Strategic intelligence has always been a key element in the survival of states and projection of power. Within the framework of realist theory, states exist in an anarchic international system where security, relative gains and survival are overriding concerns. In this paper, realism is used as the main analytical lens for understanding why states invest in strategic intelligence, although it is not the only possible way to interpret intelligence behaviour. From a realist perspective, strategic intelligence is used by states to help them reduce uncertainty in the international system as well as anticipate threats and defend security in an anarchic international system. Here, strategic intelligence refers to that intelligence which supports national level decision making, long-term threat assessment, and early warning.
In that context, intelligence is not something that is secondary to the overall bureaucratic function but is a strategic enabler. It is intelligence that enables states to anticipate the threats, exploit the vulnerabilities of their adversaries and influence the outcome before the conflict becomes overt. Technology amplifies this function by expanding the scope, speed, secrecy and precision of the intelligence function.
Historically speaking, the states that better integrated intelligence and technology had disproportionate advantages over competitors. From the very beginning of cryptographic devices and signalling systems up to the invention of satellite reconnaissance, cyber operations and artificial intelligence, technology has proved to be a force multiplier in the art of statecraft on several occasions. The pattern has been the same through the ages: intelligence innovation is the source of technological surprise and the effective use of technological surprise can lead to strategic surprise which alters the balance of power before an adversary has time to adjust.
This paper argues that the development of strategic intelligence can best be described as a history of states using technology to minimize uncertainty and provide themselves with the advantage. Ancient, medieval, industrial and contemporary examples all contain the same realist logic - that states innovating in the intelligence domain gain an operational leverage - and those who do not adapt become vulnerable. The discussion makes use of selected examples, rather than a complete historical chronology, to illustrate how the use of technology has repeatedly changed the face of strategic intelligence.
Short Historical Overview - from Secrecy to Early Warning
States have long recognized the power of information superiority in the course of military and political affairs. In Ancient China, Sun Tzu considered espionage and foreknowledge as important instruments in overcoming superior opponents. In Ancient Greece, the scytale cipher among the Spartans indicated some attempt to ensure the security of military communications by technical means. The value was not only in secrecy but in maintaining freedom of command but denying the adversary insight.
Persian and Roman empires extended this logic using communications infrastructures such as scouts, relays, roads, coded signals, fire beacons, and flags. Rome in particular combined roads, messengers, reconnaissance and signalling into an early system of linked logistics, communication and intelligence. Such developments were based on a principle which is still central today: Secure communication and early warning are instruments of power.
Deception also played an enduring role. The Trojan Horse is a powerful strategic lesson, that sometimes deception and infiltration can overcome stronger defences. In modern terms, this is a combination of cognitive deception and operational intelligence.
During the medieval period and the early modern period, intelligence became more systematised. In the Arab world, the development of frequency analysis by Al-Kindi changed cryptography from an art to a science of decryption that enabled rulers to interpret hostile communications more adequately. The Abbasid Caliphate also illustrated the importance of organised intelligence and courier networks across great areas. In Europe, Sir Francis Walsingham's Elizabethan intelligence system of coded correspondence, interception and analysis was used to protect regime stability in exposing the Babington Plot.
The industrial age and the twentieth century further fostered this change. Telegraphy was primarily a communications infrastructure, but it served to bolster strategic intelligence by accelerating the rate of communications for analysis and decision-making purposes. In the twentieth century codebreaking at Bletchley Park and against the Japanese communications generated decision advantage at the highest level of war. Later aerial reconnaissance and satellite surveillance were used as methods of extending intelligence into denied spaces and is well illustrated by the U-2 programme during the Cold War.
Such cases also help to understand the difference between technological and strategic surprise. Technological surprise is the unexpected use of a new capability, whereas strategic surprise is only achieved if it is successfully integrated, used, and exploited before adversaries can adapt.
Contemporary Strategic Intelligence: from the Dominance of Data to Cyber-Physical Operations
In the modern era, strategic intelligence is more and more a combination of big data, AI, cyber intelligence, and geospatial systems. States no longer depend on intercepting messages or photographing military facilities. States are now using digital ecosystems and communication metadata, social networks, satellites, sensors and commercial technologies for building pattern of life intelligence and predictive threat pictures. This change is in line with realism: In a system of competition, decreasing uncertainty faster than competitors is a form of power by itself.
The 2025-26 Israeli operations provide one of the most extensively documented recent examples of such a change. The Hezbollah pager operation is one of the most obvious cases of intelligence-based technological surprise. Reuters and BBC reported that Israeli operatives inserted explosives into thousands of Rocky pagers ordered by Hezbollah, apparently at the stage of production; some 3,000 were detonated later after a coded signal was sent. The same Reuters article also mentioned that Hezbollah had switched to using pagers partly to evade Israeli electronic surveillance, which made the compromise all the more strategic. In effect, a communications security measure was transformed into a catastrophic counterintelligence vulnerability. The operation showed penetration of supply chains, secret technical manipulation and psychological disruption on a large scale. Not only was it an intelligence success, it was also a strategic message about the depth of Israeli penetration into the security ecosystem of the Hezbollah.
A second modern example is the reported Israeli exploitation of Tehran's traffic-camera and surveillance environment. According to media reporting, Israeli intelligence penetrated Tehran traffic cameras and related surveillance systems in order to build pattern-of-life intelligence on senior Iranian government figures and elements of their surrounding security environment. The importance of this case is the use of civilian infrastructure for strategic intelligence gathering. Traffic cameras, urban sensors, networked surveillance tools are no longer simply municipal property, they can become platforms of intelligence for target development, movement analysis and for the timing of operations. This is one of the defining attributes of modern cyber-physical espionage: the civilian digital infrastructure may be converted into a battlespace of intelligence competition. It should be noted that these examples are used here because they are among the most extensively reported recent cases of cyber-physical intelligence operations, not because such methods are unique to one state or region.
Policy Implications and Conclusion
Considering the abovementioned, three policy implications should be highlighted. The first aspect is that supply chains have become an intelligence terrain. States, institutions, and commercial operators must treat commercially acquired communications devices as potential vectors of supply-chain compromise and invest in verification protocols accordingly. The second aspect is that urban infrastructure constitutes a strategic vulnerability. Cameras, sensors and smart city systems can create everlasting intelligence for whoever can access those first. Third, technological surprise is now making its way through civilian systems, and not just military ones. Considering these, resilience, verification and counter-intelligence are more important than ever.
In conclusion, there is a consistent logic of realism in the history of strategic intelligence: technology makes it possible for the states to know more, to react more quickly, to deceive better and to strike more precisely. From the scytale to Bletchley Park, the telegraph to artificial intelligence empowered surveillance, whoever has the best combination of technology and intelligence on their side will have the upper hand. The recent Israeli cases show that this logic has now reached a cyber-physical age, where supply chains and city infrastructure can be used as the tools of espionage and strategic surprise. For modern states, technological adaptation is no longer a choice. It is a condition of survival.
