On June 27, the U.S. Department of State announced that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda had signed a peace deal.[1] This landmark agreement brought an official end to three years of hostilities between the two countries and created substantive foundations for durable peace in Central Africa. It implored the DRC and Rwanda to respect each other’s territorial integrity, restrict support for armed groups and protect humanitarian workers operating in conflict-affected areas. These commitments would be regulated by a DRC-Rwanda security coordination mechanism that would take effect within thirty days of the peace deal.
Despite these trepidations, the DRC-Rwanda peace deal ephemerally appeared to be a watershed event for the region. On July 19, Qatar brokered the DRC and M23’s signing of a declaration of principles to end the conflict between them. On August 1, the DRC and Rwanda agreed to a regional economic framework agreement that spanned the energy, infrastructure and mineral sectors.[2] The two countries also agreed to participate in connectivity projects with the U.S.-backed Lobito Corridor, which extends from Lobito, Angola to Katanga, DRC and seeks to prevent China from securing a dominant foothold in the region.
These developments proved to be a false dawn. Since June, the UN peacekeeping agency responsible for the DRC MOUNSCO has recorded 1,087 civilian deaths that stemmed from political violence in Ituri and North Kivu. The level of violence recorded in Rutshuru territory in July 2025 was the most severe since November 2021. While presenting the UN Secretary General’s latest report on September 30, MONUSCO chief Bintou Keita warned “There are discrepancies between the progress we see on paper and the reality we observe on the ground which continues to be marred with violence.”[3] Instead of implementing the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 2773, which called for an immediate cessation of hostilities,, M23 has pursued an expansionist course and created parallel governance structures in Goma.
Why have months of concerted shuttle diplomacy from the U.S. and Qatar and promising framework agreements not yet succeeded in bringing about peace in Central Africa? While the ongoing conflict popularly attributed to external power malfeasance, it is essential to not view the DRC as the staging ground of a proxy war. Governance crises and grassroots political dynamics render an easy breakthrough in the DRC conflict nearly impossible. The origins of the DRC conflict and the factors complicating the implementation of the June 2025 peace agreement will be afforded an in-depth discussion below.
A Brief Historical Synopsis of the DRC’s Protracted Conflict
While the DRC’s war with M23 officially began in March 2022, its origins date back to internecine conflicts of the mid-1990s. After the Rwandan Patriotic Front triumphed in the 1990-94 Rwandan Civil War, Hutu extremists who partook in the genocide against Tutsis fled to Zaire. The Banyamulenge community of Rwandan Tutsis joined these Hutu extremists and settled in the South Kivu region of Zaire. As Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime weakened, Zaire became a proxy battleground between Rwanda’s warring ethnic groups.
During the 1996-97 First Congo War, the governing Rwandan Patriotic Front viewed itself as the guardian of ethnic Tutsis and Rwandan forces were allegedly complicit in the massacres of Hutus in Zaire. Goma remained under the control of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie, a Rwandan-aligned rebel group, from 1998-2001. Although the 2001 assassination of Congolese President Laurent Kabila and South Africa-brokered peace talks spurred on efforts to create a stable transitional government in DRC, Rwandan-aligned rebels feared that this outcome would cause their influence to atrophy. These grievances fuelled a years-long cycle of new offensive waves followed by abortive peace agreements.
The 2009 peace treaty between the Rwandan-aligned National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and the DRC authorities brought a temporary respite to this cycle of violence. This relief was short-lived as M23 launched a rebellion in North Kivu from April 2012 to November 2013 which resulted in the displacement of 140,000 Congolese.
Although M23 was militarily defeated by a joint DRC-MONUSCO counter-offensive and saw its command structure exiled to Uganda, its destabilizing mantle was merely assumed by other groups. The Islamist Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Uganda ratcheted up its operations and Islamic State Central Africa Province complemented their attacks. This atmosphere of disorder enabled M23’s quiet regrouping and resurgence as an engineer of political violence in 2022.
Unpacking the Domestic and International Drivers of Protracted Conflict in the DRC
Despite mounting pressure from the UN Security Council and a concerted U.S. push to end hostilities, the conflict in the DRC has continued to escalate. The June 2025 peace agreement did not result in even a fleeting respite. Although external intervention is often described as the main catalyst for this protracted conflict, foreign interference is a tertiary factor to the DRC’s seemingly intractable governance crisis and the grievances that fuel domestic support for M23.
The Domestic Determinants of the DRC Conflict
The DRC’s governance crisis is inextricably linked to the country’s greatest economic asset: its vast mineral wealth. M23’s expansion in eastern DRC was partially motivated by its desire to secure control over tin, tungsten, gold and coltan. Due to the Congolese state’s acute weaknesses, M23 made significant strides towards this aspiration and used its control over surrounding farmland to facilitate the smuggling of these valuable precious metals.[4] Yet M23’s consolidation of critical mineral resources also depends on a vast architecture of government-linked and international stakeholders who have capitalized on the mining sector’s anarchic character.
An integrated network of foreign mining companies, 150,000-200,000 artisanal miners and one million indirect beneficiaries fuel an illicit cobalt trade.[5] These commercial activities are enabled by law enforcement officials who profit from reselling cobalt produced by artisanal miners and corrupt border security personnel who facilitate its transfer to Zambia, Burundi and Tanzania. To protect the trade, artisanal cobalt miners compensate local armed groups.
These financial inflows to militants complicate the Congolese government’s ability to re-establish a security monopoly over North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri regions. The DRC’s governance crisis has also allowed M23 profit from illegal tariffs on goods that transit through the Sake-Kilolirwe-Kitshanga road, the illicit exploitation of Congolese timber resources and forced labour in the agricultural sector.[6] An April 2024 IPIS report based on extensive field research in North Kivu argues that these less discussed revenue streams could enrich M23 to a greater extent than the plunder of mineral resources.
Due to M23’s egregious track record of human rights abuses which allegedly span from summary executions of civilians to the raiding of hospitals, DRC President Felix Tshisekedi has accused it of perpetrating genocide against the populations of the territories it occupies.[7] While this narrative has considerable sway in the international community, it belies the considerable reservoirs of local support that M23 can leverage in a conflict setting. While M23 is defined by the DRC authorities and many international observers as a Rwandan proxy militia, it remains at its core a domestic Congolese movement that opportunistically leverages external support.
Based on the author’s interviews with Congolese experts and civil society activists, M23 has effectively framed itself as a protector of Tutsis against violence in the DRC. These narratives have appeal because they believe that their ethnicity has restricted their educational and employment prospects in the DRC. M23 actively recruits Tutsis from refugee camps and entices them to do their bidding through salongo community work projects. M23’s investments in local infrastructure and community development projects increases participation rates in its labour schemes. While less consistently successful than M23, the ADF has emulated these tactics and successfully recruited large numbers of fighters from Kinshasa’s prisons.
As M23 becomes embedded in eastern DRC, pro-government Congolese militias that seek to liberate these regions are greeted with suspicion. According to Congolese sources interviewed by the author, M-23 leverages a robust array of aligned social media influencers that frame pro-government militias as “terrorists’ and encourage violent resistance against them. Credible allegations of human rights abuses perpetrated by the DRC-government-aligned Wazalendo militias accentuates these anti-government sentiments.
The Role of External Powers in the DRC Conflict
International interference merely exacerbates what is already an intractable local conflict. The scale of Rwanda’s alleged support for M23 is a subject of intense debate. A May 2024 UN Panel of Experts report revealed that Rwanda had stationed up to 4,000 troops in eastern DRC and argued that Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF)-M23 joint missions were behind the swift collapse of Congolese control over Petit Nord and Lake Edward.[8]
Subsequent UN reports have framed Rwanda as a vital provider of intelligence support for M23 and contended that its goal is securing hegemony over the DRC’s mineral resources.[9] Rwandan President Paul Kagame has emphatically denied his country’s alleged role in arming M23. Rwandan officials have persistently framed the ongoing conflict in DRC as a national security threat and argued that the FDLR has long used Congolese territory as a base to threaten Rwanda.
Despite these exhortations, there is compelling evidence of Rwanda’s involvement in the eastern DRC conflict. M23’s GPS jamming technology has thwarted the advance of Chinese-manufactured drones and M23 forces have used 122mm rockets to fire on displacement camps in frontline zones.[10] These weapons are significantly more sophisticated than those used by other Congolese militia groups and mirror equipment that has been procured by Rwanda. Moreover, the flight of retreating M23 rebels to Rwanda suggests that they view the country as a safe harbour destination.
Uganda’s alleged interference in the eastern DRC conflict has also attracted negative scrutiny. Although the Ugandan military was a reliable partner in the DRC’s counter-insurgency campaigns during the early stages of M23’s 2022 offensive, the strength of their collaboration is a subject of debate. In February 2025, Uganda increased its troop deployments in DRC from 4,000 to 5,000. While DRC Communications Minister Patrick Katembwe regarded Kampala’s move as a first step towards Uganda joining the war against M23, this did not transpire.
Instead of combatting M23, Uganda wanted to ensure eastern DRC’s conflict did not spillover into its borders and leverage its official neutrality to mediate between warring factions.[11] Uganda’s unwillingness to assist the Congolese military’s anti-M23 offensive has sowed mistrust in Kinshasa. Uganda’s troop deployment decisions have reportedly been made in a unilateral fashion rather than in concert with the Congolese authorities. This unilateralism has sparked concerns in the DRC about clandestine Uganda-ADF cooperation, mineral smuggling across the shared border and ICC-indicted warlord Thomas Lubanga’s destabilizing potential. Virulent denials from President Yoweri Museveni’s son Major General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, who spearheaded 2021 Operation Shujaa against the ADF, have not quelled these critiques.[12]
Although the Congolese authorities routinely sound the alarm about external backing for M23, the DRC government has also leaned on international support. In response to a May 2023 South African Development Community (SADC) resolution, South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania have dispatched a coalition of forces into the DRC. As the 2003 SADC Mutual Defence allows for “immediate collective action” against threats to regional peace and security, these deployments align with multilateral legal frameworks.[13] Inadequate equipment provisions and small-scale deployments, which currently stand at 1,300 compared to the 5,000 agreed in 2023, have rendered these forces ineffective against M23. Their participation has sharpened intra-continental polarizations and complicated the path to an African-led solution to the DRC conflict.
Assessing the Viability of the June 2025 DRC Peace Framework
Despite initial optimism, the June 2025 peace framework has not resolved the core issues that triggered the eastern DRC conflict. The deficiencies of the agreement were apparent to seasoned observers of regional geopolitics, and it is unclear whether they can be easily rectified in the short-to-medium-term.
The mineral-centric nature of the DRC peace agreement aligns with the Trump administration’s transactional approach to foreign policy but at the possible expense of its appeal to local actors. This credibility deficit has been noted by veteran observers of and participants in the DRC conflict. Mvemba Phezo Diozele, a Senior Associate at CSIS’s Africa Program, warned that the deal overestimated mineral wealth as a driver of conflict and neglected root causes like regional power struggles and governance challenges.[14] Former Congolese President Joseph Kabila panned the deal as “nothing more than a trade agreement” as the DRC had previously proposed that the U.S. gain access to its critical minerals in exchange for security guarantees.[15]
Are these doomsday prognostications about the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement valid? Early trendlines from the implementation of the deal suggest that they align with realities on the ground. While the U.S.’s linkage of mineral extraction to security force deployments in eastern DRC provides a quick-fix solution, it risks eroding Congolese sovereignty. The complementary presence of foreign mining and security companies has historically worsened protracted conflicts in Africa.[16] Given the long-standing role of international mining companies and corrupt Congolese local authorities in exacerbating mineral smuggling, these precedents can be readily extrapolated to the DRC.
There are also considerable risks that Western mining investments could exacerbate cronyism and ameliorate the U.S. and Europe’s capacity to exert leverage over the conduct of conflicting parties. The Trump administration’s critical minerals push in the DRC is linked to its desire to level a playing field that has titled in China’s favour. China Molybdenum owns the Tenke Fungurume cobalt mine and has complemented this strategic investment with large-scale infrastructure investments.[17] The ambitions of Norin Mining, a subsidiary of Chinese weapons giant Norinco, in the DRC have received fierce pushback from the Republican-led Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[18]
Although China has also offered the DRC military cooperation and showcased its ability to serve as a security provider to Africa at the 2024 FOCAC summit in Beijing, its substantive assistance pales compared to what the U.S. can provide. Based on the author’s engagement with senior former and current U.S. officials, the Trump administration is prepared to offer several avenues of security cooperation. The most discussed form of collaboration is the U.S. deployment of troops at Banana port in exchange for exclusive mineral access rights. The U.S. would pair this collaboration with transfers of defensive equipment under the auspices of the October 2020 security MOU with the DRC and robust new intelligence sharing programs.
While these proposed forms of U.S. security assistance would strengthen the DRC’s hand against M23, Trump’s approach has still attracted criticisms. California Democratic Congresswoman Linda Sanchez has highlighted the conflict-of-interest potential associated with Trump associate Gentry Beach spearheading the consortium that invests in the Rubaya coltan mine, a notorious smuggling hub.[19] The potential alleviation of sanctions on controversial mining magnate Dan Gertler is another major corruption risk.[20] As Tshisekedi leverages personal emissaries and K Street lobbyists to strengthen personal connections to figures in Trump’s orbit, the addition of commercial deals to the equation could entrench cronyism and impede governance reforms that are necessary for the DRC’s stability.
Although the EU mirrored the U.S. by striking a critical minerals partnership MOU with the DRC in October 2023, Rwanda has emerged as a more strategic venue for European entry into Central Africa’s mining sector. European businesses view Rwanda’s tantalum reserves to be of high strategic value and are also increasingly interested in the country’s lithium and rare earth potential. These private sector forays encouraged the EU to sign a critical mineral supply partnership MOU with Rwanda in July 2024.[21]
According to the text of the MOU, Rwanda committed to helping European institutions track and trace smuggled critical minerals in Central Africa. The author’s interviews with EU officials revealed the limited efficacy of this cooperation in the DRC context and growing polarizations within Brussels about the merits of sticking with the Rwanda MOU. These grievances entered the public discourse via a February 2025 European Parliament resolution.[22] This non-binding resolution mandated that Rwanda withdraw forces from the DRC and rescind military support for M23. It also accused Rwanda of exporting minerals from M23 controlled areas of the DRC and cited this alleged practice as a casus-belli for the suspension of the critical minerals MOU. The EU’s retention of the MOU could complicate its ability to dissuade Rwanda from destabilizing conduct or complement new U.S. sanctions such as those imposed on M23 affiliates on August 12.[23]
Aside from these risks, there is a major structural obstacle to a lasting peace: the absence of multilateral dialogue Tshisekedi, Kagame and M23’s leadership were conspicuously absent from the June 27 signing ceremony and no institutionalized mechanism to facilitate dialogue between these three parties has been ensconced. Tshisekedi continues to use public forums like the UN General Assembly to urge Kagame to suspend Rwanda’s support for M23.[24] Qatar has successfully brokered talks between the DRC and M23 but multilateral engagement that combines the Congolese parties with external stakeholders has not taken root.
A Forward-Looking Assessment of the DRC Conflict
Due to the DRC’s ongoing governance crisis and entrenched strategic interests of key external powers, a speedy resolution of the conflict is unlikely to transpire. The pathway to peace is complicated further by the instability that permeates elsewhere in Central Africa. The stability of the Central African Republic remains marred by the Sudanese civil war’s spillover and ex-Seleka rebel insurgencies. Cameroon’s President Paul Biya is pursuing re-election at age 92 with no legitimate successor in sight. Burundi is reeling from the aftershocks of a foreign exchange crisis and severe petroleum shortages. Given the interconnected and internationalized nature of crises in Sub-Saharan Africa, regional stability is a vital prerequisite for the DRC’s restoration of peace.
In the meantime, it is essential that the international community strengthens the resilience of the DRC’s fragile institutions. Great powers like the U.S., EU and China will naturally take the lead but regional powers can also be part of the solution. The UAE’s strategy towards the DRC, which consists of the supply of armoured vehicles to the Congolese military and diversified critical mineral and renewable energy investments, is a compelling positive playbook for other external actors to follow. Ultimately, the pathway to peace in Central Africa lies through concerted multilateral dialogue and prudent regulation of the DRC’s mineral resources.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[1] Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda, Department of State, June 27, 2025
https://www.state.gov/peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda
[2] Statement of Tenets for the Regional Economic Integration Framework, Department of State, August 1, 2025
https://www.state.gov/releases/bureau-of-african-affairs/2025/08/statement-of-tenets-for-the-regional-economic-integration-framework
[3] DR Congo: Peace Still Elusive Despite “Progress we see on paper,” UN Official Says, United Nations, September 30, 2025
[4] Ashley Nunes, The Nexus of Conflict, Mining and Violence in Eastern DRC, Newlines Institute, September 30, 2025
https://newlinesinstitute.org/political-systems/nexus-of-conflict-mining-and-violence-in-the-ituri-and-kivu-provinces-of-the-drc/
[5] Oluwole Ojewale, Rampant Cobalt Smuggling and Corruption Deny Billions to DRC, ISS Africa, June 18, 2024
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/rampant-cobalt-smuggling-and-corruption-deny-billions-to-drc
[6] The M23 “Version 2”- Local Stakes, Motivations, Perceptions and Impacts, IPIS, April 4, 2024
https://ipisresearch.be/publication/the-m23-version-2-local-stakes-motivations-perceptions-and-impacts/
[7] DR Congo: Rwanda-Backed Executed M23 Executed Civilians in Goma, Human Rights Watch, June 3, 2025
https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/03/dr-congo-rwanda-backed-m23-executed-civilians-goma and DRC: M23’s Rampant Human Rights Abuses Demand Concerted International Action, Amnesty International, March 18, 2025 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/m23s-rampant-human-rights-abuses-demand-concerted-international-action/ document how major international human rights organizations characterize M23’s track record
[8] Letter Dated 31 May 2024 from Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, United Nations Security Council, June 4, 2024
https://docs.un.org/en/s/2024/432
[9] Musinguzi Blanshe, UN Experts Cast Blame on Rwanda and Uganda. What are they Doing in DRC?, Al Jazeera, July 18, 2025
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/18/un-experts-cast-blame-on-rwanda-and-uganda-what-are-they-doing-in-drc
[10] Ian Wafula, The Evidence that Shows Rwanda is Backing rebels in DR Congo, BBC, January 29, 2025
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckgyzl1mlkvo
[11] Uganda Deploys Additional Troops to DRC, Economist Intelligence Unit, February 11, 2025
https://www.eiu.com/n/uganda-deploys-additional-troops-to-drc/
[12] Muhoozi, Kagame Dismiss UN Experts Congo Report, Uganda Monitor, July 17, 2025
https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/muhoozi-kagame-dismiss-un-experts-congo-report-5121300#story
[13] Lindy Heinecken, South African Troops are Dying in the DRC: Why they’re there and what’s going wrong, The Conversation, January 31, 2025
https://theconversation.com/south-african-troops-are-dying-in-the-drc-why-theyre-there-and-whats-going-wrong-248696
[14] Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Critical Minerals, Fragile Peace: The DRC-Rwanda Deal and the Cost of Ignoring Root Causes, CSIS, June 27, 2025
https://www.csis.org/analysis/critical-minerals-fragile-peace-drc-rwanda-deal-and-cost-ignoring-root-causes
[15] Paul Nije, DRC Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal met with Scepticism in Rebel-Held City, BBC, June 28, 2025
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckg3721np9go
[16] Sheriff Bojiang Junior, Trump’s Congo Gamble: Critical Minerals and a Dangerous New Bargain, The Africa Report, August 29, 2025
https://www.theafricareport.com/391031/drc-cobalt-rush-creates-mineral-frenzy-that-africa-is-trying-to-harness/
[17] Isel Ras, Congo’s Mineral Curse Fuels US-China Rivalry, Lowy Institute, August 25, 2025
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/congo-s-mineral-curse-fuels-us-china-rivalry
[18] Christian-Geraud Neema, Can the DRC Leverage U.S.-China Competition Over Critical Minerals for Peace, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 19, 2025
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/can-the-drc-leverage-us-china-competition-over-critical-minerals?lang=en
[19] Congo Critical Minerals Letter, U.S. House of Representatives, August 8, 2025
https://lindasanchez.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/lindasanchez.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2028.08.08-congo-critical-minerals-letter.pdf
[20] John Prendergast and Sasha Lezhnev, U.S. Sanctions Removal on Mining Magnate Would Set Back Peace and Investment in DR Congo, Just Security, October 8, 2025
https://www.justsecurity.org/122097/drc-peace-mining-sanctions/
[21] EU and Rwanda sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Material Value Chains, European Commission, July 19, 2024
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pl/ip_24_822
[22] MEPs want to Suspend EU-Rwanda Deal on Sustainable Value Chains for Critical Raw Materials, European Parliament, February 13, 2025
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20250206IPR26752/meps-want-to-suspend-eu-rwanda-deal-on-critical-raw-materials
[23] Treasury Sanctions Entities Linked to Violence and Illegal Mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.S. Department of Treasury, August 12, 2025
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0221
[24] Congo’s Tshisekedi Calls on Rwanda to Make Peace as Diplomacy Stumbles, Reuters, October 9, 2025
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congos-tshisekedi-calls-rwanda-make-peace-diplomacy-stumbles-2025-10-09/
