22 January 2025
Unexpectedly, and in plain sight, there has been a revolution in air power affairs. For a long time, air forces principally comprised manned aircraft and their training and support structures. This model has been quietly gradually expanding as rockets, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and drones entered service. The sudden use of small, low-cost drones in very large numbers in the Ukraine War is now attracting much attention but this focussed interest has obscured a more fundamental shift that is much larger than drones alone. Air operations have now decisively shifted from being homogeneous in nature to being heterogeneous.
This shift looms large in the combat air operations currently underway. An extraordinary diversity of rocket, missile and drone systems have been used in conflicts by Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas over the last year. Equally striking has been that this employment has been large-scale, enduring and rapidly intensifying.
Heterogenous air power is now being regularly used by both states and non-state actors in well-coordinated, large-scale offensive air operations. Hamas’s assault on October 7, 2023 involved thousands of numerous types of ballistic rockets, commercial drones modified to drop ordnance, al-Zouari loitering drones and paragliders. The Houthis now attack ships using sequenced attacks comprising multiple types of drones, ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles. In its attack on April 13/14, 2024, Iran fired some 170 drones, 120 ballistic missiles, and 350 rockets (Agencies, 2024).
Meanwhile, large states are similarly active as illustrated in the February 7, 2024 attack by Russia on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Just one of many, this well-coordinated air operation involved 63 Shahed-136 and -131 attack and decoy drones; 12 Iskander-M ground-launched ballistic missiles; 40 Kh-101/Kh-555 air-launched subsonic cruise missiles; five Kh-22 air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles used in a secondary land attack mode; seven Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic missiles; two Kh-59 air-to-surface guided missiles; and 22 S-300/S-400 surface-to-air missiles used in a secondary land attack mode (Meduza, 2024).
The ability to create and employ such large-scale packages of diverse air assets has traditionally been restricted to the US. Indeed, some argue that Russia’s Aerospace Forces (VKS) failed in the early days of the Ukraine War because it could not build large air combat packages of different types of manned of aircraft (Galamison and Petersen, 2023). Heterogenous air power has overturned this convention and now allows most states and non-state actors to devise and use large offensive and defensive air packages.
Future air wars will clearly now often involve well-coordinated, large-scale heterogenous air operations. This presents both opportunities and threats to existing air forces with important strategic, operational, organisational and defence industry implications.
Strategically: Universal
First, strategically, it is now evident that heterogeneous air power can be successfully employed by states and non-states, big and small. Given the complexities inherent in such a diversity of users, it is arguably impossible for national defence forces to stay well-informed about all those that may use such air power in the future and the form it might take. The difficulties in doing this are apparent considering Israel missed Hamas’s preparations for its air assault on the Gaza border barrier. Gaza had been under extensive air, ground and sea surveillance for decades with much seen and yet seemingly not fully appreciated.
The alternative approach might be for the air forces to accept the possibility of surprise and become able to nimbly adapt to new circumstances quickly and efficiently. This could be hard. Air forces have rarely been agile organisations, not the least because the long-term nature of their equipment with service lives of 30 years or more has not required it.
Even so, becoming adequately agile is likely to require air forces quickly creating similarly heterogenous force structures encompassing drones, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, rockets and manned aircraft. A broadly based heterogenous force structure offers many more strategic, operational and tactical possibilities than a narrowly conceived structure built around only manned aircraft.
Operationally: Disruptive
Second, operationally, defending against heterogeneous air power attack now principally requires avoiding being found. The frontline between Ukrainian and Russian forces is today characterised by intensive air surveillance that quickly focusses heavy indirect fire onto any detected hostile targets using drones, rockets, missiles and artillery. To survive, military forces need to be dispersed into small elements where each presents a less attractive to target, and take measures to deceive, confuse and obfuscate the hostile heterogeneous air power (Noorman, 2024).
Furthermore, the ideas underpinning some older air power notions may now be obsolete. Remarkably, the centrepiece of traditional air power thinking - gaining air superiority - may no longer be possible. The exponential increase in the numbers of small commercial and military drones on modern battlefields, combined with the inherent problems of defending against rockets, cruise and ballistic missiles, makes the traditional way of using manned aircraft to gain air superiority almost irrelevant.
As part of rethinking air superiority doctrine, a new sub-domain is being postulated: an air littoral that extends from the ground upwards several thousand feet in which control will always be contested. The inference is that the fight to control this sub-domain will be undertaken by surface forces; there is no role seen for air forces – apparently by themselves as well, as others (Grieco and Bremer, 2024).
Organisationally: Transformation Essential
Thirdly, the idea of air forces becoming unimportant to achieving air superiority highlights that organisationally air forces will need to change as manned aircraft begin to share centre stage with glide bombs, cruise and ballistic missiles, rockets and countless type of drones. The air domain has always been a crowded place where all wish to be involved but the situation has expanded dramatically.
Air forces now need to operate in an environment in which most – whether large or small states, non-state entities, non-government organisations and even individuals - can use air power to varying degrees. Air forces will need to be comprehensively reimagined. Ukraine’s new Unmanned Systems Forces branch appears a harbinger of fundamental change not a one-off (Hardie, 2024).
Industrially: Create Useful Simplicity
Lastly, considering defence industry, the rise of heterogeneous air power opens up many opportunities for innovation. Importantly, innovations in unmanned systems are inherently simpler to achieve and generally much more affordable than for manned air vehicles. However, rapid innovation cuts both ways.
In Russia’s Ukraine war, newly developed drones become obsolete within a few months as kinetic and electronic counters are equally rapidly devised (Molloy, 2024). The elements comprising heterogeneous air power can experience considerable churn. It is unlikely to be the “set and forget” form of air power that homogeneous air power with its long-life manned aircraft is.
In that regard, an emphasis might be placed on designing simplified missiles and drones that can be mass produced quickly and at low cost from readily available materials and components. Being able to rapidly scale up heterogenous air power to meet urgent strategic and tactical demands arguably requires adopting such an engineering philosophy.
Iran’s air power export strategy might be instructive. Iran exports deliberately simplified rockets, missiles and drones to those with a limited capacity to manufacture, maintain and operate complicated equipment. This extends to designing equipment others can manufacture under relatively rudimentary conditions such as is done by Hezbollah in Lebanon (Hinz, 2021). Simplification also reduces costs allowing larger numbers to be acquired. Russia in mass producing Iranian Shahed drones is simplifying their design, aiming to drive unit cost down from some US$375,000 to about US$50,000 (Tegler, 2024).
Simplification however implies accepting a reduced operational performance including having lower reliability drones, rockets and missiles. Even so, fielding a cruder form of air power can still be effective, as the Houthi’s success in upsetting Red Sea merchant shipping reveals.
One area where innovation is needed is in having capabilities to comprehensively defend against the heterogeneous air power of drones, rockets and missiles. Just countering drones alone can require warning sensors, backpack and vehicle mounted electronic jammers, gun systems, hard-kill interceptors and laser blinding devices. Heterogeneous air power can be matched by fielding large numbers of diverse heterogeneous counters, but this is inherently a complicated and costly approach that involves many skilled personnel and diverts them from other tasks.
Ideally, defensive systems would be capable against the multiple dissimilar elements of heterogenous air power, not just against one type of element alone. Such flexibility is important given that such systems will probably need to be deployed both tactically on the frontlines and deep in the homeland. There is also a growing urgency as the increasing use of GPS denied navigation systems and artificial intelligence is reducing the effectiveness of today’s electronic jamming techniques. New directed energy weapons, such as high-energy lasers and electromagnetic pulse systems, offer much but so far seem technically immature.
Air forces globally will need to transform to meet the strategic, operational, organisational and defence industry challenges posed by the rapid emergence of heterogenous air power. The use of this new air power form by Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas highlights that this is an era where almost all can now potentially undertake well-coordinated, large-scale heterogenous air operations. Air power is no long a scarce or rare resource. Air forces globally now need to transform.
References
- Agencies. (2024, October 1). As Israel braces for a 2nd attack, what are Iran’s missile and drone capabilities? The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-israel-waits-for-a-2nd-attack-what-are-irans-missile-and-drone-capabilities/
- Meduza. (2024, March 22). Russia has attacked Ukraine's energy infrastructure. The attack was carried out on the Dnieper dam. Kharkov was left without light. Meduza. https://meduza.io/feature/2024/03/22/rossiya-atakovala-energeticheskuyu-infrastrukturu-ukrainy-udar-nanesen-po-plotine-dneproges-harkov-ostalsya-bez-sveta
- Galamison, M. S. and Petersen, M.B. (2023, Fall)). Failures of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine. Air & Space Operations Review, Vol.2, No.3. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASOR/Journals/Volume-2_Number-3/Galamison_Petersen.pdf
- Noorman, R. (2024, March 27). The Return of the Tactical Crisis. Modern War Institute. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-return-of-the-tactical-crisis/.
- Grieco, K.A. and Bremer, M.K. (2024, Fall). Contesting The Air Littoral. ÆTHER: A Journal of Strategic Airpower and Spacepower, Vol. 3., No.3. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AEtherJournal/Journals/Volume-3_Number-3/Grieco_and_Bremer.pdf
- Hardie, J. (2024, June 21). Ukraine’s new Unmanned Systems Forces takes shape. FDD’s Long War Journal. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/06/ukraines-new-unmanned-systems-forces-takes-shape.php.
- Molloy, O (2024). Drones in Modern Warfare: Lessons Learnt from the War in Ukraine. Australian Army Research Centre. https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/241022-Occasional-Paper-29-Lessons-Learnt-from-Ukraine_2.pdf
- Hinz, F. (2021). Missile Multinational: Iran’s New Approach to Missile Proliferation. IISS: The International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/irans-new-approach-to-missile-proliferation.pdf
- Tegler, E. (2024, February 7). $375,000 - The Sticker Price for an Iranian Shahed Drone. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2024/02/07/375000the-sticker-price-for-an-iranian-shahed-drone/?sh=4adb4a5d56d6.
