The Philippines assumed the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2026 under the theme “Navigating Our Future, Together.” This leadership transition occurs at a critical juncture for ASEAN, as it continues to face persistent political, economic, and security challenges that tests its cohesion and credibility. Ongoing instability in Myanmar, unresolved border tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, and intensifying disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) have exposed structural limitations in ASEAN’s consensus-based approach to regional governance.
While ASEAN confronts a wide range of issues, these three fault lines are geopolitically consequential. If left unaddressed, they risk undermining Southeast Asia’s stability, weakening ASEAN centrality, and constraining the organisation’s ability to shape its external environment. The Philippines’s chairmanship therefore represents not merely a rotational responsibility, but a strategic opportunity to recalibrate ASEAN’s regional agenda, particularly on maritime security.
ASEAN’s Strategic Context in 2026
Entering 2026, ASEAN member states recognise the need for a more coherent and strategic approach (ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat Press Statement, pg. 5) to strengthening the three pillars of community-building which include economic integration, political-security cooperation, and socio-cultural connectivity. Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2025 helped lay important groundwork by reinforcing institutional continuity and advancing long-term planning. A key outcome was the formulation of the ASEAN Economic Community Strategic Plan 2026-2030, which reflects ASEAN’s efforts to adapt to global economic fragmentation, supply chain reconfiguration, and technological competition.
These initiatives complement ASEAN-led strategic frameworks such as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which emphasises maritime cooperation, connectivity, and inclusive regional architecture. In this setting, the South China Sea (SCS) remains a defining test for ASEAN’s relevance as a security actor. The SCS dispute, involving overlapping claims by Brunei, Malaysia, The Philippines and Vietnam against China has put ASEAN’s role in conflict management at a juncture i.e. either ASEAN stands as a united regional bloc or a bloc consists of 11 member countries in dealing with China. ASEAN has not been at its forefront when approaching security matters in the region. Since its establishment, ASEAN has been thriving with its diplomatic forums but not being aggrieve when addressing regional security. How ASEAN (in the future) manages this issue will shape the perception of its capacity to balance major power interests while safeguarding regional autonomy.
The Philippines’ Strategic States in the South China Sea
As a claimant state and littoral country, the Philippines has direct and immediate interests in preserving freedom of navigation, maritime stability, and the rule of lawin the South China Sea. It is in the Philippines interest to protect its Exclusive Economic Zone as a means to defend its access to natural resources like fisheries, oil and gas. Even with different administrations (from Aquino to Duterte and to Marcos jr.), Manila has consistently asserted its claims over the Spratlys Islands and Scarborough Shoal, collectively designated as the West Philippine Sea, despite increasing pressure from China’s expansive maritime activities.
Vietnam faces similar challenges, underscoring that the SCS dispute is not merely bilateral, but regional in nature. ASEAN states have long maintained that such disputes are best managed through multilateral and regional mechanisms. From a strategic perspective, advancing claims through ASEAN frameworks enhances diplomatic leverage, international legitimacy, and collective bargaining power, particularly for middle and smaller states.
ASEAN’s adoption of the 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea marked an early attempt to de-escalate tensions and encourage restraint following armed clashes between China and Vietnam in the late 1980s. The declaration sought to promote confidence-building and adherence to international norms, including the Treaty of Amity & Corporation in Southeast Asia. China, as a response, passed its domestic legislation (Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone) in the same year to assert its extensive maritime claims, further complicating the regional security environment and widened the gap between political declarations and strategic realities.
Despite ASEAN’s regional approach, tensions between China and the Philippines have persisted and, at times, intensified. The organisation’s inability to issue a joint communique in 2012 – due to lack of consensus over the South China Sea, highlighted the vulnerability of ASEAN centrality when member-state interests diverge under external pressure.
Nevertheless, incremental progress has been achieved. China’s agreement to negotiate a Code of Conduct (COC) with ASEAN signalled a shared recognition that unmanaged competition in the SCS carries unacceptable risks to all parties. However, the COC is intended not as a mechanism to resolve sovereignty disputes, but as a conflict-management tool aimed at preventing escalation, fostering trust, and stabilising interactions among claimant states.
Status and Strategic Limits of the COC
Formal discussions on the COC began in 2013 and culminated in the adoption of a framework agreement in 2017 at the ASEAN-China Summit. However, the framework remains non-binding and lacks enforcement mechanisms, limiting its operational effectiveness. The text includes guidelines to conflict prevention and incidents management, which can be seen as more comprehensive than “maritime security” and “freedom of navigation”. One thing that is sure from the framework, it did not insert “legally binding” to the guidelines, which carries no enforcement to the mechanics. These constraints have prompted calls, especially from ASEAN, for a more substantive and binding agreement.
While no official deadline has been set, 2026 has emerged as a politically significant target for concluding COC negotiations, coinciding with the Philippines’ ASEAN Chairmanship. For Marcos Jr.s’ administration, progress on the COC would represent a strategic diplomatic achievement. With the administration entering the latter half of its term, 2026 (while being ASEAN chair) offers a narrow but meaningful window to advance Philippine interests through multilateral leadership rather than unilateral escalation.
The strategic value of the COC is perceived differently across stakeholders. For most ASEAN members, the COC serves as a stabilising mechanism rather than a final settlement. It allows ASEAN to manage tensions while safeguarding broader economic interests. China remains ASEAN’s largest trading partner (in 2025, China’s export of machine tools and automobile parts to ASEAN grew 56.1% and 22% year on year), and economic interdependence continues to shape regional calculations. Maintaining stability in the South China Sea is therefore seen as essential to preserving trade flows, investment, and supply chain resilience.
For China, the COC offers a means of shaping the strategic environment (International Law Studies, p. 50) without conceding on core sovereignty claims. It shows Beijing welcomes any open communication and still being a responsive regional partner as long as it’s territory not being challenged. Beijing views the COC acceptable so long as it does not affect territorial delimitation or challenge its long-term maritime ambitions. In this case, the COC functions as a diplomatic cushion i.e. reducing immediate risks while deferring substantive resolution.
While the COC is unlikely to transform the strategic balance (as it does not have a legal binding effect) in the South China Sea, the dynamics between China, ASEAN and The Philippines manifests the importance of confidence-building in the South China debacle. In an era of intensifying major power rivalry, China also has an interest in signalling diplomatic engagement and regional responsibility through ASEAN-led mechanisms.
Prospects Under the Philippines’ Chairmanship
Given the limited scope of the COC, incremental progress in 2026 is plausible. The Philippines’ chairmanship provides Manila with agenda-setting opportunity and a convening power, enabling it to defend freedom of navigation in the SCS, safeguarding maritime security using ASEAN as a regional platform. The Marcos Jr. administration appears cognisant that while managing tensions in the West Philippine Sea remains challenging, demonstrating diplomatic momentum is strategically important for both domestic and international audiences.
Recent ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting has signalled renewed commitment to concluding COC negotiations within 2026. Complementing this effort, the Philippines has proposed a Declaration on Maritime Corporation, which has been positively received by ASEAN members. This initiative focuses on practical cooperation rather than sovereignty, aligning with ASEAN’s preference for functional confidence-building outcomes.
Conclusion: A Strategic Window, not a Strategic Resolution
Whether the conclusion of the COC ultimately favours the Philippines, or represents a middle-ground compromise, or merely sustains the status quo remains open to be debated. What is clearer, however, is that 2026 offers ASEAN and the Philippines (especially), a strategic window to reinforce regional diplomacy, demonstrate relevance, and modestly stabilise a volatile maritime domain.
Even if adopted, the COC will not resolve the root causes of conflict in the South China Sea. Territorial sovereignty disputes will persist, and incidents at sea are unlikely to disappear entirely. Nonetheless, under the Philippines’ ASEAN Chairmanship in advancing the COC, it may serve a broader strategic purpose, that of stabilising regional security by preventing aggressive behaviours of the parties to the conflict. It can reaffirm ASEAN centrality, preserve regional autonomy, and prevent competition from escalating into competition.
From a policy perspective, success in navigating the South China Sea debacle should therefore be measured not by the resolution of disputes, but by ASEAN’s ability to manage them on its own terms.
