Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Central Asian states share historical, cultural and religious ties as well as security concerns, yet these two regional blocs have only seriously started to strengthen their cooperation and partnership since the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict triggered new alliances to be formed. Since 2022, the regions have held three ministerial meeting and one high-level summit involving heads of state (Jeddah 2023). The second presidential meeting was scheduled to be held in Samarkand in May 2025 but was postponed.[1]
This GCC-Central Asia cooperation represents a new model of regional diplomacy that aims to legitimize the creation of an emerging bloc in the global south able to navigate the complexity of the current reshaped geopolitical scenario and contribute to greater regional and international security and stability.[2]
From the Central Asian perspective, the development of deepened relations with the GCC is coherent with a traditional multi-vectorial foreign policy aimed at expanding cooperation with other strategic actors to balance Sino-Russian influence in the region. An improved dialogue with the GCC could allow Central Asian countries to access new markets and attract investments to develop their renewable energy and infrastructure sectors.
For Gulf countries, the interest to deepen ties with Central Asia is linked to their strategic plans for a post-oil economy. To accomplish this move away from oil, the GCC wants to reshape its role in the international landscape and become a trade and financial hub connecting Asia and Europe.
Central Asian and Gulf countries have chosen to promote a collective approach on political, economic and security spheres as opposed to a bilateral approach. This regional bloc approach appears to be a trend, especially for Central Asian countries. The C5 bloc, for example, promotes dialogue with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. If the Central Asian bloc wanted to create a separate dialogue with China, the United States, Japan, Italy, or Germany, it would be called “C5+1.” Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov also proposed a“C5+a regional bloc,” which would pair the C5 countries with, for example, the GCC, European Union, or ASEAN,.[3]
The process of institutionalisation of the GCC-Central Asia cooperation
The current level of upgraded cooperation has been the result of a long-term rapprochement between these two blocs, which began with the diplomatic recognition of Central Asia’s independence after 1991. The role of GGC countries in Central Asia was marginal in the 1990s compared to Russia, U.S., Turkey, and Iran, which were able to extend political and economic influence in the region by exploiting economic, cultural, religious, linguistic, and historical links. In the last 20 years, cooperation between Central Asia and the GCC has expanded in trade, culture, education, development of irrigation systems and modernization of agriculture infrastructures, security and counterterrorism in addition to the initiatives in the oil and gas sector and humanitarian aid. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been the main recipients of humanitarian aid and education initiatives, which have been focused on improving the living conditions of school children, student exchange programs, and providing food aid.
In 2014, the meeting of Arab League-Central Asia foreign ministers represented the first attempt to promote a multilateral framework of the relations.[4]
The institutionalisation of the cooperation between the blocs was enshrined with the first GCC-C5 (Central Asia) Strategic Dialogue meeting in Riyadh on September 7, 2022. The meeting involved only foreign ministers and culminated in the adoption of 2023-2027 Joint Action Plan for Strategic Dialogue and Cooperation, which identified politics, security, economics and investment as domains for collaboration. The parties also agreed to share best practices in the realms of media, sports, tourism, youth affairs, culture, education. [5]
The July 19, 2023, GCC-C5 summit in Jeddah was a historical milestone in region-to-region cooperation, as it brought together all five Central Asian presidents with high-ranking political authorities of the Gulf. The meeting was driven by a shared interest of the participants to increase their role within a multilateral international system given geopolitical turbulences.[6] Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Mohammed bin Salman, summed up the political guidelines that drive this new cooperation when he said: “The challenges confronting our world demand collective action.” In his speech he referred specifically to challenges affecting energy security and global food supply chains and stressed the need to respect the sovereignty and independence of states and to refrain from interference in their internal affairs.[7]
In the joint statement GCC and C5 leaders expressed their commitment to preserve regional and international stability and ensure security in the areas of transportation and communication, food, energy, and water. They also agreed to develop renewable energy sources and green technologies together in order to create business and investment opportunities and increase trade exchange.[8]
For Central Asian republics, the growing interest of the GCC towards the region is seen as a promising opportunity for investment. Uzbekistan President Mirziyoyev proposed the creation of a joint investors’ council and a potential free trade area among the regions as well as GCC involvement in the realization of the Trans-Afghan Railway project. Kyrgyz President Japarov expressed a similar request concerning the realization of the Kyrgyz segment of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway corridor (CKU) and for the development of the Kambarata Hydropower plant.[9]
In April 2024, GCC and C5 foreign ministers attended the second “Central Asia–GCC Strategic Dialogue” in Tashkent; the third was held in Kuwait in April 2025. Both meetings continued negotiations on deepening trade relations through sustainable and resilient supply chains. Transportation security is especially important in this regard given current global threats.[10]
Key areas of cooperation and geopolitical implications
One of the main reasons to expand trade and promote economic cooperation between the GCC and C5 is that the economies of the regions complement each other. While Gulf countries are interested in importing minerals and metals such as copper, gold, iron, and steel from Central Asia, the C5 countries want to attract financial investments to ensure the growth of their national economies.
While investments from GCC countries into Central Asia have tripled since 2022, however, the trade turnover between the blocs remains extremely low, accounting for less than 1 percent of the GCC’s global trade and less than 2 percent of Central Asia’s.[11] At the same time, both parties aim to diversify their economies, which are mainly based on raw materials. C5 countries want to develop commercial sectors such as manufacturing, and agriculture and improve their transportation infrastructures, whereas Gulf countries are increasingly prioritizing green technologies, digitalization, artificial intelligence, and tourism.
Food security has emerged as another relevant field in which to improve bilateral cooperation between the GCC and the C5. Central Asian states could increase crop production with modern technological support, while Gulf countries are vulnerable to food insecurity because of their heavy dependence on imports, which account for 85 percent of their total food.[12]
Another promising field for the strategic partnership to cooperate in is technology. In a post-oil economy, Gulf countries will need to ensure access to Central Asia’s huge deposits of rare earths and critical raw minerals (CRM) for green energy and defence. Central Asia holds 38 percent of the world’s reserves of manganese, 30.7 percent of chromium, and 20 percent of lead, and has other minerals such as zinc, titanium, copper, cobalt, and molybdenum.[13] During the recent GCC-C5 strategic summit in Kuwait, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu noted that his country has more than 5,000 mineral deposits with a total estimated value exceeding US$46 trillion and invited his Gulf partners to participate in full cycle of CRM and rare earth joint projects, from exploration to processing and innovative applications.[14]
The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain want to achieve carbon neutrality between 2050-2060, so they have focused on developing Central Asia’s significant RES potential to help in the energy transition process.
Two big Gulf-based renewable energy companies — Saudi ACWA Power and Masdar from the UAE — have already committed to start several projects in the region. ACWA Power agreed to invest US$13.5 billion in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan’s clean-energy sectors and signed a power purchase agreement to construct Central Asia’s largest wind plants and storage facilities in Uzbekistan. Masdar signed an agreement to build three solar photovoltaic (PV) power plants in Uzbekistan and has started to develop a 200MW PV solar plant in Kyrgyzstan, while also exploring hydropower projects in Tajikistan.[15]
The promotion of transport infrastructure to link Gulf countries with Central Asia also represents a promising field of cooperation with mutual gains for both parties. GCC countries have expressed interest in participating in the construction of the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan and CKU railways, which are overland transport corridors crossing the region. This would enable the delivery of goods from Pakistani ports to the Gulf region crossing the Indian Ocean..[16]
These corridors could transport CRM, rare earth minerals, and agricultural products to bolster GCC food security, while Central Asian states could gain access to global markets from GCC ports, reducing their dependence on Chinese and Russian-controlled export routes. Furthermore, these routes will deliver goods and services from the GCC to Eurasian markets, gradually diversifying away from a dependence on oil exports.
According to the Jeddah declaration, GCC and C5 heads of state consider security and stability a priority of their partnership and want to coordinate efforts to eradicate terrorism and extremism. Bilateral agreements in this area have been signed in the past, including Uzbekistan’s Anti-Terrorism Cooperation Pact with Saudi Arabia in 2024, Kazakhstan’s military cooperation with Qatar in 2025, and an MoU to combat terrorism financing between Kazakhstan and the UAE in December 2023.[17]
For C5 leaders, the presence of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan is perceived as a potential threat who could delay or freeze infrastructure projects and discourage international investments. For Central Asian states, the GCC offers critical counterterrorism expertise and intelligence-sharing capabilities to help address this concern. For the GCC, Iran’s recent threat to close the strategic chokepoint of Hormuz further emphasizes the importance of a strategic partnership with Central Asia and others to implement a trans-regional security architecture.
Moreover, a comprehensive cooperation in connectivity, trade corridors, green energy transition, and CRM supply chains will allow to Gulf countries and Central Asian states to preserve a strategic autonomy in the reshaped geopolitical scenario, acting as influential players within a multilateral system of international relations.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
References:
[1] Kun.Uz, “Central Asia–GCC summit in Samarkand postponed, May 1, 2025, https://kun.uz/en/news/2025/05/01/central-asia-gcc-summit-in-samarkand-postponed
[2] News Central Asia, “Gulf Cooperation Council – Central Asia: A New Model of Regional Diplomacy”, April 18, 2025, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2025/04/18/gulf-cooperation-council-central-asia-a-new-model-of-regional-diplomacy/
[3] The Caspian Post, “Turkmenistan Proposes "Central Asia + ASEAN" Format”, December 23, 2024, https://caspianpost.com/turkmenistan/turkmenistan-proposes-central-asia-asean-format
[4] News Central Asia, “Gulf Cooperation Council – Central Asia: A New Model of Regional Diplomacy”, April 18, 2025, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2025/04/18/gulf-cooperation-council-central-asia-a-new-model-of-regional-diplomacy/
[5] Gulf Research Center (2024) GCC-Central Asia Relations: Developing Regional Cooperation, GRC Research and Analysis, April 2024, https://www.grc.net/documents/661e6acd01ac8DevelopingGCCCISRelations2.pdf
[6] Battaloğlu, Nesibe Hicret and Bülent Aras (2023) Central Asia-GCC Relations: Exemplary Cooperation within Global South, GULF STUDIES CENTER Policy Brief Cluster: Politics and Security, September 15 2023, https://www.qu.edu.qa/siteimages/static_file/qu/research/gulf%20studies/documents/policy%20brief%2015.pdf
[7] Al Arabiya English, “Saudi Crown Prince declares adoption of decisions issued by GCC-Central Asia summit”, July 19, 2023, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2023/07/19/GCC-Central-Asia-summit-begins-in-Jeddah
[8] Saudi Press Agency, “GCC-Central Asia Summit Issues Joint Statement”, Saudi Press Agency, July 19, 2023, https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/885fda0640u
[9] News Central Asia, “Gulf Cooperation Council – Central Asia: A New Model of Regional Diplomacy”, April 18, 2025, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2025/04/18/gulf-cooperation-council-central-asia-a-new-model-of-regional-diplomacy/
[10] Saudi Press Agency, “Joint Statement Issued Following GCC-Central Asia Strategic Dialogue Second Ministerial Meeting”, April 15, 2024, https://spa.gov.sa/en/N2083189
[11] Sager, Abdulaziz and Eldor Aripov (2025) Central Asia and the GCC: from historical ties to strategic partnership, Arab News, April 27, 2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2598578/central-asia-and-gcc-historical-ties-strategic-partnership
[12] Ibidem
[13] Vakulchuk, Roman and Indra Overland (2021), Central Asia is a missing link in analyses of critical materials for the global clean energy transition. One Earth, 4(12), 1678-1692, 2021, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332221006606
[14] Omirgazy, Dana (2025) “Central Asia, Gulf Countries Deepen Strategic Partnership at Kuwait Meeting”, The Astana Times, April 17, 2025, https://astanatimes.com/2025/04/central-asia-gulf-countries-deepen-strategic-partnership-at-kuwait-meeting/
[15] Ali, Toghrul (2023) Forging Regional Ties: Gulf Countries and Central Asia’s Growing Importance, Caspian Policy Center, July 28, 2023, https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/security-and-politics-program-spp/forging-regional-ties-gulf-countries-and-central-asias-growing-importance; Wajid, Asna (2023) The diplomatic surge between the GCC and Central Asian states, IISS Online Analysis, International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 13, 2023, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2023/11/the-diplomatic-surge-between-the-gcc-and-central-asian-states/
[16] Saudi Press Agency, “Joint Statement Issued Following GCC-Central Asia Strategic Dialogue Second Ministerial Meeting”, April 15, 2024, https://spa.gov.sa/en/N2083189
[17] Mamedov, Eldar (2025) “The GCC and Central Asia: In Search of Strategic Autonomy”, The National Interest, May 28, 2025, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/silk-road-rivalries/the-gcc-and-central-asia-in-search-of-strategic-autonomy
