In late August, Egypt began deploying military resources to Somalia in a bid to establish itself as the leading force in an African Union peacekeeping mission that will replace the current ATMIS presence. The move follows a defence pact signed between Egyptian President Abdel al-Sisi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in early August, amid rising tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia. Egypt's growing presence in Somalia represents a strategic shift that could alter the regional dynamics of the Red Sea, as the area faces growing instability from multiple interlinked conflicts. These include Sudan's civil war, Eritrean-Ethiopian tensions, the resurgence of al-Shabaab and the growing influence of Islamist militants in Puntland, creating a volatile environment. Egypt's renewed focus on Africa reflects a shift in its foreign policy from a predominantly pan-Arab orientation to one that also prioritises Africa and the Mediterranean, reshaping its strategic orientation along a North-South axis. This INSIGHT article examines these dynamics with the aim of shedding light on Egyptian intentions in the Red Sea arena. Only with this understanding can Gulf leaders anticipate how to proactively manage these developments, which have direct implications for the Horn region and the competitive arena of the Red Sea.
At the end of August, Egypt began sending equipment, ammunition and a small contingent of soldiers to Somalia. According to initial official statements, Egypt has pledged to gradually increase the number of troops on Somali soil. Cairo has even offered to take the lead in the peacekeeping mission announced by the African Union to replace the ATMIS operation (Barigaba, 2024). The Egyptian move followed the defence pact signed in early August between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to strengthen bilateral ties. The agreement coincided with escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia (Kurtz et. Al., 2024). Regardless of the actual deployment of Egyptian troops in Somalia, the announcement signals a decisive shift in Egypt's strategic agenda. It also has the potential shift regional distributions of power and dynamics.
Since 2020, the wider Red Sea region has faced serious instability due to several interlinked crises. These include the civil war in Sudan, the fragile situation in South Sudan, ongoing tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia, political rivalry in Djibouti, Houthi-led attacks that threaten maritime security, ethnic power struggles within Ethiopia, increased attacks by al-Shabaab against the Somali government, the rise of an Islamic State group in Puntland, and tensions between the government in Mogadishu and federal states such as Jubaland. Given this volatile environment, Cairo's decision to become more involved raises critical questions: Why has Egypt chosen to engage in such a highly unstable context? Does it really have the capacity to project power in the region? And what are the potential implications of its involvement for the Gulf monarchies?
Since then, Egypt has embarked on a new policy to strengthen its influence in Africa, reflecting a significant shift in its foreign policy approach. This shift not only marks a departure from traditional policy strategies, but also underscores a changing perception of Egypt's aspirations in the wider region. While the country continues to pay homage to its historic pan-Arab identity rooted in the Nasser era, President al-Sisi has been instrumental in raising the importance of Egypt's relations with both Mediterranean and African states (Farouk, 2018). As a result, Egypt's foreign policy is evolving into a dynamic force that operates along a vertical North-South axis, departing from the East-West focus that characterised the Mubarak era. This strategic reorientation underscores Egypt's commitment to deeper engagement with its southern neighbours and positions the country as a key player in the African landscape, with a focus on the wider Red Sea region. This region, which stretches from the Nile River Basin to the Gulf of Aden, is now a key focus of Egypt's strategic framework (FM, 2024).
Historically, Egypt's primary regional concern has been managing the Nile's waters. Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile has thus heightened tensions because it marks a significant shift in regional power dynamics. This comes in the form of Ethiopia, an upstream state, gaining strategic leverage over downstream Egypt. The GERD not only enhances Ethiopia's influence by enabling affordable energy exports to energy-deficient countries but also forces Egypt to recalibrate its regional strategy as it sees it formerly guaranteed flow of water from the Nile potentially, severely disrupted.
Egypt has responded by pursuing a double-track strategy. On the one hand, Egyptian President al-Sisi has sought to politically isolate Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and reduce Addis Ababa's influence in regional affairs. To achieve this goal, Egypt has reinvigorated its diplomatic presence in the region, expanding beyond Sudan. President al-Sisi has steadily improved relations with most Nile riparian states in an effort to form a united front against Ethiopia. Cairo has engaged in shuttle diplomacy through high-level visits to regional states (Mostafa, 2024). These included al-Sisi's first visit to South Sudan and Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly's participation in the inauguration ceremony of the Somalia’s Prime Minister, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Even within institutions such as the African Union, Egypt has been actively seeking to build a coalition against Ethiopia. Egypt has also worked to encourage the formation of an anti-Ethiopian bloc based on common strategic interests with Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea, with which Cairo has concluded security and defense cooperation agreements. For Somalia, strengthening ties with Eritrea and Egypt is a response to Ethiopian policies. In Mogadishu, the signing of the MoU is viewed as a direct challenge to Somalia's territorial integrity.
On the other hand, Egypt has become increasingly involved in the wider Red Sea region political affairs. Specifically, it capitalized on regional dynamics during the Tigray War to advance its strategic interests, as alleged by Ethiopian officials. First, Cairo supported Sudan's decision to reclaim disputed territory in the al-Fashaqa area (Ramzy, 2020). Secondly, Egypt has been accused by Addis Ababa of supporting another rebellion in the Metekel region near the GERD site. The conflict in Metekel, named after the region along the Black Nile in the Benshangul-Gumuz regional state, has pitted the Gumuz Liberation Front (GLF) against federal authorities since 2019 (Sorour, 2021). The result is that Addis Ababa has consistently accused Sudan and Egypt of providing aid and resources to the Gumuz militias to destabilise the region and prevent the GERD plant from coming online (Wuol, 2024). Ethiopia's claims are not new. In 2016, at a crucial moment for the GERD issue, Addis Ababa openly accused Egypt of funding the armed group Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Egypt has always denied any involvement in interstate and intrastate instability (Meseret, 2016). Cairo also underlines the way in which Addis Ababa seeks external responsibility even in domestic matters in order to divert public and international attention. Regardless of the veracity of Ethiopia's claims, the practice of supporting insurgencies and opposition groups within a rival state is not unique to Egypt, but a common strategy often employed by all regional actors (Holmquist and Rock, 2023).
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland on January 1, 2024, marks a pivotal development in the Ethiopia-Egypt rivalry with significant implications for regional politics. Egypt has increasingly focused its foreign policy on the Red Sea, while Ethiopia's agreement with Somaliland highlights its ambition to secure maritime access driven by economic and strategic priorities. Historically dominant in the region, Ethiopia views the Red Sea as its primary sphere of influence, frustrated by the growing presence of external powers (Donelli, 2024). Similarly, Egypt considers the waters between Suez and Aden, often referred to as the ‘Egyptian lake,’ vital to its strategic interests. To bolster its Red Sea presence, Cairo has deployed its region-leading navy. Meanwhile, rising tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia on account of the Somaliland MoU created an opening for Egypt, which leveraged Mogadishu's search for external support to strengthen its foothold, further escalating the competition between these regional powers (Soltes, 2024).
Undoubtedly, Egypt's willingness to deploy troops in Somalia is the most significant component of new Cairo's assertive approach towards the Horn of Africa. By agreeing to send troops to support the African Union peacekeeping mission, Egypt is demonstrating its willingness to take on new regional responsibilities. The purpose of deploying troops on Somali soil is to ensure the continuity of the institution-building process in Mogadishu and to counter the activities of the al-Shabaab terrorist group (Amin, 2024). In this way, Egypt aims to contribute to regional stability.
Egypt’s current limited troop presence in Somalia may signal intentions for a larger deployment, but significant challenges remain. While Egypt boasts a relatively large and well-armed military, its focus has been on domestic security issues, such as countering ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula, leaving it ill-prepared for sustained expeditionary operations. The recent covert movement of troops via Egyptian naval vessels demonstrated logistical capabilities but underscored the military’s limited readiness for long-term extraterritorial deployments. Additionally, Egypt’s internal instability raises doubts about its ability to maintain more than a symbolic presence in Somalia.
Somalia’s volatile environment presents further risks. Any casualties inflicted by al-Shabaab could damage President al-Sisi’s public image and expose the military’s weaknesses. This complicates Cairo’s purported willingness to lead the African Union’s upcoming peacekeeping mission against the terrorist group, despite their shared anti-Ethiopian stance. Al-Shabaab is likely to target Egyptian forces, exacerbating Egypt’s internal challenges and undermining its broader regional strategy.
Cairo is also grappling with concurrent crises, including instability in Libya, conflict in Sudan, and the Gaza crisis, which strain its resources and focus. The decision to expand in Somalia risks reigniting regional rivalries, as responses from key players like Turkey and the UAE could disrupt the current period of appeasement, even if Saudi Arabia supports Egypt’s involvement.
Egypt’s growing involvement in Somalia underscores its strategic recalibration toward a North-South axis. This blends traditional diplomatic efforts with a more assertive military posture. While its deployment to Somalia and diplomatic moves to build an anti-Ethiopia coalition signal its ambitions to secure its influence in the Horn of Africa, significant obstacles persist. Somalia’s instability, coupled with Egypt’s internal challenges and strained resources due to concurrent regional crises, raise questions about the feasibility and longevity of Cairo’s strategy. Egypt's doubts and difficulties operating in the Somali context are not unique. Ethiopia also faces uncertainties beyond its complex relationship with Somalia. Indeed, for several months now, the country has experienced severe internal political fragility. There have even been violent uprisings in several regions of the country, which the government in Addis Ababa is struggling to quell (Gelmo et. al., 2024). Moreover, in Somalia, where Ethiopian troops have been present for almost twenty years, there is growing fatigue. Therefore, both Egypt and Ethiopia face internal and external challenges that complicate their ability to sustain long-term engagement in the region.
The volatile interplay of Ethiopian and Somali politics, compounded by Somaliland’s November 2024 presidential election that brought the opposition party to power but represented a strong endorsement Somaliland’s de facto independence from Somalia, presents a precarious environment that could exacerbate existing tensions. Ethiopia is operating in its own backyard. It knows Somalia and the wider region better than Egypt. So, if Cairo wants to bolster its footprint in the region, it needs to quickly learn the local dynamics. Despite having far fewer military capabilities than Egypt, Ethiopia’s gamble coupled with Somaliland’s continued quest for independence recognition may pay off. For Egypt, then, success will depend on balancing its military ambitions with effective diplomacy to navigate the increasingly complex regional dynamics. National security considerations, driven by developments on the Nile, are pushing Egypt towards a new policy in the region. Ethiopia, on the other hand, sees access to the sea as an issue relevant to its future strategic security. Therefore, any move towards regional de-escalation must take both issues into account. The international community, particularly Arab Gulf states like the UAE, should closely monitor these developments to prevent escalation and support stability in this increasingly contested region.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics
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