Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have signed a memorandum of understanding on logistics cooperation and the railway sector. The proposed rail link would run from Saudi Arabia through Jordan and Syria to Türkiye, with potential onward access to European markets. If implemented, it could create an alternative overland freight corridor at a time when maritime disruption has increased interest in regional transport diversification.
In the 1860s, Ottoman planners viewed rail transport as a means of linking Damascus with Medina and supporting both pilgrimage and military mobility. Construction of the Hejaz Railway began in 1900, and the line reached Medina in 1908. The railway was severely damaged during the First World War, and, after a short revival, eventually lost the connection with Medina in 1924. The Damascus–Amman section subsequently operated only intermittently. A limited weekly Amman–Daraa passenger service was restored in 2010, but cross-border passenger and freight operations were suspended in 2011 following the outbreak of conflict in Syria. With its 1,050mm gauge, the services were slower than highway transport.
The proposed Saudi–Türkiye rail corridor would primarily depend on rail rehabilitation and cross-border coordination in Syria and Jordan. Syria is particularly important because of its location between Türkiye and Jordan and its historical role in connecting regional rail systems. Before the conflict, Syria operated a mixed-gauge railway system. Most of the national network used the 1,435 mm standard gauge and was connected to Türkiye through three border crossings. Syria also had a standard-gauge rail connection with Iraq, although this link had been interrupted before the 2011 conflict. In contrast, the historic Hejaz Railway alignment from Damascus towards Jordan used a 1,050 mm narrow gauge.
The gauge difference is important for the proposed corridor. The historic Hejaz line towards Jordan is narrow gauge and cannot directly connect with the 1,435 mm standard-gauge networks in Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Türkiye, or support a modern regional freight service for its low speed and limited capacity. A Saudi–Türkiye link would therefore require major upgrading of the existing route or new standard-gauge construction across Syria and Jordan. Syria’s damaged transport infrastructure also makes financing a central issue. Railway rehabilitation is unlikely to be funded through domestic resources alone and will require concessional finance, regional support and private investment in freight terminals and logistics facilities. Security, customs coordination and cross-border operating agreements will be equally important. The aim should be to build an efficient freight corridor rather than simply restore the former network.
Jordan lacks a modern railway network for international freight. The narrow-gauge Hejaz Railway towards Syria has been inactive across the border since 2011, while the former Aqaba phosphate railway ceased operations in 2018. Jordan and Etihad Rail have agreed to develop a 360-kilometre freight line linking the phosphate and potash areas of Al-Shidiya and Ghor Al-Safi to Aqaba. This would strengthen mineral exports, but further investment would still be needed to establish standard-gauge connections towards Syria and Saudi Arabia.
Extension is the main issue for Baghdad to be part of the rail link. After the wars across three decades, Iraq gradually resumes its rail services along several routes, but mostly along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, being away from the border with Saudi Arabia. In addition, the international rail service with Syria has not been reopened. Similar to Syria, internal stability is also essential for any rail development in Iraq.
It is too early to tell which route will be the international rail link, but Riyadh and Ankara have respective rail networks to extend. Currently, Saudi Arabia’s north-south line reaches to Al-Haditha close to the Jordanian border and a mining site in Hazm Al Jalamid, relatively towards Iraq. Compared with fully reviving Hejaz rail from Medina, these two locations would be more economic. Turkiye’s rail networks are convenient for connecting Syria. In addition to Tahtakopru, Çobanbey and Nusaybin, three former rail border crossings, Turkish Transport Ministry has reopened its 350-kilometre rail lines along with the Syrian borders, where can be built for additional connection lines.
Although both Saudi Arabia and Turkiye have respective beginning points, negotiation with the hosted countries, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq would be most critical. All the regional countries have a strong motive in enhancing land transportation, especially after witnessing the significant impact of blockading the Strait of Hormuz this year, but how to share the burden of construction and ensure security along the routes would not be easy. After this bottleneck, construction will test whether previous planning is appropriate or not, as it may encounter actual challenges, such as security threat and logistic support, which require more collaboration to overcome. Given the rail links built, maintenance and operational costs would be a continuous challenge, because there may not be sufficient demands, both passengers and freight, to cover the costs in the initial stage or even later. Bearing deficit to preserve the strategic link would require political commitment of these countries.
Despite its strategic appeal, the corridor is likely to require considerable time, investment and coordination to become operational. Syria’s damaged infrastructure, differences in rail gauge, limited financing and continuing security concerns remain important constraints. Progress will also depend on coordinated customs arrangements, compatible technical standards and sustained political commitment among Riyadh, Anman, Damascus and Ankara. Recent disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea have reinforced the importance of alternative transport corridors.
During the first half of 2025, around 20.9 million barrels of oil per day transited the Strait of Hormuz, equivalent to approximately 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption, while the strait also carried around one-fifth of global LNG trade. These disruptions have renewed interest in developing complementary overland transport routes to improve regional supply-chain resilience. The current disruption in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea provide strong motives for these countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, as development of rail tracks also contain potential for pipelines. However, whether they remain sufficient attention when maritime transport returns to normal would be a fundamental factor.
