Introduction
The Middle East is experiencing a phase of profound geopolitical upheaval, compelling regional and global powers to recalibrate the foundations of their military and defense engagements. In this shifting landscape, the deepening military partnership between Egypt, an indispensable regional actor, and China, a rising global power, emerges as an indicator of broader strategic realignments. This analysis unpacks the structural context underpinning the Sino-Egyptian defense relationship, delves into the strategic calculations driving Beijing’s military outreach to Cairo, and explores Egypt’s rationale for embracing Chinese military technologies and defense capabilities. It further assesses the potential ramifications of this evolving partnership for the balance of power and security configurations in a region marked by escalating volatility.
Structural Shifts in the Middle East’s Regional Order Amid Growing Chinese Influence
The geopolitical disruption in the Middle East reflects the fragmentation of traditional patterns of stability and the reconfiguration of regional and international power balances, driven by intensifying geopolitical competition among regional and global actors. These shifts are a direct outcome of a series of overlapping geopolitical shocks, beginning with the far-reaching consequences of Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, which triggered strategic and political repositioning across multiple theaters in the region, most notably Gaza, southern Lebanon, and the Syrian Golan Heights. This was further compounded by protracted tensions in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, culminating in recent military escalations involving Iran.
Regional actors, chief among them Israel, are actively seeking to expand their geo-security influence and to impose new strategic realities by enhancing their military capabilities and engaging in complex security arrangements that transcend national boundaries and extend into neighboring regional spheres. Parallel to this trajectory is the growing involvement of global powers, most notably China, in the region. China has strategically transformed from being merely an economic partner in the Middle East to becoming an increasingly active political and security player. China’s renewed ambition to deepen its ties with Arab states was clearly articulated by Foreign Minister Wang Yi
[[1]] during his address at the 10th Ministerial Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, where he affirmed that “China is ready to play a greater political and security role with Arab countries and supports their efforts to address their challenges in a manner that respects their interests and promotes sustainable development.”
China wants to assume a greater role in reshaping the international order through its three flagship initiatives — the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative — and to continue its pursuit of a high-tech, innovation-driven economy. Since the Global Security Initiative (GSI) extends to the Middle East, China successfully mediated the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023, triggering a broader wave of regional rapprochement. It also issued a position paper on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and facilitated dialogue among Palestinian factions in Beijing, marking a significant step toward advancing peace and stability in the region. [[2]] relationship with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is expected to remain strategically significant in the foreseeable future as Beijing. China also views the region as a platform to showcase the success of the “Chinese model” of governance, economic development, and multilateralism to the world, particularly to countries of the Global South.
China’s current strategy toward the Middle East broadly rests on four strategic pillars:[[3]]
- Achieving national rejuvenation and ensuring regime security. This includes supporting the Chinese economic model, securing hydrocarbon supplies, advancing China’s strategic objectives through financial resilience, and deepening security and defense cooperation with the region.
- Constructing a multipolar global order centered around China’s interests and values. By expanding the participation of Middle Eastern and North African states in existing multilateral forums and institutions, China hopes to strengthen its position and influence within these platforms.
- Positioning China as a moral leader of the Global South. China hopes to achieve this primarily through symbolic and rhetorical support aimed at amplifying its normative appeal.
- Projecting the success of the Chinese model. China hopes to show that its system is a viable alternative to Western models of governance and development.
In this context, Beijing’s mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, culminating in a trilateral statement announcing[[4]] the agreement to normalize relations between the Saudi Arabia and Iran, represented a turning point. China demonstrated its soft-power abilities, building consensus through multi-track diplomacy in a region marked by deepening complexity, and winning broad acceptance, even by rival actors. This granted Beijing emerging regional legitimacy that extends beyond the economic sphere into the political domain. China opened new avenues to play a more active role in shaping regional politics. This will inevitably lead to specific security realignments, thus reinforcing China’s position as a rising global power with increasing influence in the geopolitical and security dynamics of the Middle East.
A Strategic Leap in Sino-Egyptian Military Cooperation
Egypt and China share a long-standing history of civilizational interaction that stretches back thousands of years. In the modern era, Egypt became the first Arab and African country to officially recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1956, paving the way for broader Chinese engagement with both the Arab world and the African continent. In response, China extended[[5]]political support to Egypt during the Suez Crisis and later backed Cairo’s efforts to regain its territories following the 1967 setback "The 1967 setback, referring to the Arab–Israeli war in which Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and the Golan Heights. "
Building on this historical partnership, China and Egypt signed[[6]] a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, officially launched by President Xi Jinping and Abdel Fattah El-Sisi on December 23, 2014, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. This agreement was significant in elevating bilateral cooperation across all sectors.
Military ties between the two countries have remained relatively limited, with the exception of the[[7]] K-8 (JL-8) basic training aircraft joint production agreement, which was signed by Egypt’s Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI) and China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC) in 2000. Another notable development was the docking of the Chinese guided-missile destroyer Xi’an at Egypt’s[[8]]main port in Alexandria. Though the event was officially described as a four-day “technical stop,” it should not be viewed in isolation. The terminal the warship docked at was majority-owned (over 80%)[[9]] by two Chinese companies (Hutchison Ports and the state-owned Yantai Port Group of Shenzhen) and the docking of the Xi’an was followed just five days later by a joint Chinese-Egyptian naval exercise. Naval units from both countries,[[10]] including the Xi’an, participated in drills aimed at supporting “maritime security” and ensuring the safety of global “sea lines of communication.”
These two developments raise critical questions about the growing intersection between China’s commercial port operations and the strategic ambitions[[11]] of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Over the years, China has routinely used foreign ports managed by Chinese companies for naval maintenance and repairs under the guise of technical stopovers, including in Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Djibouti, Greece, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Spain, but this the first time it had done so in Egypt.
China and Egypt also launched their first-ever joint air exercise, titled “Eagles of Civilization 20259,”[[12]]at the Wadi Abu Rish Air Base in southern Egypt between April 19 and early May 2025. According to a statement issued by China’s Ministry of National Defense,[[13]] the exercise was deemed “of great importance for strengthening practical cooperation, consolidating mutual trust, and deepening the friendship between the two armed forces.” The significance of these exercises extended beyond their immediate tactical and training dimensions, revealing the shifting patterns of security interaction in the Middle East and China’s calculated efforts to expand its military footprint in a region marked by ongoing great-power competition. Egypt’s hosting of these drills reinforces its status as a pivotal player in regional security dynamics.
One of the key dimensions of the evolving military partnership between Egypt and China is the emphasis on joint projects and technology transfer. The local production[[14]] of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Wing Loong-1D and ASN-209, with Chinese technical support, is a prominent example of this cooperation. This technology transfer is of critical importance to Egypt’s long-term objective of reducing dependence on foreign suppliers and building a more self-sufficient defense industry. By acquiring the capability to manufacture advanced military equipment domestically, Egypt can enhance its defense autonomy and potentially open avenues for future arms exports.
These events indicate that Egypt is rapidly moving toward a comprehensive restructuring of its military system by diversifying its armament sources and gradually moving away from exclusive reliance on its traditional Western allies, chief among them the United States. This strategic shift no longer appears to be merely a choice aimed at broadening defense alternatives, rather, it has become a necessary response to mounting pressures, particularly the stalling of critical Western arms deals, chief among them the U.S. sale of F-15 fighter jets[[15]] which has yet to materialize despite repeated assurances from Washington, amid tightening political restrictions on American arms exports. “The Biden administration decided to withhold $130 million of military aid to Egypt out of a total of $300 million allocated under conditions; this amount was frozen until the Egyptian government meets the specified human rights requirements.[[16]]
Concern within political and military circles in both the U.S. and Israel has arisen regarding reports of advanced negotiations between Cairo and Beijing for the acquisition of sophisticated Chinese fighter jets.[[17]] These reportedly include the J-10CE, as well as the fifth-generation stealth aircraft J-35, often described as China’s advanced counterpart to the American F-35. An August 9, 2025 report by specialized Chinese media,[[18]] however, revealed a shift in Egypt’s armament strategy, marked by its decision to forgo the purchase of advanced J-10CE fighter jets, despite advanced negotiations with Beijing, and instead opting to acquire $400-million’ worth of drones. The report attributed the decision primarily to financial constraints, noting that Egypt’s annual defense budget stands at just $4.5 billion, far below the estimated $8 billion cost of the deal.
Other reports indicate[[19]] that Egypt is about to finalize a major naval deal with China involving the acquisition of Type 039A Yuan-class submarines, a platform that has drawn significant interest from international military circles due to its advanced stealth capabilities and extended underwater endurance enabled by air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems. These naval capabilities would provide Cairo with a critical strategic advantage, particularly amid intensifying regional competition in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
Strategic Repositioning: What Are the Objectives of Each Side?
Chinese Premier Li Qiang arrived[[20]] in the Egyptian capital, Cairo, on July 9, 2025, in a visit underscoring the strength and strategic[[21]] depth of Sino-Egyptian relations and carrying both political and economic messages. During the visit, Premier Li highlighted[[22]] the evolution of relations between the two countries, stating: “In recent years, under the strategic leadership of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, our bilateral ties have witnessed remarkable growth. Mutual political trust has continued to deepen.” He further noted that the two presidents had reached “important understandings during their two meetings last year on advancing the establishment of a Sino-Egyptian community with a shared future in the new era.”
The year 2024, which was declared the “Year of Egyptian-Chinese Partnership,” [[23]] witnessed the consolidation of economic and diplomatic ties between the two countries. In September, a delegation from Egypt’s Suez Canal Economic Zone signed contracts and memoranda of understanding worth $1 billion with Chinese companies. The year concluded with a visit by Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly to Beijing.[[24]]
In recent years, China has aimed to leverage the geostrategic developments in the Middle East to move beyond its traditional economic role and establish a comprehensive, multidimensional strategic presence in the region through security, military, and political partnerships. Through this strategy, Beijing seeks to capitalize on the regional decline in confidence in Washington and the fluctuations in the U.S.’s arms policies, positioning itself as a reliable alternative in advanced armaments without imposing political conditions or bureaucratic restrictions. This approach has materialized in the defense cooperation with Egypt.
On the other hand, cooperation with Egypt provides a vital testing ground for the Chinese military’s capabilities in complex desert and coastal operational environments, beyond its traditional East Asian theater. This aligns with the People’s Liberation Army’s “Far Seas”[[25]]doctrine. This cooperation also fits within Beijing’s calculated global military expansion strategy, through establishing or utilizing logistical support points in strategic regions, enabling it to protect its transnational interests, especially during times of crisis.
China’s keen interest[[26]] in strengthening its relations with Egypt should also be viewed within the framework of its massive Belt and Road Initiative.[[27]] Situated at the northeastern tip of Africa, Egypt serves as a vital gateway to the continent, with the Suez Canal acting as a crucial maritime passage connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Egypt’s large population, exceeding 100 million, represents a significant consumer base for Chinese goods. It is therefore unsurprising that China has made substantial investments in numerous infrastructure projects directly linked to the Belt and Road Initiative.
In this context, Egypt’s rapprochement with China is driven by several strategic considerations, most notably:
- The Gaza Crisis and Israeli Right-Wing Policies:
Cairo is closely following the proposals circulating within certain Israeli political circles regarding resettlement issues, and affirms that any potential arrangements should take into account Egypt’s national security considerations. The Egyptian leadership also believes that diversifying international partnerships, given the shifting political positions of some parties, can help maintain an adequate margin for political maneuvering and avoid exposure to pressures that do not align with its strategic priorities. A prominent manifestation of this approach was Egypt’s organization of the joint air exercise “Eagles of Civilization” with China, coinciding with the peak of Israeli military operations in Gaza and growing calls within the Israeli government for the displacement of Gaza’s population. This exercise sent a message, signaling that Cairo is moving to strengthen partnerships with major powers competing with the U.S., thereby reinforcing its strategic autonomy and shielding itself from political and security blackmail during crisis moments.
- The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) Dilemma:
Egypt regards the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Africa’s largest hydroelectric project with a planned capacity of 6,450 MW, relies on the Blue Nile, which provides about 80% of Egypt and Sudan’s water. While Ethiopia sees it as a development project, Cairo and Khartoum fear its filling and operation could threaten their water and food security.” as vital since it is linked to the country’s water security. The limited progress in international efforts aimed at enhancing coordination between Addis Ababa and Cairo, has spurred Egypt to develop and expand its defense and security partnerships as part of a comprehensive approach designed to support national capabilities and safeguard strategic interests. Although China holds significant influence in Ethiopia, Egypt’s possession of Chinese weaponry does not necessarily imply a direct strike on the dam but rather expands its strategic maneuvering space. This space remains contingent on coordination with Beijing, which aims to maintain balanced relations with both Egypt and Ethiopia.
- Surrounding Geostrategic Threats:
The tense situations in Sudan and Libya, along with counterterrorism efforts in Sinai, requires the diversification of Egypt’s arms sources and readiness to address the complex and intertwined challenges. These challenges include the presence of cross-border armed groups, smuggling operations, and the continuation of terrorist activities, which necessitate advanced military capabilities
- Repeated Tensions in Cairo-Washington Relations Over Human Rights(:[[28]]
The U.S. Congress has linked portions of military aid to Egypt improving its human rights record, and has frozen or reprogrammed support at times. The Biden administration acknowledged the strategic importance of the U.S. Egypt relationship, but its focus on human rights conditions has created friction with Cairo, which regards such demands as interference in its internal affairs. This has pushed Egypt to diversify its partnerships toward powers like China, which adhere to a policy of non-intervention.
Conclusion: The Geopolitical Implications of Chinese Influence in the Middle East
The recent developments in Egypt’s defense strategy, particularly the deepening of its military partnership with China, come amid significant geopolitical shifts in the Middle East. The silence of the U.S., Egypt’s traditional military partner, about Egypt’s purchase of Chinese military systems, including the Y-20 aircraft, has fueled speculation about a potential regional realignment.
U.S. silence can be interpreted in various ways. It may reflect a “wait-and-see” approach by Washington, acknowledging Egypt’s sovereign right to diversify its military partnerships, or it could signal a strategic reassessment of U.S. priorities in the region. Regardless of the specific rationale, the lack of an immediate public response from the U.S. suggests a potential shift in the longstanding dynamics of the U.S.-Egypt relationship.
The growing partnership between Egypt and China carries serious implications for Egypt’s relations with its Western allies, particularly the U.S. Cairo’s attempts to leverage the ongoing competition between Washington and Beijing to secure political advantages in a manner reminiscent of Cold War-era balancing[[29]] may backfire and negatively impact its relationship with Washington for several key reasons:
- The U.S. has long been a key strategic ally of Egypt, providing substantial military and economic aid, in addition to political support over the past four decades. The U.S. National Defense Strategy has identified China as the greatest threat[[30]] to American national security interests, so Washington may view Cairo’s efforts to strengthen bilateral ties with China as fraternizing with an adversary.
- The introduction of advanced Chinese military equipment requires specialized operational infrastructure, long-term training, and intelligence compatibility,[[31]] which may conflict with existing Western systems already integrated into the Egyptian military. This will create logistical and tactical challenges in integrating Chinese systems within Egypt’s combat doctrine.
- Some in Israel see potential implications for regional military balance with the evolving defense cooperation between China and Egypt. This could encourage increased dialogue between Israel and the U.S. to address any related concerns through diplomatic and security channels, but it could also lead to Israeli political interventions that hinder cooperation with Egypt. Israel could also push for restrictions on the supply of certain military systems to Egypt or even economic sanctions.
- Ultimately,[[32]] China’s defense and security priorities in its neighboring regions and immediate vicinity will shape Beijing’s strategy toward the Middle East and North Africa. It is unlikely that China will seek a more active and deeply invested security and defense relationship in the region until its core security priorities, such as “reunification” with Taiwan, are fulfilled.
References
[1][1]( Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “H.E. Wang Yi at the 10th Ministerial Conference of The China-Arab States Cooperation Forum.” May 30, 2024. Link
[2]) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Wang Yi Meets with Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Dermer.” MFA China, September 15, 2024. Link
[3]) International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Evolving Dynamics of China’s Middle East and North Africa Strategy.” May 8, 2025. Link
[4]) Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Sweden, “Joint Trilateral Statement by the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.” March 11, 2023. Link
[5]) Eurasia Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Eagles of Civilization 2025: A Strategic Turning Point in Military Relations between Egypt and China.” May 9, 2025. Link
[6]) The Economic Times, “China, Egypt sign strategic partnership agreement.” December 24, 2014. Link
[7]( Ibid
[8]( Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, “Chinese missile destroyer ‘Xi’an’ makes technical stop in Egypt’s Alexandria.” August 17, 2019. Link
[9]) Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert, “Pier Competitor: China’s Power Position in Global Ports.” International Security, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Spring 2022), pp. 9–47.
[10])Egypt Independent, “Egyptian‑Chinese naval forces begin joint training in Mediterranean sea.” August 22, 2019. Link
[11]( Middle East Institute, ““Chinas Growing Maritime Presence in Egypt’s Ports and the Suez Canal.”” November 3, 2023. Link
[12]( Asia Live News Service, ““Eagles of Civilization 2025: China and Egypt Deepen Military Ties with First‑Ever Joint Air Drills.”” April 23, 2025. Link
[13]( Xinhua, “Chinese, Egyptian air forces to hold first joint training.” April 16, 2025. Link
[14]) Defence Arabia, “An Evolving Strategic Landscape: Egypt’s Shifting Military Partnerships.” April 23, 2025. Link
[15]) The Arab Weekly, “US deliver F‑15 jets to Egypt as it seeks to reassure allies.” March 16, 2022. Link
[16]) Al Arabiya “US to Hold $130 Million in Military Aid to Egypt over Human Rights: Report.” September 14, 2021.Link
[17]( Defence Security Asia, “Egypt Eyes Chinese J‑35A Stealth Fighter as U.S. Blocks F‑35 Sales to Preserve Israel’s Edge.” January 28, 2025. Link
[18]) Defense Arabic. “Egypt Abandons J-10C Fighter Jet Deal in Favor of Purchasing Chinese WJ-700 Drones.” August 9, 2025. Link
[19]( Defence Security Asia, “Egypt Poised to Redraw Mediterranean Power Balance with Chinese Yuan‑Class Submarine Deal.” April 28, 2025. Link
[20]( Asharq News, “Egypt Receives Chinese Premier Amid Cairo’s Strategic Bet on Beijing,” July 9, 2025. Link
[21]) Youm7, ““Chinese Premier: President El-Sisi Is a Dear Friend of Beijing and Commands Great Respect,”” July 10, 2025. Link
[22]) Asharq Al-Awsat, “Egypt and China to Deepen Strategic Partnership in Face of Regional Challenges,” July 10, 2025. Link
[23]) The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China, Egypt Agree to Enhance Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” December 31, 2024. Link
[24]) Daily News Egypt, “Egypt’s PM Returns from China after Signing Agreements, Holding Talks,” September 7, 2024. Link
[25]) Erickson, Andrew S., “China Maritime Report: ‘One Force, Two Force, Red Force, Blue Force: PLA Navy Blue Force Development for Realistic Combat Training,’” September 4, 2024. Link
[26]) Al-Anani, Khalil, “Egypt’s Strategic Partnership with China: Opportunities and Implications,” Arab Center Washington DC, January 27, 2023. Link
[27]) World Bank, “Belt and Road Initiative,” March 29, 2018. Link
[28]) Reuters, “U.S. to hold $130 million of Egypt’’s military aid over human rights – sources,” September 14, 2021. Link
[29]( Al‑Anani, Khalil, “Egypt’s Strategic Partnership with China,” January 27, 2023. Link
[30]) Babb, Carla, “China Remains Top Threat in New U.S. National Defense Strategy,” Voice of America, October 27, 2022. Link
[31]) Ibid.
[32]) International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “The Evolving Dynamics of China’s Middle East and North Africa Strategy: Future Scenarios,” May 2025. Link
