Introduction
The Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed on January 1, 2024, marks a seismic shift in the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical landscape. The de facto independent but de jure unrecognized Republic of Somaliland took the bold initiative and reportedly agreed to grant Ethiopia access to the Gulf of Aden via the Berbera Port, expanded and operated by Dubai’s DP World since 2015, and lease a 20-kilometer coastal strip for an Ethiopian naval facility. In return, Ethiopia may become the first country to recognize Somaliland’s independence from Somalia. The agreement, if implemented, would also break with diplomatic precedent and potentially escalate regional tensions with Somalia and Egypt, both of which oppose Ethiopia’s naval ambitions.
The MoU raises critical questions: Why did Somaliland act now, more than 30 years after declaring independence? Why trade strategic territory for official independence recognition? And how will this deal reshape the volatile Horn of Africa and the wider Red Sea/Arabian Gulf region? To answer these questions, this INSIGHT will focus on Somaliland as the primary actor, not a passive piece in a larger geopolitical contest between Ethiopia, Somalia, Egypt and other external states.
This article reveals how Somaliland’s leaders seized a rare geopolitical window to advance their long-stalled bid for recognition. Unlike conventional analyses that prioritize major power rivalries, this article will explore Somaliland’s national interests, identity, and security imperatives and demonstrate how a small but determined state can successfully maneuver within a volatile regional order. Somaliland’s move is not just a diplomatic milestone — it is a fulfillment of the African Union’s (AU) territorial norms, which in Somaliland’s case remain shelved, and a potential catalyst for broader geopolitical realignments. The stakes could not be higher.
Somaliland’s independence: History, identity, and geopolitics
The Republic of Somaliland, formerly British Somaliland, is viewed by the international community of states as formally part of Somalia. It has, however, been self-governing and sovereign over its territory since 1991, when it unilaterally seceded from Somalia. But it still lacks any legal recognition. The agreement thus set the stage for Ethiopia’s possible legal recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. Should that occur, other states may follow the lead of Ethiopia, which hosts the headquarters of the AU in Addis Ababa.
The result of the MoU is that Somaliland’s independence claims immediately returned to prominence. But its quest of independence is a lengthy one dating back to the 19th century, and one that is perfectly congruent with the independence of other post-colonial African states. It began in an era when the British Empire forged key agreements with various Somaliland clans and sub-clans, notably the Gadabuursi, Issa, and Habr Awal. In 1884, the region was formally established as British Somaliland, a protectorate characterized by some degree of autonomy that set it apart from the more firmly controlled Italian Somalia to the east and south. Nevertheless, Somaliland eventually opted for independence and achieved this on June 26, 1960. A few days later, on July 1st, Somaliland voluntarily entered a union with the Trust Territory of Somalia to form the Republic of Somalia.
Cracks in the union began to appear as early as July 1961 when Somalilanders voted against the Union Constitution, and in December 1961 military units revolted in Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa, in a failed bid to restore Somaliland’s independence (Cannon, 2021, p. 124). Part of the issue was the marginalization of Somaliland as a territory, symbolized by the 1,000-kilometre road distance between Hargeisa and Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. Thus, the center-periphery dynamic described by Herbst (2014) that played out across many other post-colonial African states also became firmly entrenched in Somalia with disastrous results for the voluntary union of Somaliland and Somalia.
Center-periphery relations were further exacerbated over time by the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre (1969-1991), which resulted in widespread discrimination and marginalization of Somalilanders on account of clan dynamics.[1] The political and economic machinations of the Mogadishu government clearly neglected the aspirations of Somalilanders, among others, and fueled a growing sense of injustice and frustration. When Barre launched and then lost the disastrous Ogaden War (1977-1978) against Ethiopia, it sowed the seeds for an eventual Somali civil war (which were actually multiple wars), that led to Mogadishu using the Somali Air Force to bomb and strafe Hargeisa, resulting in devastation of the city and a massive refugee crisis. The death knell of the Somali Republic finally came in 1991, the same year Somaliland declared its exit from the union and reestablished its independent statehood (Bradbury, Abokor, & Yusuf, 2003).
The trauma suffered by Somalilanders at the hands of the Somali government in Mogadishu has led to a powerful, collective memory of struggle, migration, and death. This memory, in turn, has been reified by three generations and counting of Somalilanders who have been born in the de facto independent Somaliland since 1991. This identity is also fed by the stark contrasts between Somaliland’s peaceful, stable trajectory and Somalia’s descent into the clan-fueled violence and terrorism of a failed state (Pegg, 2023).
Somaliland has taken significant steps over three decades of de facto independence and sovereignty toward sustainable and viable institutional and administrative development. As with the structural development of Somaliland, political development and stable transitions of power are central to promoting the country’s independence credentials. Somaliland’s most recent presidential and party elections, held in November 2024, once again demonstrated the political maturity of all actors involved. The peaceful transfer of power from the defeated Kulmiye ruling party to the opposition Waddani party as well as the one-person, one-vote electoral process is unique not only in the Horn of Africa, but also across much of the continent (Cannon, 2024).
Somaliland’s calls for independence are thus not only a reflection of historical grievances, but also a testament to the unique identities and trajectories of its people over the years. They also form a powerful, emotive rationale against rejoining Somalia, a country that is fractured, factionalized, plagued by violence and instability, and that has been that way for nearly four decades. Somalia’s federal government has derogatorily been referred to as the “Mayors of Mogadishu,” because the writ of their rule barely covers the capital city (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019). Two of Somalia’s federal states, Puntland in the north and Jubaland and the south, are almost entirely autonomous from the federal government. At the same time, the disintegration of security, rule of law, bureaucracies, and civil society has created a vacuum in which clan-based militias and, above all, Islamist terrorism, represented by al-Shabaab, have been able to flourish.
Shifting regional dynamics and Somaliland’s strategic opportunity
The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU was therefore neither an isolated event nor an abrupt development but the product of shifting regional dynamics that created an opportunity for Somaliland to assert its interests. For decades, African and international actors maintained a status quo that resisted Somaliland’s recognition, seeking to prevent further fragmentation after South Sudan’s independence in 2011. Yet, by 2022, the Horn of Africa’s political landscape had entered a period of profound instability, creating a rare window for Somaliland to maneuver diplomatically. The next sections describe these changes in detail.
Ethiopia’s strategic shift
For much of the early 21st century, Ethiopia — under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (1995–2012) — maintained regional dominance and acted as a stabilizing force that balanced external and internal divisions. However, after Zenawi’s death and the rise of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (2018-present), Ethiopia entered a new era of internal volatility and foreign policy recalibration. Abiy’s push to restructure Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism fueled growing instability, as seen in the Tigray War (2020–2022) and ongoing insurgencies in the Ethiopian states of Amhara and Oromia (Gebreluel, 2024). At the same time, his diplomatic outreach to Eritrea, which ended decades of hostilities, led to the short-lived partnership between Eritrea’s president, Isaias Afwerki (1993-present), Somalia’s president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed aka Farmajo, and Abiy. This coalition sidelined Somaliland and diplomatically attempted to reinforce Mogadishu’s claim over the de facto independent country.
Ethiopia’s strategic calculations, however, changed dramatically after the Tigray War. The fallout from the conflict strained its ties with Eritrea, because Isaias opposed Ethiopia’s negotiations with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). At the same time, Somalia’s political alignment shifted with the election in 2022 of Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who reversed his predecessor’s Ethiopia-friendly stance and moved closer to Eritrea. The rapprochement between Somalia and Eritrea, when combined with Ethiopia’s deteriorating ties with both Mogadishu and Asmara, reshuffled the regional balance (Ahmed, 2024).
Ethiopia’s growing international isolation following the Tigray War compounded its diplomatic challenges. The United States (U.S.) and European Union (EU) distanced themselves from Abiy’s government, condemned human rights abuses committed during the conflict, and suspended key economic and security partnerships. U.S. aid to Ethiopia was reduced, and Ethiopia lost preferential trade access under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2022. The EU also raised concerns about humanitarian abuse and froze funding for development programs. The result was that Ethiopia found itself increasingly reliant on non-Western actors, such as China, Iran, and Türkiye, while simultaneously facing mounting domestic unrest.
Somaliland’s strategic timing
Somaliland acted when it did because the regional landscape had reached a moment of exceptional flux. Ethiopia’s post-Tigray War isolation from Western powers, coupled with its deteriorating relationship with Eritrea and Mogadishu’s growing alignment with Asmara, left Addis Ababa searching for new strategic partnerships. Concurrently, Somaliland’s own economic and political development had proceeded relatively smoothly, which created a rare opportunity for Hargeisa to take the risky step of asserting its interests. Indeed, Somaliland was able to present itself as a stable, cooperative partner for Ethiopia when it decisively acted to generate the MoU in late 2023. It offered strategic maritime access to the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea for Ethiopia and was able to fulfill that promise because of its sovereignty over its territory, in contrast to neighboring Somalia. As such, Somaliland’s leadership, long accustomed to diplomatic inertia, seized this window of opportunity by framing the MoU, unveiled to great surprise on January 1, 2024, as a mutually beneficial agreement, rather than a unilateral move (Donelli, 2024a). Unlike Somalia, Somaliland capitalized on its reputation as a functional, self-sustaining, stable, and sovereign state, economic potential, and a vital geostrategic location.
Somaliland, under the leadership of former President Muse Bihi (2017-2024), engaged in high-level diplomacy with Ethiopia. By becoming a proactive negotiator, Somaliland forced a breakthrough in its long-standing quest for recognition, which Somaliland’s version of the MoU reportedly promises from Ethiopia in return for 20 kilometers of its coastline for 50 years (Cannon 2024). While Ethiopian recognition is not yet guaranteed, the MoU signals a historic turning point — one where Somaliland is no longer waiting for international approval but actively shaping its own future within a shifting regional order.
Somaliland’s gambit and the onset of regional stability
Should Ethiopia gain access to Somaliland’s coastline for an eventual naval facility and, in turn, recognize Somaliland’s independence, it would uphold rather than challenge the AU’s long-held norms on territorial integrity, sovereignty, and post-colonial borders, despite Mogadishu’s claims to the contrary. This is not a break from the AU’s charter but an affirmation of it (Hoch and Rudincová, 2015). The AU’s principle of respecting post-colonial borders should apply to Somaliland, which was a sovereign state in 1960 before voluntarily uniting with Somalia. But the AU, and its member states, have chosen to ignore this (Rudincová, 2017).
Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland, however, is not the only path forward. With U.S. President Donald Trump’s reelection in November 2024, Washington appears increasingly open to working directly and constructively with Somaliland (Webb, 2024). America may not recognize Somaliland outright, but its move would be separate and distinct from Ethiopia’s. Indeed, if Washington or other major powers began formally and directly cooperating with Somaliland, Hargeisa may no longer need Ethiopia’s backing, potentially giving Hargeisa the option as a sovereign state to ignore or cancel the MoU.
Why does Somaliland’s recognition matter for the wider region? First, it is not just a legal matter, but a regional security imperative. The militarization of the region’s maritime spaces is fueling instability. The fastest way to prevent Ethiopia from adding to the militarization of the Red Sea is for other states to recognize Somaliland. This, in turn, could result in Ethiopia’s access for trade via Berbera and lessen its need for a naval facility. Second, recognition would reduce regional tensions by firmly making Somaliland a legitimate and stable actor. The Türkiye-Somalia naval agreement and Egypt’s troop deployment to Somalia in response to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU would no longer serve an urgent purpose, because recognition of Somaliland would allow states to officially work with both Somali and Somaliland and thus stabilize the region and curb growing naval rivalries. Third, such developments hold direct implications for the Arabian Gulf, as Gulf states — particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia — have significant economic and security interests in the Red Sea. A stable, recognized Somaliland would enhance trade security, counter-piracy efforts, and broader Gulf-African partnerships, reinforcing regional economic integration rather than military competition.
Conclusion
Somaliland acted when it did because it saw a rare geopolitical opening with Ethiopia’s isolation, shifting alliances, and renewed U.S. interest. With a stable government, strategic location, and growing economic potential, Somaliland is not just a claimant but a functional state shaping its own future.
The world no longer needs to ask if Somaliland should be recognized, but when. Recognition would enhance regional security, economic cooperation, and maritime stability, offering a rare chance to strengthen both the African and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional orders while also advancing Gulf states’ strategic interests in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. The question now is whether states will act or continue to ignore reality.
References
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* Associate Professor, Khalifa University of Science and Technology, Abu Dhabi.
[1] Siad Barre was from the Marehan clan, a sub-clan of the larger Darod clan, and his decades-long rule heavily relied on support from his clan and other Darod sub-clans, particularly the Marehan, Ogaden, and Dulbahante clans.
