20 March 2025
ISIS and Al-Qaeda, having positioned themselves as brutal moralizers, appear increasingly irrelevant in the context of the Gaza war. Marginalized, and distant from the frontlines, the organizations suffer a form of “relative deprivation” a term coined by the American political scientist Ted Robert Gurr in 1970,[1] from their inability to achieve tangible victories in line with their expectations. Their growing sense of impotence, instead of generating violence, drives them further into an ultra-elitist discourse, creating a self-reinforcing isolation that distances them not only from the battlefield but also from the realities and priorities of the populations they claim to represent.
ISIS took a full two weeks to respond to the October 2023[2] Hamas attack, a globally pivotal event, highlighting its inability to react swiftly to major geopolitical developments. When it did react, its response was based on its familiar takfirist rhetoric, a radical doctrine that proclaims the excommunication (takfir) of Muslims deemed deviant, declaring that a Palestinian victory could never be achieved under the “banner of the Iranian axis.” This response substituted the real stakes in Gaza with the symbolic narrative of an imagined enemy, the so-called “Tawaghit” (idolatrous tyrants), accused of driving a return to “Jahiliya” (pre-Islamic ignorance). This disconnection[3] in narrative underscores ISIS’s enduring inability to establish a foothold in the Palestinian struggle. Lacking legitimacy, the group retreats into a rhetoric of absolute rejection, exemplified by the statement of Ahlam Al-Nasr, the so-called “poetess of the Islamic State,” who proclaimed: “All those belonging to Hamas are apostates […] You are a pawn in their hands.”[4]
Much like Al-Qaeda, ISIS’s eternal rival in terrorism, the group excels in crafting elaborate postures and lacks the ability to produce a pragmatic vision, even one aimed at reclaiming what was lost by the inhabitants of the Palestinian territories. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu referred to this phenomenon as “symbolic violence,” describing how the rhetorical posturing of an entity — whether political or militant — conceals its inability to carry out through meaningful actions.[5]
Residual Presence
The Palestinian Territories have historically been a no-go zone for ISIS and Al-Qaeda, where neither has managed to establish a meaningful foothold. Palestine operates like a closely interconnected village, where enduring social ties are anchored around prominent, long-established families. This dense social fabric, eloquently explored by Palestinian historian Salim Tamari in The Mountain Against the Sea: Essays on Palestine Society and Culture (2008), has consistently served as a political unifier, a “political coagulator.” This structure has consistently repelled external influences, such as foreign fighters, who had been pivotal to Al-Qaeda’s rise in Afghanistan.
The approach of ISIS and Al-Qaeda in Palestine attracts a few scattered individuals attracted to ultraviolence but is ultimately ineffective. Palestinian nationalism is built on deeply rooted values — a territory, a flag, and a people — that are fundamentally at odds with the messianic rhetoric of terrorist organizations. While the groups seek to manipulate the Palestinian cause to mobilize support, they incorporate the cause into an abstract, de-territorialized, and globalized project where the Palestinian issue becomes just one among many, submerged in a narrative of the eternal struggle between good and evil.
In September, American sources reported the emergence of a new group called the “Guardians of Al-Masra,” which issued a call for armed struggle from Gaza, drawing ideological inspiration from Al-Qaeda.[6] Inconsistencies have cast doubt on the group’s credibility. The Guardians claimed responsibility for launching a “Grad” missile in northern Gaza — a weapon exclusively controlled by Hamas — raising suspicions of either misinformation or an attempt to exaggerate the group’s military significance. Its appeals for funding through the cryptocurrency Tether suspiciously coincided with Israeli operations targeting accounts using the same currency. Additionally, it is important to emphasize the cautious approach taken by Israeli experts, who have responded to this announcement with notable skepticism. Throughout the history of terrorism, small groups with very limited resources often try to establish their presence through communication strategies. However, they typically lack the operational capacity to have any significant impact on the actual theater of operations.
The most serious attempts by terrorist groups to infiltrate the Palestinian territories occurred between 2005 and 2015, a decade of profound instability in the Middle East marked by the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the political vacuum left by the death of Yasser Arafat, and Hamas’s victory in legislative elections in Gaza. In this period of heightened turmoil, a handful of individuals drawn to nihilism formed organizations.
- Jahafil Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad fi Filastin, established in 2008 with a declaration of allegiance to Al-Qaeda, was responsible for rocket attacks on Israel and claimed the abduction of pro-Palestinian activist Vittorio Arrigoni.[7]
- Jaysh al-Islam, known for participating alongside other Palestinian factions in the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006, later clashed with Hamas in its Al-Sabra stronghold in Gaza. The group eventually abandoned the fight.
- Liwa al-Tawhid was long considered the leading Salafi-jihadist organization in Gaza.[8] Following confrontations with Hamas, its fighters were absorbed into the Al-Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades in 2015.[9] Today, it forms part of the multitude of groups operating in Gaza, fighting Israel under the broader shadow of Hamas.
Al-Qaeda has managed to inspire a handful of isolated actors in the past, such as ephemeral groups or lone wolves such as Islam Farokh,[10] but the latest attempt to mobilize fighters and target strategic infrastructure has fallen flat. This failure highlights the diminishing influence of an organization now reduced to residual ultraviolence, scattered across various local conflicts. Undermining the group’s credibility even further is the suspicion that Saif al-Adl, its presumed leader, who called the war in Gaza “a fantastic opportunity,” is hiding in Iran. Al-Qaeda has previously condemned Hamas and Hezbollah for their ties to Tehran.[11]
The situation appears strikingly similar to ISIS, Al-Qaeda’s rival. According to the Syrian opposition, the new leader of the Islamic State, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi, held a meeting in a mountainous area near Palmyra in September 2024. Following the gathering, which included four senior commanders,[12] an order was issued to activate the so-called “external security” unit, supposedly specialized in international operations, to plan attacks in Europe and in the Gulf under the slogan “Vengeance for Gaza.” The Islamic State announced a similar campaign in January 2024 but failed to produce any tangible results.
Although the number of ISIS attacks nearly doubled in Syria and Iraq during the first half of 2024,[13] these operations remain entirely disconnected from the Palestinian conflict. No attacks have occurred in the West or the Gulf, nor has there been a notable wave of recruitment. Their criticism of the Palestinian political leadership[14] has done nothing to influence the reality in the Palestinian territories, a fact that has persisted for years. A striking example of this disconnect came in 2022, when three Arab Israeli activists were arrested in Umm al-Fahm.[15] Despite living under Israeli control, their primary goal was not to engage with the Palestinian cause but to leave and join ISIS fighters in the Sahel, demonstrating how the takfirist ideology of ISIS is fundamentally detached from regional realities and further emphasizing the growing irrelevance of these organizations in the context of Palestine.
Life Cycle Theory of Organizations
The Palestinian case highlights that terrorist organizations are short lived. Their life cycle typically has three stages — birth, peak, and decline — to which the political scientist David Rapoport introduced a fourth stage: dissolution.[16] The organizations are heavily influenced by internal dynamics that limit their longevity, such as fragmented or rival chains of command, and challenges in sustaining operations due to dwindling human, financial, and military resources. These problems lead to the erosion of nihilistic dogmas and certainties. In Palestine, what we observe is ideological obsolescence — the moment a terrorist group reaches the end of its ideological trajectory and finds itself unable to respond effectively to an international event that surpasses its scope. ISIS and Al-Qaeda are disintegrating into decentralized networks that lack both the coordination and the resources necessary to translate their rhetoric into meaningful action.
The media often creates a distorted lens that gives the illusion of truly understanding these organizations. However, by constantly observing and anticipating, we end up over-analyzing statements that, in fact, have negligible impact on the ground. While the “media visibility bias” (John Horgan) can be misleading, a far more pressing question remains, pertaining to the future for the Palestinian Territories.
When hostilities cease, the concerns of terrorism experts may materialize into reality. In the aftermath of Gaza and the West Bank, countless young Palestinians will live with the memory of the wounds of the war. Gaza risks becoming the “root cause”[17] of a new wave of radicalization, a direct response to the devastation endured since October 2023. The critical question will then become: which entity — whether militant, political, or military — will have the structural capacity to absorb and channel this surge of anger among Palestinian youth? Will they organize, arm, and mobilize them in perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Should we fear an operational resurgence from ISIS or Al-Qaeda, enabling them to stage an unexpected comeback? Will they exploit Palestinian frustration to reinsert themselves into a cause that has eluded them, or will they remain indefinitely excluded from this struggle, disconnected from Palestine and powerless spectators of the Middle Eastern tragedy?
The decline of terrorist groups highlights the inherent contradictions of their organizational model. ISIS and Al-Qaeda have seen their regional branches abandon global priorities to focus on local conflicts, significantly weakening the organizations’ influence. Their reliance on indiscriminate violence has alienated the very populations they claim to represent, eroding their local support base and further diminishing their relevance. The Gaza war stands to be a pivotal moment in the decline of ISIS and Al-Qaeda on the global stage, exposing the fatal disconnect between their millenarian ideology and the realities of the modern world. This conflict underscores the ultimate failure of their morbid opportunism, a strategy built on exploiting global tragedies to sow hatred and fear. It signals a strategic dead end and their irrelevance in the contemporary era.
References
[[1]] Ted Robert Gurr (1936-2017). American political scientist and author of Why Men Rebel, Gurr was a specialist in global political insurgency and violence. He studied minorities and the dynamics of insurgency around the world.
[2] The first ISIS message on the war in Gaza is dated 19 October 2023 and is entitled ‘Practical Measures to Fight the Jews’. https://acpss.ahram.org.eg/News/21089.aspx
[3] Martha Crenshaw, (2011). Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences, Routledge.
[4] Hamas and ISIS Allies or enemies? (30 Oct.2023), Nabd.
https://nabd.com/s/127358683-4d9bd8/%D9%88-%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A3%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%9F-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%9F-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84
[5]Pierre Bourdieu, (1980). “Le Sens pratique”, Eds Les Éditions de Minuit.
[6] Al-Qaeda activists have claimed on social media that the ‘Guardians of Al-Masra’ are part of the ‘Army of the Ummah in Jerusalem’, which has said it has no organizational links with al-Qaeda.
[7] Its leader, Hisham Al-Saedni, also known as Abu Walid Al-Maqdisi, headed the group before he was killed in an Israeli air strike on 13 October 2012.
[8] This organization is an extension of the Tawhid and Jihad Brigades and Jund Ansar Allah.
[9] The Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades are a military branch of the Popular Resistance Committees in Gaza.
[10] Islam Farokh, a 26-year-old resident of East Jerusalem, was found to be responsible for a double bombing in Jerusalem in December 2022. Acting alone and motivated by Takfiri ideology, this ‘lone wolf’ had slipped under the Shin Beth’s radar. A mechanical engineer, he had been radicalized online, learning how to make explosives from content shared by ISIS sympathizers. For months he meticulously prepared his attacks, digging an isolated pit in the Binyamin region to make homemade bombs and hide raw materials for future attacks. Islam Farokh was arrested by the Israeli authorities in 2022. https://13tv.co.il/item/news/politics/security/terror-jerusalem-903374181/
[11] “Mystery of the Al-Qaeda succession”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 31-Jul-2023
[12] Among those present was Shaddad, governor of the western Euphrates sector, known as Wilayat al-Sham. Also present were Al-Shayeb, alias ‘Al-Hajji’, in charge of the areas east of the Euphrates, known as ‘Wilayat al-Khair’, and Abu Muhaymen, responsible for collecting dues from merchants in the areas controlled by the organization.
[13] “Islamic State attacks on track to double in Iraq and Syria compared to last year, US military says”, (July 17, 2024). AP News
[14] On social networks, ISIS supporters who use pseudonyms criticize Fatah and Hamas in the strongest terms. For example: “Pay no attention to them, for their declarations and slogans are vain and futile.”
[15] Muhammad Farouk Yosef Agbaria and Abdel Mahdi Masoud Muhammad Jabarin were 21 years old at the time of the events. Only Abdel Mahdi Masoud Jabarin was known to Israeli security services for previous attacks. https://www.maariv.co.il/news/military/Article-939039
[16] Waves of Global Terrorism, (2022). Columbia University Press.
[17] Security fears in the Middle East over the return of ISIS and Al-Qaeda due to the war in Gaza, (July 19, 2024). Youm7. https://www.youm7.com/story/2024/7/19/%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8/6644987
