In the last years, the skies over the Middle East and Eastern Europe have reflected the emergence of a new operational environment in modern warfare. From drone swarms over Ukrainian frontlines to precision ballistic missile barrages launched by Iran against Israel and the Houthi campaigns in the Red Sea and beyond, recent conflicts are reshaping strategic thinking around air and missile defence. For the Arab Gulf states, these developments serve as indicators of future risk. As both state and non-state actors leverage increasingly sophisticated strike capabilities, Arab Gulf states must reassess their readiness against these emerging threats. This assessment has gained further urgency after June 23, 2025, when Iran launched a large-scale missile attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar —its most direct strike to date on a US military installation in the Gulf—causing limited damage but underscoring the vulnerability of even heavily defended sites.
Operational Lessons from Recent Conflicts
The war in Ukraine has served as a laboratory for missile and drone warfare. Since late 2022, Russian forces have conducted a prolonged strategic bombing campaign against Ukraine's energy infrastructure, industrial capacity, and critical urban centres. These strikes have involved combinations of ballistic and cruise missiles—such as Iskander-M and Kalibr—as well as massed swarms of Iran-purchased Shahed-131/136 drones and their Russian-manufactured derivatives like the Geran-3. These systems have been used to test and stretch Ukraine's integrated air defence network, creating logistical and psychological pressure even when kinetic damage has been limited.
Russia’s targeting pattern has revealed an adaptive playbook: using older, less accurate drones and missiles as decoys to exhaust Ukraine’s interceptors, followed by precision strikes with more capable systems. Critical power infrastructures have been repeatedly targeted during winter months. The scale and tempo of these attacks have required Ukraine and its partners to develop resilient command-and-control mechanisms, diversify early-warning assets, and procure short-range air defences (SHORAD) to protect key urban and energy nodes.
Iran has absorbed similar lessons. The April and October 2024 missile strikes on Israel (Operation "True Promise I and II") showcased both improved coordination and the operational limitations of Iran's long-range kinetic capabilities. The April attack demonstrated Tehran’s ability to coordinate waves of drones, cruise missiles, and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), although with limited damage due to high interception rates. October’s barrage, however, focused exclusively on 200 MRBMs, of which at least 39 reached Israeli airspace. Better timing, the exclusive use of ballistic missiles, and tighter targeting zones increased the penetration rate, highlighting the stress imposed on even highly capable systems.
Iran's evolving tactics—such as firing older missiles as decoys to exhaust interceptors—reveal a growing understanding of modern air defence dynamics. Still, its arsenal remains vulnerable to well-coordinated, multi-layered defences like Israel's Arrow-2 and 3, David's Sling, and Iron Dome, primarily when supported by allied contributions. For Gulf planners, the message is clear: future attacks are likely to combine mass, diversity, and deception, necessitating integrated and sustainable defences, including resilient anti-air deployments for urban and strategic infrastructure protection. The recent Al Udeid strike, involving ballistic missiles launched from Iranian territory toward U.S. targets in Qatar, further demonstrated Tehran’s ability to project power directly into the Gulf and to test U.S. and partner defensive responses without crossing into large-scale escalation.
Furthermore, Iran has reportedly delivered Jamal-69 (Zolfaghar) SRBMs, Arqab (Paveh) cruise missiles, and UAVs to Iraqi militias, enhancing their capacity to threaten US, Israeli, and Gulf assets. Similarly, since November 2023, Houthis have employed UAVs and cruise and ballistic missiles in hundreds of attacks on maritime and land-based targets, underscoring their growing reliance on these strategic systems. In this context, the lines between Iran’s conventional missile program and its regional proxy capabilities continue to blur.
Drone threats also remain persistent, as they can evade detection due to their size and manoeuvrability. For instance, in July 2024, a Houthi kamikaze UAV struck a building near the US embassy branch office in Tel Aviv. Sometime in the coming decade, the introduction of artificial intelligence could further accelerate the magnitude of this threat.
These developments point to an urgent need for Gulf states to absorb tactical and strategic lessons from the evolving nature of modern missile warfare.
Threat Assessment: Iran and the Houthis’ Expanding Strike Arsenal
Iran's missile arsenal poses the most immediate air defence challenge for Gulf states. Its inventory includes a full spectrum of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs), cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) capable of saturating or circumventing traditional defences.
Its MRBM portfolio includes legacy systems like the Shahab-3, upgrades like the Ghadr-1, Emad, and Sejjil, and newer, more agile platforms like Kheibar Shekan and the hypersonic Fattah. These latter platforms feature manoeuvrable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) that increase survivability against interception. With circular error probable (CEP) figures now measured in tens of meters, many of these weapons are accurate enough for precision strikes (up to 2,000 km). Short-range systems (SRBMs) like the Fateh-110, Zolfaghar, and Dezful remain core to Iran’s regional deterrent. They are mobile, road-launched, and easily concealed and have demonstrated growing precision within ranges up to 700 km.
Loitering munitions such as the Shahed-136, already deployed in Ukraine, have become key components in asymmetric saturation strategies. Iranian-Russian collaboration has enhanced the design of these systems—now known as Geran-2/3 in Russian service—and may contribute to broader tactical refinements in future Iranian deployments.
UAVs are also a key Houthi tool. Their Sammad series, derived from Iranian designs, function as loitering munitions and ISR platforms. With datalink capabilities, the Shihab variant has been central in recent Red Sea attacks. Their low cost and ease of production make them a persistent threat to Gulf infrastructure, even as limitations in beyond-line-of-sight targeting persist.
Iran and its proxies have repeatedly used this arsenal. Since 2017, Tehran has launched strikes in Syria and Iraq. In 2019, Houthis hit Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais, temporarily halting nearly 7% of global petroleum output. In 2020, Tehran launched over 20 ballistic missiles at US troops in the Ain al-Asad base in Iraq. In 2022, the UAE capital came under repeated Houthi missile attacks. In 2024, the IRGC claimed strikes in Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria.
Iranian messaging in 2025 has also emphasized its readiness to strike Gulf states hosting US assets should war break out with Washington or Tel Aviv. Officials have explicitly warned Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain not to allow US forces to use bases on their soil. These threats are part of a broader coercive strategy aimed at deterring regional cooperation with any prospective US-Israeli military campaign.
In this context, the SRBM threat looms large. These systems offer Tehran a prompt-strike option against regional adversaries, narrowing warning windows and overwhelming defences through sheer speed and proximity. The Gulf's air defence planning must consider system capability, strategic geography, and adversary intent.
Gulf Missile Defense Posture: Strengths and Structural Gaps
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates maintain robust multi-tiered missile defence systems. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi operate long-range American systems like Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD and plan to make the South Korean Cheongung II KM-SAM systems as key components of their mid-range SAM coverage. These deliveries are expected to support the gradual replacement of older platforms such as the US Hawk and French Crotale platforms. Both also operate the Russian-made Pantsir-S1 to counter UAVs and other low-cost threats.
While these systems reflect significant investments in advanced capabilities, opportunities remain to enhance their coordination and resilience. These systems originate from multiple vendors with differing radar wavelengths, communication standards, and engagement protocols. This complicates operational coordination, particularly in scenarios involving saturation or multi-axis attacks. The June 2025 Iranian barrages on Israel also revealed the consistent interceptor demand such scenarios can create, with reports indicating over 150 THAAD interceptors used by U.S. forces alone during those strikes . Requests for additional stocks from regional partners highlighted the importance of pre-arranged resupply mechanisms.
Operational experience has also exposed the vulnerability of some of these systems and underscored the need to ensure their survivability in contested environments. For instance, platforms like the Russian-made Pantsir-S1 have shown limitations in past engagements—including in Libya, the Caucasus, and Ukraine—where they were reportedly neutralized by coordinated tactics involving electronic warfare (EW) and precision strikes, particularly from air and artillery assets. While these systems offer a flexible and mobile option against asymmetric threats, their performance in these conflicts—alongside the growing threat posed by other low-cost platforms like FPV drones—highlights the importance of continuously assessing their suitability for evolving operational requirements. This is especially relevant given their role in protecting critical infrastructure and strategic assets across the Gulf.
Logistical sustainability also remains a critical consideration. As seen in Ukraine and Israel, even advanced air defense systems can face challenges in prolonged engagements, particularly in terms of interceptor availability. Maintaining sufficient stockpiles is complicated by diverse munition types and the complexities of international supply chains. While U.S.-manufactured systems like the Patriot and THAAD continue to deliver high performance, their operational costs and limited production capacity have featured prominently in U.S. debates on ongoing support to allies. Similarly, the conflict in Ukraine has prompted Russia to prioritize domestic defense needs, with a notable reduction—estimated at over 80% in 2024—in arms deliveries to the MENA region. This development underscores the importance of supply reliability and diversification when planning long-term capability sustainment.
Lastly, geopolitical dynamics further shape procurement strategies. While the United States remains the Gulf’s primary security partner, its strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific and evolving defense posture have spurred regional interest in strengthening local capabilities and enhancing strategic autonomy. At the same time, regulatory constraints around defense partnerships with Russia or China present additional factors for consideration as Gulf states seek balanced and future-ready procurement options.
Policy Considerations for the Gulf
Recent conflicts have underscored the urgency for Gulf states to transition from missile defence postures built around hardware accumulation to integrated, resilient, and adaptive architectures. Drawing on lessons from Israeli and Ukrainian experiences, as well as the operational behaviour of Iran and its proxies, Gulf planners should consider the following priorities:
- Prioritize Multi-Tier Integration and Interoperability: Gulf air defences rely on systems from multiple vendors, which can present challenges for real-time coordination. Building a regional defence architecture that unifies disparate systems into a cohesive network - through shared radar protocols, common operating pictures (COP), and streamlined command-and-control (C2) is central.
- Invest in Sustainable Stockpiles and Local Production: Missile defence in high-intensity conflicts requires sustained interceptor availability. Gulf states should prioritize stockpile depth and explore local licensed interceptor production to avoid dependency bottlenecks in prolonged crises. Co-production agreements—like those with South Korea—can help mitigate dependency risks.
- Expand Counter-Drone and SHORAD Capabilities: Recent conflicts have highlighted the limitations of some short-range air defence systems when confronted by coordinated drone saturation, electronic warfare, and long-range strikes. Gulf states should prioritize mobile and modular systems with enhanced survivability, integrating electro-optical sensors, AI-enabled tracking, and hardened networks resistant to jamming. Investments should focus on platforms that can sustain performance under electronic and kinetic stress, ensuring the better defence of urban and strategic sites from low-altitude threats.
- Train for complex multi-vector scenarios: Gulf militaries should engage in regular exercises simulating multi-domain attacks with drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. Operational readiness for these scenarios—seen in both Israel and Ukraine—is essential to surviving the opening stages of any high-end conflict.
- Harden strategic sites against saturation strikes: Gulf states must anticipate precision strikes on oil infrastructure, ports, and bases. This includes deploying layered defences and passive hardening of critical sites.
- Bolster domestic innovation and sovereign defence industry: Inspired by other examples in the region, Gulf states should scale up domestic innovation ecosystems to reduce reliance on foreign defence vendors also in the anti-air artillery sector.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
Author’s Bio
Francesco Schiavi is a Middle East international relations specialist focused on security, defense, and governance in the Levant and the Gulf. He is a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute of Switzerland (MEIS) and a contributor to many international outlets, including Al-Monitor and the NATO Defense College Foundation. For five years, he has been a researcher for the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), and since 2017, he coordinated the Middle East section of the Italian magazine Pandora. Between 2023 and 2024, he has served as an advisor to the Steering Committee for the EuroMeSco Annual Conference, organized by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) in Barcelona in cooperation with the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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