, the UAE is a major shareholder in the NDB.[32] BRICS membership does not mean the UAE is intending to pivot away from the U.S., rather, as Dr. Anwar Gargash, the Diplomatic Adviser to the UAE President, states: the “UAE is strategically turning its attention eastward to cultivate partnerships with countries such as India, Japan, China, South Korea, and Indonesia.”[33] This will enhance the country’s profile on the world stage and secure an equal and impartial role within an albeit fractious partnership. As a “neutral” middle power, the UAE has the potential to play an important intermediary role in the reconciliation of internal BRICS diplomatic disputes. Notably, the UAE perceives no conflict between its West and East relations but concedes that the increasing misconception of the nature and scope of Global South activities can create a significant setback for more constructive North-South cooperation. Engaging with the Global South effectively requires the Global North to recognise and adapt to these changing geopolitical realities, focusing on mutual benefits and a respect for national sovereignty.
BRICS Membership enables the UAE to influence global policies on energy security, sustainable development, and trade, offering a platform to amplify its voice in global decision-making processes and reduce reliance on Western institutions. Mohamed Saif Al Suwaidi, Director General of Abu Dhabi Fund, argues “that in addition to financing, the UAE is focused on knowledge transfer and capacity-building, helping to share the country’s expertise in key sectors such as renewable energy, logistics, and agriculture to accelerate development in BRICS countries.”[34] The UAE is also increasingly focusing on high-value sectors, such as space, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and finance, with the latter essential for the lubrication of economic activity. Additionally, the UAE seeks to address the US$4tn global infrastructure gap, channelling investments into critical projects like ports, airports, and logistics hubs, solidifying its role as a global trade leader.[35] BRICS membership will reduce reliance on other economic partnerships as well as enabling diversification from the energy sector, which is essential if the UAE is to achieve its goal of doubling national income by 2030. As such, Younis Haji Al Khoori, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, highlighted that the UAE’s accession to BRICS is in line with the “We the UAE 2031” vision, which aims to position the country as a key player in global economic cooperation.[36]
Conclusion
This paper’s analysis suggests that the BRICS message is gaining traction across the global South, potentially leading to further expansion in the future. The BRICS rising popularity is due to it providing a forum where individually and collectively the medium powers’ voices can be heard. There is also a sense that compared to the emerging superpowers of China and India, the U.S. is in decline, bedevilled by political friction, social division, structural inefficiency, and led by a political elite focused on a parochial mentality. In a related sense, there is the parallel belief that the growing comparative advantage of China and India in digitization, information systems, and AI will provide more effective access to these technologies. This has led to optimism that a strong BRICS can act to circumvent the perceived technology transfer barriers erected by Western multinational corporations and thus contribute to a “levelling-up” of the industrial capabilities between South and North.
Nevertheless, BRICS membership does come with possible downsides for the West, such as the widely held view that an expanded BRICS represents a counter to the G7. Yet, the reality is that the enlarged group will more closely resemble the amorphous G20, which operates without a secretariat and legal authority for decision-making, and often in the absence of consensus. If the BRICS similarly evolves, especially when combined with member-dissonance, then a lack of policy consensus and foreign policy drift will be the likely result.
In its efforts to be a friend to both Moscow and Beijing and Washington, the UAE is acutely aware it will need to take a middle-path to avoid loss of Western trust and friendship. Accordingly, the Abu Dhabi government highlights diplomatic caution, prioritizing the pursuit of what the Minister of Foreign Affairs has called “balanced strategic and economic relations.” A narrative based on reconciliation, compromise and cooperation must therefore be adopted, positioning the country between the extreme postures of the Global North and South. Yet, impartial diplomacy will not be easy, given Washington’s determination to maintain the status quo and Moscow’s anti-Western rhetoric in response to its involuntary isolation and pariah status.
Similarly, the UAE should pursue balanced diplomacy in response to China’s claim of acting as the voice of the Global South while populating the BRICS with Sino-centric partners, thus creating the danger of skewing policy positions in favour of Beijing’s strategic objectives. The UAE must also reconcile the diverse economic and political priorities of BRICS membership with potential friction from Western allies, viewing contemporary UAE foreign policy as representing a shift from its traditional Western partnerships. The UAE’s pragmatic approach will help to navigate these conflicting dynamics in pursuit of fostering a more equitable, multipolar global order. Achieving balanced strategic and economic relations in an enlarged BRICS will be challenging, requiring wise UAE statecraft, but this is a quality already demonstrated in abundance during recent decades of “neutral” diplomacy.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[1] Ferragamo, Mariel, ‘What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding?’ Council on Foreign Relations (December 12, 2024). What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding? Council on Foreign Relations.
[2] ‘IN 2010 BRICS was Established Including South Africa,’ The Banking Association South Africa (October 8, 2015). IN 2010 BRICS WAS ESTABLISHED INCLUDING SOUTH AFRICA
[3] Norton, Ben, ‘BRICS grows, inviting 13 new ‘partner countries’ at historic summit in Kazan, Russia,’ Geopolitical Economy (October 26, 2024). BRICS grows, inviting 13 new ‘partner countries’ at historic summit in Kazan, Russia - Geopolitical Economy Report
[4] Stewart, Patrick and Hogan, Erica, ‘BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (March 31, 2025). BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
[5] Papa, Mihaela, ‘The Magnetic Pull of BRICS,’ Africa Policy Research Institute (December 3, 2024). The magnetic pull of BRICS - Africa Policy Research Institute (APRI).
[6] Norton, Ben, ‘BRICS grows, inviting 13 new ‘partner countries’ at historic summit in Kazan, Russia,’ Geopolitical Economy (October 26, 2024). BRICS grows, inviting 13 new ‘partner countries’ at historic summit in Kazan, Russia - Geopolitical Economy Report
[7] Ibid.
[8] ‘The Premier Bank for Emerging Economies,’ New Development Bank (u/d). About NDB - New Development Bank
[9] Scaling Up Development Finance for a Sustainable Future, New Development Bank General Strategy for 2022-26, (2022). NDB_StrategyDocument_eVersion.pdf
[10] Ryanto, Abby, ‘The BRICS bloc is growing — and Trump’s tariff threat isn’t expected to put off aspiring members,’ CNBC (January 17, 2025). The BRICS bloc is growing — and Trump’s tariff threat isn’t expected to put off aspiring members
[11] Crowe, Chris, ‘BRICS expansion into payment systems poses threat to dominance of US dollar,’ Guardian Business (January 13, 2025). BRICS expansion into payment systems poses threat to dominance of US dollar | The Guardian
[12] ‘BRICS in 2025: Brazil to Set the Key Priorities,’ Joint Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the BRICS Member States (January 9, 2025). BRICS in 2025: Brazil to Set the Key Priorities
[13] Holtzmann, Hans-Dieter and van der Voort, Akim, ‘BRICS - What are the key issues for 2025?,’ Friedrich Naumann Foundation (January 28, 2025). BRICS: BRICS 2025
[14] The Intel Drop, ‘Beyond Scepticism: Understanding the Role of Brics+ in Global Progress’ (January 20, 2025). Beyond Scepticism: Understanding the Role of Brics+ in Global Progress - THE INTEL DROP
[15] Ibid.
[16] Al-Kebi, Ebtesam, ‘The UAE’s BRICS Membership: A Growing Role for the Global South,’ Valdai (February 6, 2024). The UAE’s BRICS Membership: A Growing Role for the Global South — Valdai Club
[17] The Intel Drop, ‘Beyond Scepticism: Understanding the Role of Brics+ in Global Progress’ (January 20, 2025). Beyond Scepticism: Understanding the Role of Brics+ in Global Progress - THE INTEL DROP
[18] Huland, Gabriel, ‘Brics: growth of China-led bloc raises questions about a rapidly shifting world order,’ The Conversation (January 29, 2025). Brics: growth of China-led bloc raises questions about a rapidly shifting world order
[19] Ibid.
[20] ‘Major Infrastructure Investments by BRICS: Projects Reshaping Geopolitics and Global Supply Chains,’ BRICS Today (March 9, 2025). Major Infrastructure Investments by BRICS: Projects Reshaping Geopolitics and Global Supply Chains - BRICS TODAY
[21] Ibid.
[22] Huland, Gabriel, ‘Brics: growth of China-led bloc raises questions about a rapidly shifting world order,’ The Conversation (January 29, 2025). Brics: growth of China-led bloc raises questions about a rapidly shifting world order
[23] Elliot, David, ‘Middle powers: what are they and why do they matter?’ World Economic Forum (January 26, 2024). What are middle powers and why do they matter? | World Economic Forum
[24] Ibid.
[25] Holtzmann, Hans-Dieter and van der Voort, Akim, ‘BRICS - What are the key issues for 2025?,’ Friedrich Naumann Foundation (January 28, 2025). BRICS: BRICS 2025; Indonesia in BRICS: Power Shift in South East Asia, BRICS Today (February 26, 2025). Indonesia in BRICS: Power Shift in South East Asia - BRICS TODAY
[26] Norton, Ben, ‘, ‘BRICS expands with new partner countries. Now it’s half of world population, 41% of global economy,’ Geopolitical Economy (December 25, 2024). BRICS expands with new partner countries. Now it’s half of world population, 41% of global economy - Geopolitical Economy Report
[27] Ibid.
[28] Venditti, Bruno and Parker, Sam, ‘Visualizing the World’s Largest Iron Ore Producers,’ Visual Capitalist (October 11, 2022). Visualizing the World’s Largest Iron Ore Producers
[29] Venditti, Bruno and Dander, Alejandra, ‘Ranked: The World’s Largest Copper Producers,’ Visual Capitalist (December 1, 2022). Ranked: The World’s Largest Copper Producers
[30] ‘UAE Engages in BRICS Meeting to Foster Global Financial Cooperation 2024,’ AHG (u/d). UAE Engages in BRICS Meeting to Foster Global Financial Cooperation 2024
[31] ‘United Arab Emirates Joins BRICS Group,’ UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs (August 28, 2023). United Arab Emirates joins BRICS Group
[32] Al-Kebi, Ebtesam, ‘The UAE’s BRICS Membership: A Growing Role for the Global South,’ Valdai (February 6, 2024). The UAE’s BRICS Membership: A Growing Role for the Global South — Valdai Club
[33] Ibid.
[34] ‘UAE Leverages BRICS Membership to Boost Global Trade Resilience, Infrastructure Leadership,’ The Intel Drop (February 14, 2025). UAE Leverages BRICS Membership to Boost Global Trade Resilience, Infrastructure Leadership - THE INTEL DROP
[35] ‘UAE Leverages BRICS Membership to Boost Global Trade Resilience, Infrastructure Leadership,’ The Intel Drop (February 14, 2025). UAE Leverages BRICS Membership to Boost Global Trade Resilience, Infrastructure Leadership - THE INTEL DROP
[36] Mayyeria, Shahba, ‘UAE’s BRICS Membership: A Strategic Move for Global Economic Cooperation,’ Focus (April 16, 2025). UAE’s BRICS Membership: A Strategic Move for Global Economic Cooperation
