19 March 2025
The concept of securitization, as articulated in the field of security studies, provides a framework for understanding how political leaders and states construct threats and leverage them for political gain. Coined by the Copenhagen School[i], securitization refers to the process by which an issue is framed as an existential threat requiring extraordinary measures.[ii]
This analytical lens is particularly useful in exploring the phenomenon of threat inflation, where political leaders deliberately amplify the perception of danger posed by an “other” to mobilize domestic support and justify military actions[iii]. Securitization, while instrumental in addressing immediate challenges, often leads to an overemphasis on military solutions at the expense of addressing underlying grievances or structural issues.
Framing the ‘Other:’ The Political Utility of Threat Inflation
Central to securitization is the act of framing. Political leaders often identify an external or internal adversary —the “other”— to rally public support and consolidate power. This framing is not merely descriptive but performative. By labelling an issue as a security threat, leaders elevate it to a position of national urgency.[iv]
University of Chicago international relations scholar John Mearsheimer’s analysis of “fearmongering” sheds light on how political leaders manipulate perceptions of external threats to achieve their strategic goals. Fear-mongering, as Mearsheimer explains, involves exaggerating or fabricating threats to instill fear in domestic or international audiences. Leaders often use this tactic to unify their population, justify military interventions, or gain support for controversial policies.[v]
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the United States government framed terrorism as an existential threat, leading to the securitization of the “War on Terror.” The discourse surrounding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq exemplified how perceived threats can be inflated.[vi] Despite a lack of concrete evidence, the administration of George W. Bush asserted that Iraq possessed WMDs and galvanized public support for the 2003 invasion, illustrating how securitization can be employed to legitimize military intervention.
Similarly, Israel has securitized its relationship with Iran by framing the Iranian nuclear program as an existential threat. Israeli leaders frequently point to how close Iran is to developing nuclear weapons and how this would destabilize the region and pose a direct threat to Israeli security. This framing has justified Israeli lobbying for international sanctions and potential pre-emptive strikes. Israel’s security environment has historically been framed through a lens of existential vulnerability. Surrounded by hostile states and non-state actors since its founding, Israel’s leaders have often portrayed its survival as perpetually at risk. This narrative of vulnerability is rooted in collective memories of the Holocaust, regional wars, and ongoing hostilities.[vii]
Iran’s narrative strategy, on the other hand, highlights its historical grievances against Western powers while framing its nuclear ambitions as defensive rather than aggressive. By positioning itself as a victim of external aggression, Iran seeks to mitigate international criticism while reinforcing its legitimacy on the global stage. This approach illustrates how countries can manipulate narratives to navigate complex geopolitical landscapes.[viii]
In the context of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, both nations have engaged in securitization to mobilize domestic and international support. Russia has framed Ukraine’s alignment with Western powers as a direct threat to its historical and geopolitical interests, justifying its military actions as necessary for national security. Conversely, Ukraine has securitized Russian aggression, framing its resistance as a defense of sovereignty and democratic values. This dual securitization has entrenched positions on both sides, complicating efforts to negotiate peace.[ix]
During the last three U.S. presidential election campaigns, Donald Trump frequently employed threat inflation to frame international trade as a dire economic challenge to the U.S. By portraying countries like China, Mexico, and Canada as unfair competitors exploiting American workers and industries, Trump argued that the U.S. economy was under siege. His proposed remedy —imposing tariffs— was presented as a necessary tool to protect American interests. By exaggerating the threat posed by foreign competitors, Trump galvanized support among voters who felt left behind by economic shifts. This fear-based approach shifted attention away from systemic issues like automation and income inequality, focusing blame on external actors.[x] It also presented tariffs as a straightforward solution to complex trade problems, even though many economists believe this approach could exacerbate the very problems it seeks to resolve.
Lessons from the Cold War: Distinguishing Perceived vs. Actual Threats
A critical aspect of securitization is the distinction between actual and perceived threats. While some threats are real and demand immediate action, others are exaggerated or even fabricated for political purposes. Leaders may perceive certain challenges as substantial threats based on their ideological leanings, strategic interests, or psychological biases. However, these perceptions often do not align with objective realities.[xi]
During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in mutual securitization, perceiving each other as existential threats. While the ideological and military competition was real, the exaggeration of the threat contributed to prolonged arms races and proxy wars. The U.S. framed the Soviet Union as a totalitarian menace, warning of the spread of communism that would undermine democratic values and global stability. This rhetoric portrayed the Soviet Union as an expansionist power bent on global domination, exemplified by the “domino theory” popular in that era, which posited that if the Soviet were allowed to change the political structure of one country, their ideology would soon spread to surrounding countries.[xii]
On the other hand, the Soviet Union viewed the U.S. as an imperialist force, driven by capitalist greed, whose military presence and alliances sought to encircle and undermine socialism. Soviet propaganda depicted the U.S. as a warmonger, a direct threat to the survival of the Soviet state and the ideals of Marxism-Leninism. This framing fuelled the narrative of an existential struggle between two opposing systems, pushing both nations into an intense competition for military supremacy and influence, often at the cost of diplomacy or peaceful coexistence.[xiii]
The Case for Desecuritization: A Focus on Root Causes Rather Than Symptoms
Securitization can perpetuate cycles of conflict rather than resolve them because they frequently result in an overemphasis on military solutions, sidelining non-military approaches to conflict resolution. The overreliance on military solutions can exacerbate existing tensions and create new ones. The securitization of Iran’s nuclear program, for instance, has often overshadowed opportunities for diplomatic engagement. While sanctions and military threats have aimed to deter nuclear proliferation, they have also fueled Iranian nationalism and hardened the regime’s stance.[xiv]
The prioritization of military solutions is evident in the disproportionate allocation of resources to defense budgets and the marginalization of diplomacy and development initiatives. For example, the U.S. response to terrorism post-9/11 has been heavily militarized, with trillions of dollars spent on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. While these measures have achieved tactical successes, they have done little to address the root causes of terrorism, such as political instability, economic deprivation, and ideological radicalization.
One of the most significant criticisms of securitization is its tendency to focus on current symptoms rather than long-term causes, often leading to short-term solutions that fail to achieve sustainable peace. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a case in point. Both sides have securitized their narratives, framing the other as an existential threat. This framing has justified military actions and hardened public attitudes, but it has done little to address the root causes of the conflict, such as competing territorial claims and historical grievances.[xv]
Similarly, the securitization of climate change as a national security threat has led to calls for geoengineering and border fortifications to manage climate-induced migration. While these measures may mitigate immediate risks, they fail to address the systemic drivers of climate change, such as carbon emissions and unsustainable development practices.[xvi] A more holistic approach that integrates security with environmental sustainability is necessary to address these challenges effectively.
Desecuritization[xvii] offers a potential pathway to lessen tensions and find more viable solutions to conflicts. This process involves reframing issues from existential threats to challenges that can be managed through political, economic, and social means. For instance, efforts to de-securitize the U.S.-Iran relationship could focus on building trust through incremental agreements, such as rejoining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Similarly, desecuritization in the Ukraine-Russia conflict could involve creating mechanisms for dialogue and addressing underlying grievances such as regional autonomy and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s role in Eastern Europe.
Conclusion
Securitization is a powerful tool that enables political leaders to frame issues as existential threats, mobilize populations, and justify extraordinary measures. While this process can be effective in addressing immediate challenges, it often involves the inflation of threats for political purposes, leading to an overemphasis on military solutions and the neglect of root causes. To move beyond the limitations of securitization, policymakers must adopt a more balanced approach that combines security measures with efforts to address underlying grievances and structural challenges. The concept of de-securitization highlights the importance of reframing conflicts to focus on long-term solutions, fostering trust, and addressing systemic issues.
Dr Kristian Alexander is a Senior Fellow at the Rabdan Security and Defence Institute (RSDI).
[i] Securitization was developed by the Copenhagen School of Barry Buzan, Ole Wœver, Jaap de Wilde and others because most writings emerged at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI) in Copenhagen in the 1990s.
[ii] Wæver, O. (1995) “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in: R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), On Security (pp. 46-87). Columbia University Press.
[iii] Malik, Shahin (2021) “Constructing Security”, in: Peter Hough et al, eds., International Security Studies. Theory and Practice. 2nd edition. Routledge, pp. 72-84
[iv] Nyman, Jonna (2023) “Securitization”, in: Paul D. Williams and Matt McDonald eds., Security Studies. An Introduction. 4th edition. Routledge, pp. 115-130
[v] Mearsheimer, John (2011) Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics. Oxford University Press, pp. 45-62
[vi] Buzan, Barry (2006) ‘Will the 'Global War on Terrorism' Be the New Cold War?’, International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, pp. 1101-1118, Will the 'Global War on Terrorism' Be the New Cold War? on JSTOR
[vii] Michael, Kobi (2009) “Who Really Dictates What an Existential Threat Is? The Israeli Experience”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 32:5, 687-713, DOI: 10.1080/01402390903189360
[viii]Tabatabai, Ariane M. (2019) Iran’s National Security Debate. Implications for Future U.S. -Iran Negotiations. RAND Corporation, pp. 17-22, Iran's National Security Debate: Implications for Future U.S.-Iran Negotiations
[ix]Siddiqi, Muhammad Usama and Brilliant Windy Khairunnisa, ‘Applying Securitisation Theory to the Ongoing Russia-Ukraine Conflict’, Paradigm Shift, January 13, 2023, Securitisation Theory & the Russia-Ukraine.. - Paradigm Shift
[x] Rediker, Douglas, ‘The Consequences of Trump’s tariff threats’, Brookings, December 11, 2024, The consequences of Trump’s tariff threats
[xi] Stępka, M. (2022) “The Copenhagen School and Beyond. A Closer Look at Securitisation Theory”, in: Identifying Security Logics in the EU Policy Discourse. IMISCOE Research Series. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93035-6_2
[xii] Krebs, Ronald R. “How Dominant Narratives Rise and Fall: Military Conflict, Politics, and the Cold War Consensus.” International Organization, vol. 69, no. 4, 2015, pp. 809–45. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24758258
[xiii] Tsygankov, Andrei P. (2022) Russia’s Foreign Policy. Change and Continuity in National Identity. 6th edition, Rowman and Littlefield, Chapter 2.
[xiv] Mabon, S., Nasirzadeh, S., & Alrefai, E. (2021) “De-securitisation and Pragmatism in the Persian Gulf: The Future of Saudi-Iranian Relations”, The International Spectator, 56(4), 66–83. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2021.1989183
[xv] Nathan, Daniel and Itay Fischhendler, ‘Triggers for securitization: a discursive examination of Israeli–Palestinian water negotiations’, Water Policy, 1 February 2016; 18 (1): 19–38. doi: https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2015.027
[xvi] Scott, S.V. (2012) ‘Securitization of Climate Change’, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 21: 220-230. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12008
[xvii] Haughton, S.A. (2019) “Securitization and De-securitization”, in: Romaniuk, S., Thapa, M., Marton, P. (eds.) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74336-3_122-1
