Introduction
On February 3rd and 4th, social media in Mexico erupted after a United States Air Force RC-135V Rivet Joint Signals intelligence aircraft was detected flying over the Gulf of California in international space.[ii] Unlike typical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) flights, which remain discrete, this mission was deliberately visible, fueling speculation about mounting U.S. pressure on Mexico under the new Trump administration. The backdrop is Trump’s campaign pledge to designate Mexican drug cartels as terrorist organizations and expand the use of U.S. military resources to counter them.[iii]
This ISR activity signals a potential shift in U.S. counter-cartel strategy, leveraging intelligence-gathering and strategic signaling to reinforce U.S. security concerns. Regardless of intent, its effects are clear; Washington is reframing Mexico’s security crisis as a counterterrorism issue. The increasing sophistication of narco-violence — which claimed nearly 200,000 lives under previous president Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (2018-2024) — has blurred the line between organized crime and insurgency. Mexican cartels now employ tactics — car bombings, targeted assassinations of officials, and gruesome public spectacles meant to instill fear and coerce authorities — reminiscent of terrorist group.
While Mexico does not harbor internationally recognized terrorist groups, some cartels blend criminal enterprise, territorial control, and elements of state capture. This evolving nature of cartel operations has prompted Washington to expand its extraterritorial counterterrorism framework, broadening the legal and operational scope of U.S. interventions.
ISR Flights: Strategic Signaling and the U.S. Counterterrorism Shift
The recent ISR surge follows Trump’s January 25th executive order designating certain cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), expanding Washington’s counterterrorism toolkit from financial sanctions to potential military action.[iv] This shift signals that cartels are no longer seen as mere criminal enterprises but as political actors consolidating power.
In just two weeks, from late January to early February, ISR aircraft conducted at least 18 missions, a sharp increase from the previous one flight per month.[v] Senior U.S. officials suggest intelligence gathered could justify additional FTO designations or even direct strikes on fentanyl and cartel leadership, actions that would violate Mexican sovereignty and severely strain bilateral relations.[vi]
Though the RC-135V remained in international space, its visibility — alongside increased U.S. naval and aerial activity — underscores a fundamental shift. More significantly, Washington now frames cartel influence not just as a transnational crime issue but as an “intolerable alliance” between criminal organizations and the Mexican state; Trump’s February 1, 2025 executive order —uses this term explicitly.[vii]
The increased ISR visibility likely serves both an intelligence-gathering function and a strategic signaling role, indicating heightened U.S. concern over cartel-state dynamics. Trump’s executive order imposing tariffs on Mexican products, later paused for 30 days, aligns with broader U.S. concerns that the Mexican government “provides safe havens” for cartels to manufacture and transport narcotics.[viii]
The strategic use of ISR flights as a pressure mechanism follows precedent. In January 2019, the U.S. deployed ISR flights near Venezuela during a political crisis between opposition leader Juan Guaidó and President Nicolás Maduro. The RC-135V monitored Venezuelan military communications while Russia bolstered Maduro’s regime.[ix] These ISR missions were not just intelligence-gathering but contingency planning measures, ensuring the U.S. had mapped key command structures in case military intervention became necessary. [x]
The RC-135V, flying at 32,500 feet, has a SIGINT sensor range exceeding 400 km, allowing it to detect and geolocate communications, military radar, and encrypted transmissions deep into Mexican territory (see Figure 1).[xi] These flights do not need to enter Mexican airspace to conduct broad electronic surveillance.
The characterization of cartels as operating with state protection introduces a new dimension to U.S.-Mexico security relations, potentially reshaping policy responses. This approach overlooks key distinctions between federal, subnational, and local governance, even though cartel protection networks vary across government levels. The intersection of organized crime, political corruption, and security vulnerabilities in Mexico has drawn increasing scrutiny in U.S. security assessments and aligns with the concept of the “gray zone of criminality” previously identified by scholars analyzing Mexico.[xii]
From Narcos to Terrorists? The U.S. Case for Reclassifying Cartels
The crime-terror nexus model helps explain Washington’s evolving view of cartels.[xiii] Traditionally, organized crime and terrorist groups were seen as distinct — one profit-driven, the other ideologically motivated. However, in states with weak institutions, criminal and terrorist groups often adopt each other’s tactics or collaborate when interests align. In extreme cases, terrorist organizations turn to crime, while criminal groups develop political strategies to sustain power.
Applying counterterrorism frameworks to cartels is not just a rhetorical shift; it grants Washington extraterritorial legal justification for a broader range of actions, potentially mirroring those used against terrorist organizations. While Mexican cartels do not seek formal state control like insurgencies, their coercive influence over political institutions mirrors aspects of terrorist networks, reinforcing Washington’s evolving security doctrine.
One of the most striking examples is the extensive U.S. investigation into potential cartel ties to allies of López Obrador. Leaked intelligence and informant reports allege that powerful figures met with high-ranking Mexican officials and intermediaries close to the former president even after he took office. [xiv] Some sources claim cartels provided financial support to political figures in exchange for protection, while others suggest they possess compromising evidence of high-level corruption.[xv]
Under President Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, these tensions have escalated. She has strongly rejected U.S. claims of an “intolerable alliance” between her government and cartels, calling them “slander.” Yet her decision to deploy 10,000 National Guard troops to the U.S.-Mexico border signals a pragmatic, if reluctant, response to Washington’s pressure. At the same time, she has pushed back, urging the U.S. to address its own role in fueling cartel violence, particularly through weapons trafficking and unchecked fentanyl demand.[xvi]
This blurred boundary between state and non-state actors likely explains the increase in U.S. ISR flights. Washington may no longer just be tracking cartel movements but assessing whether elements of Mexico’s government are complicit rather than adversarial in the fight against organized crime. If this framing holds, ISR flights near Mexico are more than intelligence-gathering missions — they are strategic signals that the cartel-state nexus is now a direct U.S. security threat.
Caught Between Washington and Cartels: Mexico’s Security Dilemma
As ISR surveillance expands and U.S. counterterrorism policies increasingly target cartels, Mexico faces a critical decision. The temporary 30-day tariff pause provides a brief window for diplomatic engagement, yet pressure from Washington is intensifying.[xvii] The reported transfer of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada to U.S. authorities in July 2024, allegedly facilitated by internal betrayals within the Sinaloa Cartel, has already destabilized cartel leadership, fueling infighting and increased violence in the northwestern city of Culiacán.[xviii] One of the sons of Joaquín “El Chapo” is believed to have orchestrated this betrayal, further fragmenting the cartel structure.[xix]
The escalation of airborne ISR operations signals a potential turning point in U.S.-Mexico security relations. It remains unclear whether this escalation reflects a fundamental doctrinal shift in U.S. counterterrorism strategy or a continuation of coercive pressure tactics previously employed in counter-narcotics operations. Recent U.S. policy discourse has shifted from viewing Mexico primarily as a counter-narcotics partner to portraying it as a security environment where hybrid threats emerge. The “safe haven” designation has profound consequences, suggesting that elements of Mexico’s security and political institutions are not just failing to combat cartels but may be complicit in their operations. This puts the Sheinbaum administration in a difficult position: should it align with the U.S. counterterrorism priorities, risking greater U.S. influence over Mexican security affairs, or should it resist U.S. pressure, at the potential cost of deeper diplomatic and economic retaliation?
After a week of speculation, the Mexican government finally acknowledged that the Pentagon had conducted at least two reconnaissance missions since Trump took office, on January 31st and February 3rd. This marked a shift from earlier statements by the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA), which had initially downplayed the reports and denied any espionage, despite global media tracking the flights in real-time.[xx]
While Defense Minister Ricardo Trevilla Trejo reaffirmed that the aircraft did not violate Mexican sovereignty, the government has not provided any official explanation for their purpose, a departure from its initial dismissive stance.[xxi] Despite this increased surveillance from late January to early February, Trevilla has maintained that ISR flights have not disrupted bilateral security cooperation, signaling that Mexico is attempting to manage tensions without direct confrontation. Sheinbaum’s government must determine how to balance national sovereignty with the potential benefits and risks of enhanced U.S. security collaboration.
The most immediate strategic choices include:
- Expanding intelligence cooperation: Deepen collaboration with the U.S. via intelligence-sharing and joint law enforcement operations, particularly against fentanyl trafficking. This enhances counter-cartel efforts but risks greater U.S. influence over Mexico’s internal security decisions, historically a point of contention for Mexican sovereignty.
- Demanding U.S. accountability. Press the U.S. to recognize its role in the crisis by acknowledging the impact of U.S. weapons flowing into Mexico and taking decisive steps to curb the unregulated demand for fentanyl that fuels cartel profits.
- Resisting U.S. pressure: Refusing deeper cooperation could prompt Washington to escalate unilateral actions, including targeted strikes against cartel leaders, covert operations using Special Forces, or expanded economic penalties such as reinstating tariffs, an approach that would further strain bilateral relations.
For Mexico, the challenge is to balance strategic autonomy with the benefits of bilateral cooperation. For U.S. policymakers, the priority will be calibrating counter-cartel measures to enhance security collaboration without undermining Mexico’s sovereignty or disrupting economic ties. The path Mexico chooses will not only reshape U.S.-Mexico security relations but also determine the extent to which it maintains control over its national security policy while adapting to evolving U.S. counterterrorism priorities. Mexico’s immediate response to U.S. pressure will shape not just its bilateral relations but also its role in the wider North American security architecture. As Washington seeks to institutionalize counter-cartel efforts, the debate over Mexico’s integration into broader intelligence-sharing frameworks is becoming more urgent.
U.S.-Mexico Security at a Crossroads
Mexico’s security challenge is no longer confined to bilateral tensions with Washington; it is now at the center of a broader regional security debate. Some policymakers argue that existing frameworks for cooperation are inadequate, advocating for more formalized intelligence-sharing mechanisms to address transnational threats.
One proposal gaining traction is a North American Security Treaty, aimed at institutionalizing U.S.-Mexico-Canada security coordination.[xxii] While the U.S. and Canada already share intelligence through the Five Eyes alliance, extending a similar framework to Mexico presents significant challenges. Concerns over sovereignty and intelligence reliability have fueled skepticism on both sides. Although U.S.-Mexico security cooperation was relatively strong until 2012, it has sharply declined, particularly after 2018 due to restrictions imposed by Mexican leaders on intelligence-sharing and foreign law enforcement activities. Washington sees this as a barrier to joint security efforts, while Mexico remains wary of deeper U.S. involvement in its national security affairs.
A limited security agreement may offer the most pragmatic path forward, allowing the U.S. to neutralize high-value cartel targets while Mexico demonstrates commitment to security without full-scale intervention. However, non-cooperation carries steep costs; tariffs could be reinstated, and unilateral U.S. ISR and security operations may escalate, fueling further tensions. A phased approach, where trust is built through incremental intelligence-sharing, could provide both nations with a workable compromise.
Still, the expansion of ISR deployments and increased naval activity suggest that Washington’s patience for diplomatic negotiations may be limited. The Sheinbaum administration must now decide whether to expand intelligence cooperation, resist U.S. demands, or seek a delicate balance between the two. The visibility of the RC-135 suggests that Washington is prepared to intensify its pressure on Mexico should cartel activity persist without an increase in bilateral enforcement measures.
The framing of cartel violence through a counterterrorism lens places Mexico in a complex strategic position, balancing sovereignty concerns with security cooperation imperatives. Will it assert its own approach to counter-cartel strategy, or will Washington impose one? The next steps Mexico takes will determine whether it maintains autonomy in its security policies or if it is pushed into a U.S.-dominated counterterrorism framework.
[i] The author extends gratitude to Olli Pekka-Suorsa, Kristian Patrick Alexander, and Arsène Saparov for their valuable feedback on an earlier version of this document. Special thanks to Olli Pekka Suorsa for providing FlightRadar and Google Earth images and for his insights on the technical capabilities of the RC-135.
[ii] Eurasian Times. 2025. “U.S.-Mexico Tensions: U.S. Deploys Cutting-Edge Spy Planes RC-135, P-8 Poseidon to Check Mexican Border.” February 5, 2025. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/u-s-mexico-tensions-u-s-deploys-cutting-edge-spy-planes-rc-135-p-8-poseidon-to-check-mexican-border/
[iii] Reuters. 2024. “Special Report: How China Got Its Fentanyl Suppliers to Stop Sending the Deadly Drug to the U.S.” November 26, 2024. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/drugs-fentanyl-china/
[iv] The White House. 2025a. “Executive Order on Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists.” January 25, 2025. See especially Sec. 2. Policy, which states: “It is the policy of the United States to ensure the total elimination of these organizations’ presence in the United States and their ability to threaten the territory, safety, and security of the United States through their extraterritorial command-and-control structures, thereby protecting the American people and the territorial integrity of the United States.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/designating-cartels-and-other-organizations-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially-designated-global-terrorists/
[v] CNN. “US Spy Planes Hunt for Intel on Mexican Drug Cartels as Surveillance Flights Surge Near Border.” February 10, 2025. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/10/politics/us-spy-planes-mexican-drug-cartels/index.html
[vi] Ibid.
[vii] See The White House. 2025b. “Executive Order on Imposing Duties to Address the Situation at Our Southern Border.” February 1, 2025. The order states: “The Mexican DTOs have an intolerable alliance with the government of Mexico. This alliance endangers the national security of the United States, and we must eradicate the influence of these dangerous cartels from the bilateral environment. The government of Mexico has afforded safe havens for the cartels to engage in the manufacturing and transportation of illicit drugs, which collectively have led to the overdose deaths of hundreds of thousands of American victims.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-duties-to-address-the-situation-at-our-southern-border/.
[viii] Ibid.
[ix] Archer, Bob. 2020. Super Snoopers. The Evolution and Service Career of the Specialist Boeing C-135 Series with the 55th Wing and Associated Units. London: Fonthill Media.
[x] Ibid.
[xi] Ibid.
[xii] This intersection is associated with the concept of the “gray zone of criminality.” See Trejo, Guillermo, and Sandra Ley. 2020. Votes, Drugs, and Violence: The Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[xiii] Makarenko, Tamara, and Michael Mesquita. 2014. “Categorising the Crime-Terror Nexus in the European Union.” Global Crime 15(3-4): 259–274. https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2014.931227 and Makarenko, Tamara. 2004. “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism.” Global Crime 6(1): 129-145.
[xiv] While the U.S. investigation was ultimately shelved due to a lack of political will in Washington, its findings illuminate how organized crime groups not only challenge state authority but also embed themselves within political structures to secure influence and impunity. See Alan Feuer & Natalie Kitroeff, “U.S. Investigated Accusations of Drug Cartel Links to Mexican President’s Allies.” New York Times, February 22, 2024.
[xv] Ibid.
[xvi] CBS News. 2025. “Mexico president says U.S. claim about cartel alliance is 'slander,' vows to retaliate against Trump tariffs.” February 3, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mexico-us-claim-cartel-alliance-slander-vows-tariff-retaliation/
[xvii] The White House. 2025a.
[xviii] CNN Español. “Cronología del caso del Mayo Zambada y Joaquín Guzmán López.” CNN en Español, September 13, 2024. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/09/13/cronologia-del-caso-mayo-zambada-y-joaquin-guzman-lopez-orix.
[xix] Reuters. 2024. “Mexican Drug Lord 'El Mayo' Zambada Says He Was Ambushed in New Account of U.S. Arrest.” Reuters, August 10, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexican-drug-lord-el-mayo-zambada-says-he-was-ambushed-new-account-us-arrest-2024-08-10/
[xx] El País. “U.S. Spy Planes Spark Controversy in Mexico: ‘We Don’t Know What They Did.’” February 12, 2025.
[xxi] Ibid.
[xxii] Eduardo Guerrero. 2024. “Hacia un Tratado de Seguridad para América del Norte.” Nexos, February 1, 2024. https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=77510.
