The vast expanse of space, once perceived as a purely scientific and exploratory domain, has rapidly transformed into a critical arena for national security and global stability. The question is no longer if space security matters, but rather how the international community can effectively address the burgeoning threats and challenges that now define this celestial frontier.
The urgency surrounding space security can be attributed to several factors. The ubiquity of space-based satellites in our everyday lives means that disruptions to these services could have catastrophic effects. The rise of commercial space companies, coupled with decreasing launch costs, has led to a significant increase in the number of actors operating in orbit. Today, approximately 80 countries have space programs, including at least 20 African states, reflecting the truly global expansion of space capabilities.[1] The blurring lines between civilian and military space applications are creating inherent security dilemmas.
The notion of space as a sanctuary free from conflict is also rapidly eroding. Several nations are actively developing and deploying counterspace capabilities, and while they maintain these are for defensive purposes, the inherent offensive potential fuels an arms race in orbit. Anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), often viewed as covert 'counterspace' technologies, can be broadly categorized into 'hard kill' systems that physically destroy satellites and 'soft kill' systems that disrupt functionality, such as signal jamming or spoofing false signals. Recent cyberattacks on satellite operators, jamming of satellite signals, and close proximity operations by military satellites have all raised concerns about the potential for escalation and miscalculation.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA), or Space Domain Awareness (SDA), is becoming a cornerstone of space security. It involves the tracking, cataloging, and monitoring of objects in orbit to prevent collisions, anticipate hostile actions, and ensure responsible behavior in space.[2]
Blurred Lines: Private Space Companies Overlap with Traditionally Public Domains
From communication and navigation (GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, BeiDou) to weather forecasting, financial transactions, and even agricultural monitoring, our lives are inextricably linked to the functioning of satellites now. There are over 5,000 active satellites as of 2023 with Starlink’s mega-constellation the most prominent.[3]
One of the most consequential shifts in the new space economy is the democratization of space access. Private entities such as SpaceX and OneWeb can generate high-resolution satellite imagery that was once the exclusive domain of state intelligence agencies. With the proliferation of small satellites and the development of advanced imaging technologies, commercial companies can now capture and distribute visual data of virtually any location on Earth.[4] Notably, Finnish satellite operator ICEYE has entered into agreements to provide near real-time Earth observation data to NATO, utilizing a fleet of 48 Synthetic Aperture Radar satellites capable of penetrating cloud cover and operating irrespective of weather conditions.[5]
Technologies initially developed for scientific or commercial purposes can often be repurposed or have dual-use capabilities with military implications. This ambiguity complicates threat assessment and exacerbates mistrust among nations. The accessibility of this data is eroding the monopoly that states traditionally held over strategic intelligence, introducing both opportunities for greater transparency and challenges related to surveillance, privacy, and data governance.
The private/public debate is especially relevant because space is becoming increasingly important for national power projection. Nations recognize the force-multiplying effects of space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and communication for their terrestrial military operations, transforming space into a potential new domain of warfare. Governments are developing capabilities to disrupt, degrade, or deny an adversary’s use of space, recognizing the strategic advantage this could provide in a terrestrial conflict. This includes the development of anti-satellite weapons, cyber capabilities targeting space systems, and electronic warfare techniques to jam or spoof satellite signals.[6]
The integration of space capabilities into terrestrial military doctrines blurs the lines between space security and terrestrial security. In 2019 the United States created a dedicated military branch, the U.S. Space Force, to organize, train, and equip forces for space operations, and NATO formally recognized space as a new operational domain alongside air, and, sea, and cyberspace. An attack on a space asset could be considered an act of war, potentially triggering a response in other domains.[7]
Despite the foundational Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space and emphasizes the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, there exists a significant international legal vacuum concerning many aspects of space security. There are no comprehensive and legally binding international agreements specifically addressing the use of force in space or the development and testing of counterspace weapons (with the exception of WMDs).[8]
This lack of specific legal frameworks creates governance gaps that can be exploited. The interpretation of existing principles, such as “peaceful uses,” is often contested, and there is no universally agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a prohibited military activity in space.
Future Shock: Risks of The New Space Race Include Miscalculation and Space Debris
Even when an incident occurs, attributing responsibility in space can be problematic. If a satellite suddenly fails, for example, how do you determine if it was a technical glitch, a micrometeoroid strike, or a deliberate attack, such as a directed-energy beam or cyber-sabotage? This interconnectedness necessitates a holistic approach to security that considers the space domain as an integral part of the overall strategic landscape. The potential for miscalculation and escalation in this new domain is significant, underscoring the urgent need for norms of behavior and arms control measures.[9]
The 2007 Chinese ASAT test, which created a massive debris field, served as a stark reminder of the destructive potential of kinetic counterspace weapons and their long-term consequences for the space environment. Similarly, a Russian ASAT test further amplified these concerns. In 2021 Russia strike on its defunct Cosmos 1408 satellite further polluted the low Earth orbit (LEO) and endangered the International Space Station (ISS). The test generated over 1,500 pieces of trackable orbital debris and hundreds of thousands of smaller fragments. These events underscore that space is no longer a benign environment and that the security of space assets is increasingly at risk.[10]
A significant and often underestimated threat to space security is the growing problem of space debris. Decades of space activities have left behind millions of pieces of defunct satellites, rocket bodies, and fragmentation debris orbiting Earth at high velocities. These objects pose a direct collision risk to operational spacecraft, potentially causing damage or complete destruction.
By some estimates, there could be over 100,000 operational satellites in orbit by 2030, dramatically increasing the risk of collisions and compounding the space debris problem.[11]
The most concerning scenario is the Kessler Syndrome, a theoretical cascading effect proposed by NASA scientist Donald Kessler. In this scenario, a collision between two large objects generates a significant amount of new debris, increasing the probability of further collisions.[12] This self-sustaining chain reaction could eventually render entire orbital regimes unusable for generations, effectively denying access to space for all nations.
The risks of space debris affect all spacefaring nations regardless of their military or commercial ambitions. The loss of critical satellite infrastructure due to debris collisions would have profound global consequences, impacting everything from weather forecasting and climate monitoring to global communications and national security.
Addressing the space debris problem requires international cooperation on mitigation measures, active debris removal technologies, and responsible spaceflight practices. The voluntary guidelines for space debris mitigation developed by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) are a positive step, but they lack the legal enforceability needed to ensure universal compliance. Specifically, the 2007 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and the 2019 Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability (LTS) of Outer Space Activities set out best practices and technical measures to reduce future debris creation and promote responsible behavior in space. Notably, the adoption of the 21 LTS guidelines by over 80 countries through consensus within COPUOS reflects an important diplomatic achievement and a growing global awareness of the need for space governance and sustainability.[13]
Relevance to GCC States and Their Growing Space Programs
The growing space programs and ambitions of GCC states like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar underscore the increasing relevance of space security to this strategically important region. The UAE’s successful Mars Hope mission, its burgeoning satellite industry, and the establishment of the UAE Space Agency demonstrate a significant commitment to space exploration and utilization.[14] In 2022, the UAE announced a 3 billion Dirham National Space Fund aimed at supporting new space ventures and encouraging innovation in the domestic space sector.[15] Similarly, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are actively investing in satellite communications, Earth observation, and space-related technologies as part of their economic diversification and national development strategies.
As global transportation and shipping hubs, many GCC countries rely heavily on satellite navigation for aviation, maritime operations, and road logistics. Additionally, flagship smart city initiatives such as Dubai and NEOM in Saudi Arabia depend on uninterrupted satellite connectivity to power their Internet-of-Things (IoT) ecosystems and urban planning.[16]
For these nations, ensuring the security and sustainability of the space environment is paramount. Their increasing reliance on space-based assets for communication, remote sensing, and potentially future security applications makes them vulnerable to the same threats facing other spacefaring nations. The risks of space debris, the potential for cyberattacks on their satellite infrastructure, and the broader implications of an arms race in space are all relevant concerns.
Therefore, GCC states have a vested interest in actively engaging in international discussions on space security and contributing to the development of norms of behavior and legal frameworks. Their unique regional perspective and growing space capabilities can provide valuable contributions to the global dialogue.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[1] Steer, Cassandra (2023) ‘Outer Space’ in: Paul D. Williams and Matt McDonald eds. Security Studies. An Introduction. 4th edition. Routledge, p.670
[2] Ibid, p. 674
[3] Eclipse (2024) 'Navigational Satellites: Evolution, Challenges, and Their Crucial Role in Modern Communication and Navigation', July 11, 2024, Navigational Satellites: Evolution, Challenges, and Their Crucial Role in Modern Communication and Navigation - ECLIPSE Suite
[4] Roulette, Joey and Marisa Taylor, 'Exclusive: Musk's SpaceX is building spy satellite network for US intelligence agency, sources say', March 16, 2024, Reuters, Exclusive: Musk's SpaceX is building spy satellite network for US intelligence agency, sources say | Reuters
[5] Kauranen, Anne, 'Finnish satellite operator ICEYE to provide data to NATO headquarters', March 28, 2025, Reuters, Finnish satellite operator ICEYE to provide data to NATO headquarters | Reuters
[6] Shields, Ian (2021) ‘Space and Security’, in: Peter Hough et al eds. International Security Studies. Theory and Practice. 2nd edition. Routledge, pp. 448-457
[7] Stickings, Ali, 'Space as an Operational Domain: What Next for NATO?', 15 October 2020, RUSI, Space as an Operational Domain: What Next for NATO? | Royal United Services Institute
[8] Lieberman, Sarah and Jana Fey (2024) ‘Space Security’, in: Norma Rossi and Malte Reiman eds, Security Studies. An Applied Introduction. Sage, pp. 497-499
[9] Steer, Cassandra (2023) ‘Outer Space’ in: Paul D. Williams and Matt McDonald eds. Security Studies. An Introduction. 4th edition. Routledge, p.677
[10] Weeden, Brian (2010 '2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Fact Sheet', Secure World Foundation, chinese_asat_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf
[11] Lieberman, Sarah and Jana Fey (2024) ‘Space Security’, in: Norma Rossi and Malte Reiman eds, Security Studies. An Applied Introduction. Sage, pp. 490-493
[12] Wall, Mike, 'Kessler Syndrome and the space debris problem', July 14, 2022, Space.com, Kessler Syndrome and the space debris problem | Space
[13] Lieberman, Sarah and Jana Fey (2024) ‘Space Security’, in: Norma Rossi and Malte Reiman eds, Security Studies. An Applied Introduction. Sage, pp. 505-507
[14] Cresniov, Alex, 'Uniting Gulf Countries for Space Leadership: The Imperative for a Regional Body', February 25, 2024, SpaceTech, Uniting Gulf Countries for Space Leadership: The Imperative for a Regional Body - SpaceTech in Gulf Region
[15] Emirates News Agency-WAM, 'UAE achieves continuous accomplishments in space sector', March 2, 2023, UAE achieves continuous accomplishments in space sector | Emirates News Agency
[16] Concox, 'UAE and KSA: Rising Global Logistics Powerhouses', Concox.com, UAE and KSA: Emerging Global Logistics Hubs – Infrastructure,
