Most of the key developments, dynamics, and trends shaping terrorist violence and its manifestations on European soil are largely determined by four parameters: technological advancements, geopolitical influence, shifting ideologies and tactical adaptions.
- Technological Advancements – The rapid evolution of digital tools, encrypted communication, social media platforms as online spaces for radicalization and weaponry (be they 3D- printed or else) have enabled terrorists to coordinate more effectively, spread propaganda globally, and execute attacks with increased frequency and spontaneity. Recent terrorist attacks in Europe - both executed and thwarted- such as the foiled Taylor Swift Concert Plot in Vienna of August 2024 underline the intensifying and highly relevant trend of virtual plotting and online procurement of terrorism.[1]
- Geopolitical Influence – Conflicts, power struggles, and shifting alliances at the global level impact the operational reach, recruitment, and funding of terrorist organizations, as currently seen in the various spillover effects on European security, often mandated through online propaganda and misinformation, which are essentially caused by overarching conflicts in the MENA region and also the conflicts in Ukraine.[2] This trend is expected to continue over the next three to five years, driven in part by the volatile security dynamics resulting from the expected global shift in U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration.
- Shifting Ideologies – The ideological landscape of terrorism continuously evolves, with extremist narratives adapting to current socio-political, and economic grievances, leading to the emergence of new convergent (“mixed” or “crossover”) forms of extremism and the resurgence of old ones. Resulting in a patchwork fusion of diverse ideological influences, fragmented belief systems, and transgressive shifts, predominantly young extremists can now build their own narratives, which can still rely on traditional ones. Extremist narratives have become fluid and evolve effortlessly, lowering entry barriers and gradually transforming into more personalized and radicalized forms. For example, conspiracy narratives merge with radical views consistent with the underlying extremist ideology. A common denominator, anti-government extremism, is increasingly driving ideologically motivated violence.
- Tactical Adaptations – Terrorist organizations and lone perpetrators frequently modify their strategies in response to counterterrorism measures, employing decentralized networks, low-level opportunity attacks executed by lone-actors, and hybrid warfare tactics to maximize impact while evading detection. For example, the recent reemergence of vehicle ramming attacks in Germany (Magdeburg[3], Munich[4] and Mannheim[5]) may suggest that attackers are once again turning to this modus operandi, a tactic previously largely abandoned by perpetrators due to enhanced security measures.
The interplay of multifaceted crises, a growing societal polarization, and a diminishing capacity to counter extremism, which frequently appears in non-violent forms, have a significant impact on the evolution of ideologically motivated, extremist violence.[6] At the same time, ongoing conflicts within the Euro-strategic security environment continue to exacerbate terrorism in Europe.[7] The wars in Ukraine and Gaza, abrupt regime change in Syria, political instability across substantial parts of the Middle East and North Africa region, and other significant regional developments pose undeniable, yet unpredictable, challenges to European security.[8]
Ideologically, various extremist narratives are gaining traction, including the rise of extremist, far-right and far-left stances, increasing anti-government sentiments, antisemitism[9], and the spread of conspiracy theories.[10] Adding to this complexity is the phenomenon of “salad-bar extremism,”[11] a hybrid of mixed ideologies that combines diverse and often contradictory extremist narratives, further blurring the ideological spectrum. The concept of “salad-bar extremism” describes a fusion of seemingly contradictory extremist ideologies that individuals adopt to radicalize and legitimize violence. Unlike traditional extremists who adhere to a single, coherent belief system, these individuals selectively combine elements from diverse sources—such as white supremacy, radical Islamism, conspiracy theories, and misogyny—to form a personalized and often inconsistent ideological framework. According to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, it reflects “an amalgamation of different disparate beliefs, interests and grievances (idiosyncratic patterns of grievances) […] We as people are becoming more incoherent [and] extremists are becoming more incoherent as well”.[12] The Magdeburg car rampage attack on a Christmas market just before Christmas 2024, however, appears to reflect the convergent pattern of salad-bar extremism. Besides psychological deficiencies a mix of ideological elements —including conspiracy narratives, anti-Muslim hatred, and other seemingly contradictory ideological fragments — seems to have played a significant role in shaping the attacker's motives.[13]
Other threats include teenagers, who are vulnerable to extremist propaganda and could constitute the next generation of militants.[14] Psychopathology increasingly influences extremist motivations, intersecting with other drivers of radicalization.[15] The “crime-terror-nexus,” when petty and organized crime intersect with terrorism to form overlapping networks that reinforce one another, also remains a challenge for European CT.
When it comes to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs),[16] low-level attacks remain the predominant method of terrorist attacks in Europe, though combined operations involving drones or other complementary methods may also be used.
Tech-Terror-Nexus
The growing exploitation of digital technologies by terrorists should not be dismissed as merely repackaging the old. Especially over the past five years, the pace of development and technological progress has been astonishing, the groundbreaking advancements in AI probably being a true pacemaker. Terrorists are progressively leveraging the digital ecosystem to advance their operations.[17]. Nearly every aspect of terrorist groups’ operations — from initial virtual exposure to extremist ideologies and positions, through recruitment, propaganda, and radicalization, to the planning and coordination of attacks — is currently facilitated online.[18] This phenomenon may be referenced as the “virtualization of terrorism.”[19] Against this backdrop, social media channels, encrypted communication platforms, and the Dark Net have become preferred spaces for terrorist activities.[20] Terrorists, both right wing extremists as well as religious extremist, increasingly use peer-to-peer encrypted messaging platforms to enhance their ability to communicate securely and evade detection by law enforcement and intelligence agencies.[21] Encrypted platforms are easily accessible, constantly available, easy to maintain — but hard to detect and penetrate.[22]
The next “big thing” is undoubtedly the growing use of artificial intelligence (AI) by extremist groups. Extremists already exploit the internet and social media for recruitment, propaganda, plotting, and coordination, but AI enhances the precision and scale of these operations.[23] AI also drives the creation of deepfakes, misinformation, and automated content dissemination, accelerating the spread of conspiracy narratives and extremist ideologies. AI tools are increasingly used for illegal activities like financial fraud and weapons trafficking.
Conflict-Terror Nexus
Transnational terrorism has thrived in the age of globalization, as terrorist groups have been able to transcend borders and unite individuals under shared ideologies and goals. These groups have capitalized on the growing interconnectivity that defines global interdependence, using technology for propaganda, agitation, recruitment, and logistical support, including the plotting of terrorist attacks. Intensified cross-border operations of subversive terrorist groups and decentralized network structures enable these groups to amplify their messages and expand the reach of their activities.
Geopolitically relevant security dynamics and conflicts, particularly in surrounding areas, increasingly influence transnational terrorism and associated threats in Europe directly. Due to the accelerated spread of extremist propaganda and the increased availability of low-threshold extremist content on social media addressing a new generation of potential perpetrators (Gen Alpha), this issue has gained significant traction over the past two to three years.
A current example of this “conflict-terror-nexus” – the interplay between conflicts and terrorist activity – is how extremists propaganda frequently frames terrorist attacks in Europe as acts of retribution for Western military interventions in the Greater Middle East or as a response to factual or perceived injustices against Muslim communities. Also, the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict has far-reaching security implications for Europe, extending beyond the military domain by influencing extremist movements and impacting the broader terrorist threat landscape.[24] Particularly concerning are:
- The uncontrolled proliferation of war weapons,
- The narrative-driven ideological mobilization of extremist groups,
- The deliberate spread of disinformation and online-propaganda.
These factors undoubtedly have the potential to destabilize existing national and international security structures, especially in terms of counterterrorism efforts across Europe.
An increasing circulation and availability of weapons from the war zone poses a significant threat to the internal security of many European states.[25] Through illicit smuggling routes, looted or stolen military equipment—such as automatic rifles, anti-tank systems, or even portable air-defense missiles—could end up in the hands of extremist groups or lone actors. Criminal networks, particularly those associated with organized crime, as well as terrorist organizations, could exploit this influx to prepare terrorist attacks or armed assaults against rival groups within European states.[26]
At the same time, the war in Ukraine serves as an ideological projection for various extremist groups, allowing them to propagate narratives that facilitate both collective and individual radicalization.[27] Right-wing extremist militias and neo-Nazi groups have been part of the conflict, some of them are fighting as mercenaries- on both sides.[28] The war keeps attracting international supporters who may return to their home countries after the war with combat experience and deeply entrenched radical convictions.
The targeted dissemination of disinformation through social media, fake news platforms, and state-controlled propaganda channels aims to reinforce stereotypical enemy images, erode trust in democratic institutions, and fuel extremist dynamics.[29] The ultimate goal of these campaigns is to manipulate and infiltrate public opinion. The actors and structures behind these efforts seek to weaken social cohesion, fostering a climate of polarization that facilitates extremism and terrorism.
A recent Europol report concludes that political instability outside the European Union could “exacerbate the terrorist threat from within the EU, materializing in a surge in the activity of terrorist groups, an increase in online propaganda, and the strengthening of recruitment efforts that may spread to member states. This is particularly the case for religion-motivated terrorism. Potential developments in key regions where jihadist terrorist groups are active represent sources of concern for the future.”[30]
Mutant Extremists
Five years after the collapse of the Daesh “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria, the EU's Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (EU-CTC), Bartjan Wegter, highlighted an increasingly fragmented extremist threat, originating from multiple sources and essentially proliferating online. Wegter coined the term “mutant jihadism” to explain the phenomenon.[31] During the last decade, both European religion-motivated extremism and right-wing extremism have morphed into more decentralized threats, leveraging both online platforms and offline milieus to recruit and radicalize individuals. These extremist groups have diversified their strategic repertoire, combining virtual recruitment with localized networks to sustain their transnational influence and capacities. Such a paradigmatic shift has led to the perpetuation of low-level attacks on European soil executed by self-radicalized lone actors inspired by other terrorists rather than having direct organizational ties.
The rise of the ISIS offshoot ISKP[32] (Islamic State – Khorasan Province) and the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel[33] are fueling Islamist propaganda and fostering radicalization of young Muslims within Western societies. Salafi jihadists and other organizations have seized on this new dynamic to proliferate a kind of “virtual caliphate,” both through “low-key” Islamist content on platforms such as TikTok[34], YouTube, 4Chan, Reddit and violent jihadist propaganda on Telegram channels and elsewhere. “Influencer preachers” have become increasingly significant as the driving force behind what has been called “TikTok radicalization.”[35] The main suspect behind the plot to attack Taylor Swift concertgoers in early August 2024 was allegedly radicalized by watching video material of the German Salafist influencer preacher Abul Baraa.[36] According to the most recent findings, the alleged perpetrator was also planning an attack in front of a mosque in Dubai in March 2024.[37] This case is symptomatic for a low-level attack scenario, however it involved meticulous planning.
Low-Level Terrorism
Low-level attacks rely on tactical simplicity in planning, logistics, and execution. Recent attacks suggest simple planning, rapid execution, and easily obtainable weaponry, such as cut-and- thrust weapons, assault rifles, and explosive vests. Vehicle-ramming attacks (e.g., Nice, Berlin, Barcelona, Stockholm, Magdeburg) have also proven effective from the attackers’ perspective.
This type of attack is expected to remain the preferred method of TTP, particularly within the extremists context, a consequence of increased counterterrorism (CT) activities, improved CT cooperation, and limited capabilities among perpetrators and terrorist organizations.[38] In Europe since 2004, more than 100 extremists attacks have been carried out or prevented by the security authorities. From 2004 until 2022 there were 130 attacks in total. Moreover a steady increase in plots, both executed and foiled, has been identified from 2022-mid 2024.[39] The perpetrated jihadist attacks until 2022 led to more than 800 deaths and at least 3800 have been injured, some of them seriously.[40] The Norwegian “Jihadi Plots in Europe Dataset” (JPED) dataset includes 273 well-documented jihadi terror plots in Western Europe from 1994-mid-2024.[41] Strikingly, 69 of them have occurred between January 1, 2019, and June 1, 2024.[42] For the period January 1, 2019-June 1, 2024, foiled plots account for 65 percent (45 of 69 cases).[43]
Since the onset of the terrorist wave in Europe, marked by the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, terrorist assaults have been carried out either by coordinated hit teams or individual perpetrators, with the latter accounting for the majority of incidents. Most of the Western-European terrorist attacks since Daesh were defeated militarily, “have been low-tech, conducted by single actors, using melee weapon or vehicles. European scholars have not seen complex, mass casualty attacks, like those in Paris in November 2015, which involved a group of attackers, employing different weapons and tactics, such as suicide bombings and mass shootings.”[44]
Furthermore, right-wing terrorism in Europe has experienced a concerning increase particularly over the past five years[45], marked by both a growing number of attempted incidents, related arrests, and convictions.[46] Regarding plotting and execution of attacks a perceivable shift in tactics pointing towards simplification and online mandating is recognizable. While traditionally associated with groups such as neo-Nazis and white nationalists, recent cases suggest a diversification in perpetrator profiles, mirroring jihadist attackers. Moreover, these parallels manifest in all aspects, particularly in the growing role of online radicalization as a tool for inciting violence. This has enabled lone actors and small, decentralized networks to execute “opportunity attacks”, complicating efforts by authorities to detect and prevent these incidents before they happen.
One of the most notable characteristics of right-wing terrorism may be identified in its focus on targeting minority groups, immigrants, and institutions that promote social integration. In countries like Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, right-wing extremists have targeted places of worship, communities of immigrants, and political figures advocating for diversity and inclusion. In Germany, the 2019 Halle synagogue shooting was carried out by a lone actor who radicalized online exemplifies this targeting trend, where the assailant attempted to enter a synagogue during Yom Kippur and subsequently killed two people in nearby locations.[47] The following year, the Hanau (Germany) shootings resulted in the deaths of nine individuals at two shisha bars, underscoring the persistent threat of far-right violence.[48]
In France, anti-Semitic incidents have escalated, notably with the arson attack on a synagogue in La Grande-Motte in August 2023.[49] The 33-year-old perpetrator's intent to kill Jews marked a significant intensification of anti-Semitic violence in the country.
The political response to right-wing terrorism in Europe has been mixed, with some states introducing stronger counterterrorism measures, while others struggle to define the scope and threat of this ideology. Given that terrorist attacks have resulted in a significantly higher number of incidents and casualties in Europe over the past decade, it is unsurprising that this threat has dominated the security agenda, however right-wing extremism is increasingly being recognized as a significant and evolving threat. The continuing dynamic of lone-actor terrorism, combined with the use of encrypted communication and online platforms for radicalization, poses challenges for law enforcement.
In this context, Europe is predominantly witnessing tactical approaches often referred to as “opportunistic” or “occasional” terrorism. This form of “low-level” terrorism encompasses various scenarios that share a common characteristic: the terrorist act, frequently carried out by a lone actor, is inspired by extremist propaganda narratives and facilitated by a conducive environment. While instances of self-radicalized lone actors without organizational connections persist, investigations increasingly uncover a more intricate reality of networked extremism. The category of the “lone perpetrator plus” has been introduced to address this phenomenon of externally inspired attackers who sometimes get logistic and planning support beforehand, but who execute the attack alone.[50]
Many terrorist plotters are found to have connections to Daesh or affiliated-but-independent terrorist networks, both within Europe and internationally, interacting through a combination of physical meetings and digital communications, utilizing popular encrypted messaging apps like Telegram. This networked approach allows for the dissemination of tactical guidance and target selection from more experienced operatives. The “Islamic State,” and more recently ISKP,[51] have adopted “cyber-coaching”[52] through “virtual planning hubs”[53] as a method for enabling terrorist activities in Europe. This approach, which has been effective, involves experienced members providing remote guidance and support to individuals or small cells, often in far-away locations, planning attacks.
Conclusion
The European terrorist threat landscape has diversified and is constantly evolving. It is shaped by technological advancements, geopolitical instability, and adaptive extremist tactics. A tactical adherence to inspired low-level attacks, increasingly triggered by easily accessible extremist online propaganda, and facilitated by virtual plotting platforms supported by AI, highlights the growing complexity of the threat. The exploitation of social media, the employment of encrypted communication channels, and the focus on recruiting adolescents in combination with an ongoing crime-terror nexus are amplifying the challenges faced by counter-terrorism efforts, as they enable decentralized and networked extremism. To address these emerging dynamics, a comprehensive approach combining international cooperation with reliable partners in the Middle East and North Africa, advanced technological tools, and targeted prevention strategies is essential to safeguard European security.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
REFERENCES
[all links included in the references were active as of March 14, 2025].
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[2] Stockhammer, Nicolas (2025): “Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War on World Order and the Future of Counter-Terrorism”, In: Sadik, Giray (ed.): The Effects of The Russia-Ukraine War on Countering Terrorism, NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT), Ankara, https://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/researches/20-UKR_RUSwarEffectsCT.pdf.
[3] Gross, Jenny /Chutel, Lynsey (2024): “Germany Bulked Up Christmas Market Security. An Attack Still Happened”, NY Times (21 Dec. 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/21/world/europe/germany-christmas-market-security.html.
[4] Cole, Deborah (2025): "Driver who hit union rally in 'suspected attack' in Munich is Afghan asylum seeker, police say", The Guardian (13 Feb. 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/13/vehicle-driven-into-group-of-people-in-munich.
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[11] Hemmila, Tess/Perliger, Arie (2024): “Hybridization or Salad Bar Ideology? Testing Ideological Convergence Within the American Violent Far Right”, in: Crime & Delinquency, 0(0), https://doi.org/10.1177/00111287241271288; Kidwai, Saman Ayesha (2024): Salad Bar Extremism, in: Modern Diplomacy (September 26, 2024), https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/09/26/salad-bar-extremism; The Soufan Center (2021): Intel Brief: The Counterterrorism Challenge of “Salad Bar” Ideologies, (March 29, 2021), https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-march-29.
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[13] https://www.focus.de/panorama/welt/amokfahrt-auf-weihnachtsmarkt-terror-experte-sieht-bei-magdeburg-attentat-grosses-ungeloestes-sicherheits-problem_id_260585938.html; https://www.sn.at/politik/weltpolitik/terrorismusforscher-stockhammer-wir-tat-form-ideologien-mix-170590201.
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[15] De Roy van Zuijdewijn, Janine /Bakker, Edwin (2016): “Analysing personal characteristics of lone-actor terrorists: Research findings and recommendations”, in: Perspectives on Terrorism, 10(2), 44,
[16] Silva, Daniella (2017): “London Terrorist Attack: Vehicle, Knife Incident Shows Threat of Low-Tech Terror.” NBC, March, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/london-parliament-attack/london-terrorist-attack-vehicle-knife-incident-shows-threat-low-tech-n737156.
[17] Weimann, Gabriel (2015): Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation, Columbia University Press; Saltman, Erin (2024): The future of counterterrorism: Evolving online tools and tactics, Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-future-of-counterterrorism-evolving-online-tools-and-tactics.
[18] Stockhammer, Nicolas (2023) (ed.): Routledge Handbook of Transnational Terrorism, Oxon/New York): 460.
[19] Ibid, 460–461.
[20] Williams, Heather J. et al (2021): “The Online Extremist Ecosystem. Its Evolution and a Framework for Separating Extreme from Mainstream”, RAND Expert Insights (Dec. 2, 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1458-1.html.
[21] Graham, Robert (2016): “How Terrorists Use Encryption”, CTC Sentinel, June 2016, Volume 9, Issue 6 (June 2016), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss614.pdf.
[22] Clifford, Bennett / Powell, Helen (2019): “Encrypted Extremism. Inside The English-Speaking Islamic State Ecosystem on Telegram”, Program on Extremism (GWU), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/EncryptedExtremism.pdf.
[23] Nelu, Clarisa (2024): “Exploitation of Generative AI by Terrorist Groups”, in: ICCT Analysis,
https://www.icct.nl/publication/exploitation-generative-ai-terrorist-groups#:~:text=Through%20all%20these%20methods%2C%20terrorists,propaganda%20to%20influence%20people's%20behaviour; also: Weimann, Gabriel et al. (2024): „Generating Terror: The Risks of Generative AI-Exploitation, in: CTC Sentinel, vol. 17, issue 1 (Jan. 2024), 17–25, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/CTC-SENTINEL-012024.pdf.
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[29] Jungherr, Andreas (2020): Desinformation: Konzepte, Identifikation, Reichweite und Effekte. In: Landesanstalt für Medien NRW (Hrsg.): Was ist Desinformation? Betrachtungen aus sechs wissenschaftlichen Perspektiven. Düsseldorf, https://www.medienanstalt-nrw.de/fileadmin/user_upload/NeueWebsite_0120/Themen/Desinformation/WasIstDesinformation_Paper_LFMNRW.pdf.
[30] EUROPOL TeSAT Report 2022, 76, https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Tesat_Report_2022_0.pdf.
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[33] Hoffman, Bruce (2023): „Understanding Hamas’s Genocidal Ideology“, in: The Atlantic (Oct. 10, 2023), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/10/hamas-covenant-israel-attack-war-genocide/675602.
[34] „Verfassungsschutz warnt vor "Tiktokisierung des Islamismus", Zeit Online (April 21, 2024), https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2024-04/tiktok-islamismus-salafisten-jugend-radikalisierung.
[35] Neumann, Peter R. (2024): Die Rückkehr des Terrors. Wie uns der Dschihadismus herausfordert, Berlin: Rowohlt, 81-97.
[36] Hartleb, Florian / Stockhammer, Nicolas (2024): „Ich hätte den Sprengstoff in der Menschenmenge
platziert" Eine Analyse des vereitelten Terroranschlages auf die Massenveranstaltung „Taylor-Swift-
Konzert" im August 2024 in Wien”, EICTP Research Paper (September 2024), 13, https://eictp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/SwiftPlot_Wien_1009_DE.pdf; Abdelaziz, Salma/Davey-Attlee, Florence/ Avramova, Nina (2024): „The ‘rock star’ preacher influencing young people online”, CNN (August 15, 2024), https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/15/europe/abul-baraa-salafi-preacher-intl-latam/index.html.
[37] „Swift-Terrorverdächtiger plante offenbar auch Anschlag in Dubai“, Die Presse (January 19, 2025).
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[38] Silva, Daniella (2017): “London Terrorist Attack: Vehicle, Knife Incident Shows Threat of Low-Tech Terror.” NBC, March, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/london-parliament-attack/london-terrorist-attack-vehicle-knife-incident-shows-threat-low-tech-n737156.
[39] Nesser, Petter / Nasr, Wassim (2024): “The Threat Matrix Facing the Paris Olympics”, in: CTC Sentinel, vol. 17, issue 6 (June 2024), 2, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/CTC-SENTINEL-062024_cover-article.pdf.
[40]Goertz, Stefan (2021): Der neue Terrorismus. Neue Akteure, Strategien, Taktiken und Mittel. 2nd ed., Wiesbaden: Springer VS, VII.
[41] Nesser, Petter (2024): Introducing the Jihadi Plots in Europe Dataset (JPED), in: Journal of Peace Research 2024, Peace Research Institute Oslo, 61:2, 317-329: 323, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00223433221123360.
[42] Nesser /Nasr (2024), 2.
[43] Ibid, 2.
[44] Nesser, Petter (2021): “Foiled Versus Launched Terror Plots: Some Lessons Learned”, in: EICTP Vienna Research Papers on Transnational Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Key Determinants of Transnational Terrorism in The Era of Covid-19 and beyond. Trajectory, Disruption and the Way Forward, Vol. II, March 2021, 151.
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