Though Sino-Russian relations are far from being immune to tensions, the military-security cooperation serves as a powerful counter to the United States’ efforts to cause a split between Moscow and Beijing.
Since Donald Trump’s return to power the United States has intensified its diplomatic outreach to Russia, aiming to ease mutual differences over Ukraine and other contentious issues such as Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Washington is primarily motivated by its broader strategic goal of driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing[1] in an effort to counter China’s global projection of power[2].
Until recently the prospect of direct US-Russia negotiations seemed unlikely. Indeed, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, US-Russia relations have deteriorated sharply. The Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 led to sanctions from Washington, a bolstered NATO with Finland and Sweden joining the alliance, and stronger relations between the United States and the European countries.
Yet, Washington’s renewed interest in engaging Moscow appears rooted in a strategic recalibration: a long-term pivot away from Europe and the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific region. United States’ policymakers recognize that isolating China will be difficult without at least partially engaging Russia. There is some strategic rationale behind this thinking. Historically, Russia and China have had a fraught relationship marked by competition and mistrust, including military skirmishes such as the 1969 border conflict. Even today, their partnership – while strong – is not without complications. In Central Asia, for instance, China has surpassed Russia economically and is increasingly active in the region’s security sphere while in the South Caucasus it has signed a series of strategic partnership agreements . Moreover, since Moscow’s foreign policy has pivoted sharply toward Asia there is a growing appetite in Russia for a more balanced approach to foreign relations which would involve lessening dependence on its eastern neighbor.
Nevertheless, despite the existing potential for differences in the Sino-Russian partnership, splitting Moscow from Beijing will be difficult given the scope and range of their cooperation in such areas as defense and security.
Security and Military Dimension
Since 1990s Russia has been among China’s top arms suppliers which boosted the latter’s military capabilities and allowed China to ramp up domestic production. China especially benefited in terms of air, naval and anti-air capabilities, which helped it to project power onto the South-China Sea. Su-35 fighter jets as well S-400 air defense systems are most prominent high-tech items that Russia sold to China[4]. Then in 2016 additional agreements were reached for the sale of Russian D-30 and Al-31 aircraft engines to the Chinese side[5]. The bilateral military cooperation also included the progress on production of Russian high-tech on Chinese soil itself. For example, Be-103 amphibious aircraft and 3M-54E (SS-N-27) Klub Sizzler antiship missiles.
Despite the growing military and defense cooperation, in reality Russian arms exports to China have actually decreased[6]. The reason is China’s flourishing domestic production capacity. China is now capable of producing fully indigenous missiles, fighter jets etc. Russia still retains technological prominence in some areas such as submarines and missiles, but the country since 2022 has turned into a net importer of Chinese technologies such as semiconductors, industrial machinery and chemicals.
The bilateral defense cooperation grew significantly since 2014 when Russia’s relations with the EU and the United States nosedived and Moscow was keen to diversify its foreign relations. One of the examples of this expanding cooperation since 2014 is an effort by both countries to produce high-tech weaponry through joint programs. Heavy-lift helicopters, tactical missiles or even a joint project to produce an early warning system for China were among the many that have been initiated by both sides. The introduction of joint project concept is an incremental development in Sino-Russian defense relations. More importantly, joint projects will likely remain a hallmark of bilateral relations as both are sides are regard them as beneficial, despite some concerns from the Russian side.
Similar upward trajectory was observable in the security cooperation between China and Russia. For example, strategic security consultations are held on a yearly basis increasing bilateral trust[7]. In November 2021, for example, the then Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu signed a “Roadmap for Military Cooperation 2021-2025”, committing both militaries to closer coordination of exercises, intelligence, training, and technology projects over the next five years[8]. In late 2024 Russian national security adviser Shoigu attended China’s Zhuhai Air Show where he toured PLA hardware alongside Chinese counterparts[9]. Later on China’s foreign minister Wang Yi at the G20 summit, affirming their “comprehensive partnership” on security matters.
The two countries have also expanded cooperation on such issues as security in the Arctic region, Central Asia and general the Indo-Pacific region. Another vital component of China-Russia security cooperation has been naval and land military drills both bilaterally or within the framework of multilateral organizations such as the SCO. Among the land exercises the Zapad/Interaction 2021 is noteworthy. Then came Vostok-2022 (in Russia’s Far East) and Tsentr/Kavkaz series which have since included Chinese brigades, demonstrating joint command interoperability.
There are also air drills such as the one held in June 2023 when the joint air exercises consisted of two components: one in the Sea of Japan and another in the Pacific Ocean. These were followed by naval drills. Joint naval patrol such in 2003 in the Bering Sea is another feature of bilateral security cooperation. Overall since 2022 the scope of bilateral naval drills notably grew with Russian and Chinese military ships visiting each other’s ports. The Okean 2024 exercise, a massive 6-day naval event that had been carried out since 1985, has also been brought back by Russia[10]. As part of Okean 2024, Chinese navy took part in drills in the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Sea of Okhotsk. The growing frequency of Sino-Russian military drills, especially in the Pacific region is in a way a signal to heightened NATO interest in the area and to a number of military drills conducted by the United States and its partners.
In short, bilateral security and military cooperation have ranged from direct arms sale to joint weaponry production to drills from the Arctic Circle to the Indian Ocean. These maneuvers help to improve interoperability, give each side insight into the other’s tactics and technology, and send political messages of geopolitical solidarity especially at the time when the two countries face groing pressure from the US and the EU on issues ranging from Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific region.
Political dimension – Reverse Kissinger?
There is also a (geo)political dimension to the developing Sino-Russia bilateral relations and why splitting this partnership is likely to be unsuccessful. Chinese and Russian political leaders have held numerous meetings since 2022 when the war in Ukraine began. In early 2022 Moscow and Beijing declared a “no limits” partnership, pledging to deepen ties and to coordinate policies against geopolitical competitors[11]. Both oppose the US and the West in general in its attempts to maintain superiority on the global stage. Both also present themsselves as “civilization states” and champions of a more just, “multipolar” international order.
China and Russia regularly back each other in the UN Security Council (for example on North Korea, Iran, and condemning foreign interference) and believe that the United States tries to contain them and use NATO or its separate Asian allies to undermine Moscow’s and Beijing’s respective ability to project power in the immediate neighborhoods. The sentiment of containment is powerful enough to push the two countries to align their visions on general concept of security whether it is in and around Ukraine or in the Indo-Pacific region. For instance, China and Russia favor shared security concept whereby any given state’s security should not be guaranteed without taking into account the interests of a neighboring state, especially if it is a big power. It is this different understanding of bilateral relations and regional security that made Moscow and Beijing to argue simultaneously against NATO’s expansion in the wider Black Sea region and the emergence of AUKUS and QUAD in the Indo-Pacific region.
Both also see the concept of democracy differently from how it is perceived in the West, and claim that the West’s exclusive ownership of this concept should be replaced with an idea of multifaceted understanding of democracy[12]. This is an important and often disregarded trait in the Sino-Russian relations. Moscow and Beijing promote a different kind of state-to-state relations where countries would not be forced to choose sides but, however, should heed the interests of bigger neighboring states. Both also preach non-interference into internal affairs of any other country irrespective of what political model it pursues.
Moscow and Beijing prefer flexibility and therefore eschew entering into a full-blown alliance. Both embrace transactional type of relations where each preserves enough space for maneuverability in foreign policy. For them an official alliance is burdensome and is similar to how the Western countries see foreign affairs. Ability to navigate is what China and Russia value the most. The lack of the official alliance does not preclude developing relations which border on an unofficial alliance. Over the past decades agreements have been signed on border security (e.g. joint border patrols and data exchanges), cyber and law-enforcement liaison, and even coastal coordination (China and Russia signed a coast guard cooperation pact in 2023). A notable step was the revision of the Sino-Russian 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation (extended in 2021 through 2030), in which the two sides reiterated opposition to Western sanctions[13]. This and numerous other agreements were extensions from previous years, but they nevertheless have been renewed or newly signed against the backdrop of exacerbating rivalry between Russia and the West as well as the US and China.
Therefore, unlike the ideological and strategic divide of the 1970s, when the United States managed to widen the split between China and the Soviet Union, nowadays Moscow and Beijing are firmly aligned in their opposition to Washington’s bid to retain global dominance. The Sino-Russian partnership, though pragmatic and non-alliance-based, serves mutual interests well. Moreover, Moscow, even in the event of improved ties with Washington, would be unlikely to sever its ties with Beijing. As argued above, economically and militarily, China is indispensable to Russia. And with global politics shifting toward multipolarity, Russian leaders are wary of returning to a Western-centric alignment that may not outlast the current U.S. administration.
Even if the United States could lay the groundwork for decoupling Russia from China, doing so would necessitate Washington’s broader geopolitical disengagement from Eurasia – a goal that has consistently eluded American presidents since the early 2000s[14]. The United States’ efforts to pivot to the Indo-Pacific have repeatedly been derailed by crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Today, with the war in Ukraine unresolved, conflict in Gaza intensifying and general instability in the Middle East persisting, the United States remains firmly entangled in West Asia and eastern Europe.
Conclusion
Overall, over the past decade and especially since 2022 the Sino-Russian relations have seen significant growth in military-security and political cooperation reflected in frequent strategic dialogues, a joint planning roadmap, and cooperative defense structures, and the development of multilateral organizations. BRICS and SCO have provided the necessary platform for the two countries to increase their international profile, make their vision of multipolar world order more attractive for other big countries which either are not aligned with the West or are openly opposed to it.
Therefore, the Russia-China military-security relationship today could be described as a robust strategic partnership – one that is broad, and likely to endure in the near term, but which remains short of a full alliance commitment. The relationship is beneficial to both sides. Indeed, Russia’s political and economic isolation from the West since 2022 has in practice pushed it closer to China, making Beijing an indispensable commercial partner. China, for its part, has benefited from access to Russian raw materials and battlefield-tested technologies.
The Sino-Russian military-security and political cooperation from 2020 through early 2025 has been unprecedented and transformed the security environment across Eurasia. The partnership remains rooted in self-interest on both sides and is likely to persist and possibly deepen as long as common threats and mutual needs dictate. This means that the splitting of the Sino-Russian partnership is a highly unlikely scenario.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[1] “US seeking to 'drive wedge' between Russia, China — Russian Foreign Ministry”, TASS, April 24, 2024, https://tass.com/politics/1780663
[2] “China, Russia Remain Close Despite Trump’s Efforts to Drive a Wedge”, AsiaPacific.ca, April 9, 2025, https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/china-russia-remain-close-despite-trumps-efforts-drive-wedge
[3] “Azerbaijan Deepens Ties with China during Aliyev’s Visit to Beijing”, Special Eurasia, April 23, 2025, https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/04/23/azerbaijan-china-aliyev-visit/
[4] “The Growing Significance of China-Russia Defense Cooperation”, Army War College, September 18, 2024, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Display/Article/3908561/the-growing-significance-of-china-russia-defense-cooperation/
[5] “China buys 463 D30 engines for Y-20 and H-6K, WS-20 to come”, China Arms, January 6, 2020, https://www.china-arms.com/2020/01/d30-engines-for-y20-and-h6k/
[6] D. Gorenburg, E. Wishnick, B. Waidelich, P. Schwartz, “Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation”, CNA, 2023, https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/05/russian-chinese-military-cooperation
[7] “China, Russia hold annual strategic security consultation, marking high-level mutual trust in major changes in intl politics”, Global Times, November 12, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202411/1322940.shtml
[8] “Russia, China sign roadmap for closer military cooperation”, Military Times, November 21, 2021, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2021/11/24/russia-china-sign-roadmap-for-closer-military-cooperation/
[9] “Russian Security Council Secretary Shoigu visits PLA booth, AVIC hall at Airshow China”, Global Times, November 14, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202411/1323039.shtml
[10] “Okean Returns: A Battered Russian Navy Brings Back a Soviet-Era Exercise”, U.S. Naval Institute, October, 2024, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/october/okean-returns-battered-russian-navy-brings-back-soviet-era#:~:text=Okean%202024%20was%20designed%20to,weapon%20systems%2C%20and%2090%2C000%20personnel
[11] “Moscow, Beijing declare Russian-Chinese friendship has no limits, no ‘forbidden areas’”, TASS, February 4, 2022, https://tass.com/politics/1398071
[12] Q. Gang, A. Antonov, “Russian and Chinese Ambassadors: Respecting People’s Democratic Rights”, The National Interest, November 27, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russian-and-chinese-ambassadors-respecting-peoples-democratic-rights-197165
[13] “Carrying Forward China-Russia Good-neighborliness and Writing a Splendid Chapter for a New Era”, Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, 2021, https://www.cpifa.org/en/cms/book/351
[14] R. D. Blackwill, R. Fontaine, “The U.S. Pivot to Asia and American Grand Strategy”, CIRDS, 2024, https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-autumn-2024--issue-no-28/the-us-pivot-to-asia-and-american-grand-strategy
