On February 12, 2025, the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) collided with the Panama-flagged bulk carrier M/V Besiktas-M off the coast of Egypt while approaching the Suez Canal to deploy in the Red Sea waters,[1] highlighting the underlying risks of navigating busy maritime chokepoints. Similarly, on September 23, 2024, the Henry J. Kaiser-class fleet replenishment oiler USNS Big Horn (T-AO-198) grounded off the coast of Oman,[2] temporarily halting at-sea refueling operations and disrupting logistical support for the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) Carrier Strike Group (CSG). While maritime incidents are rare, this is not the first collision of an American aircraft carrier in the Middle East. In July 2004, the former USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) struck a dhow during night air operations in the Gulf, sinking the small ship. Besides, low-intensity allisions also occurred between warships and logistics vessels of the U.S. Navy involved in at-sea replenishment operations in 2014.[3]Unforeseen, non-combat incidents can significantly impact the forward deployment of naval forces, particularly in the strategic waters falling within the area of responsibility (AOR) of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The presence of the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers and replenishment vessels in the Middle East is crucial for America’s power projection and deterrence, including the steady support of forward-deployed military forces. Shipping accidents, combined with potential delays in repair and redeployment operations, can significantly reduce the effectiveness of naval presence, limit operational flexibility, and disrupt ongoing missions. Additionally, these events bring attention to the broader role of military logistics and fleet sustainment services in ensuring the long-term success of naval operations.
The USS Truman: Anatomy of a Collision
Homeported at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, the USS Truman CSG took station in the Middle East waters in mid-December 2024,[4] joining other American military assets forward deployed in the region to deter and degrade the Houthi attacks on international shipping. During its deployment in the Arabian Sea, the USS Truman CSG significantly contributed to Washington’s regional defense posture, including conducting precision airstrikes against Houthi military sites and ISIS affiliates in Somalia.[5]
After a 50-day deployment in the Red Sea, the Truman transited the Suez Canal northbound in early February 2025, heading to U.S. Naval Support Activity (NSA) Souda Bay, Crete, for a port visit.[6] The latter is an operational ashore base serviced with an all-weather airfield, a deep-water pier facility, and refueling and resupply services. NSA Souda Bay’s strategic position and top-notch fleet support facilities make it a critical asset in the U.S. Navy’s architecture of forward outposts. While NSA Souda Bay falls under the U.S. Navy’s 6th Fleet (Europe/Africa) AOR, its close location to the Red Sea renders it vital for supporting surface combatants operating in the 5th Fleet (Middle East). Additionally, the naval base’s Marathi NATO pier complex makes it the only military facility in the Mediterranean that has a deep-water pier with docking capabilities for American aircraft carriers.[7]
Port calls play a crucial role in fleet sustainment operations during extended forward deployments. They are essential for ensuring the ship’s combat readiness by facilitating support activities like vessel upkeep, bunkering, and provisioning. Additionally, these calls provide crew members the opportunity to engage in recreational activities on shore, which is vital for their well-being after long deployments in high-risk contexts. Yet, in general, military strategists in Washington, DC, aim to reduce port visits to the minimum to limit the warship’s absence from the operational theatre. In general, routine port calls for refueling, resupply, and crew shore leave last about three to five days, while goodwill visits can be extended up to seven days. After finishing its port call at NSA Souda Bay, the Truman drew near Port Said, the northern entrance to the Suez Canal, to resume its operations in the Red Sea when it collided with the bulk carrier MV Besiktas-M, which was leaving the Canal bound for Constanta, Romania.[8] As investigations are ongoing, damages suggest the Besiktas-M’s starboard bow struck the Truman’s starboard quarter, causing damage to the ship’s hull above the waterline. The merchant vessel’s AIS (Automatic Identification System) indicates that the incident occurred in the anchorage site north of Port Said.[9]
These waters are among the world's most congested areas for maritime traffic, with hundreds of ships waiting in holding position before heading south in the Red Sea alongside numerous vessels exiting the Suez Canal. Unlike typical U.S. Navy protocol in busy waters, the American aircraft carrier approached the Suez Canal with its AIS turned off. Shortly after the collision, the Truman activated its AIS and regrouped with its escorting warship, the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109), before heading back to NSA Souda Bay for urgent repairs.[10] Although damaged, Truman continued to conduct routine flight operations while in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Once in Crete, teams from the U.S. Navy’s Forward Deployed Regional Maintenance Center (FDRMC) conducted an Emergent Repair Availability (ERAV) on the aircraft carrier.[11] Headquartered in Naples, Italy, the FDRMC is the only forward-deployed regional maintenance center within the AOR of the U.S. Navy’s 5th and 6th Fleets.[12]
The assessment team concluded that the damage included the exterior walls of some storage and maintenance spaces, while external damage affected a line handling space, the fantail, and the platform above one of the storage spaces. Crucially, aircraft elevator number three, which plays a vital role in moving fighter jets from the hangars to the flight deck, suffered no damage.[13] Supported by teams from Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Theodoropoulos Group (an NSA’s local shipbuilding partner), FDRMC personnel completed a five-day ERAV on the Truman, restoring the aircraft carrier’s combat readiness.[14]
Following the U.S. Navy’s usual procedure after a collision, Washington aimed to restore confidence by reshuffling Truman’s command structure, appointing Capt. Christopher “Chowdah” Hill to relieve Capt. Dave Snowden as commanding officer.[15] With repairs finished in record time, the aircraft carrier and the USS Jason Dunham returned to U.S. CENTCOM’s AOR in the last week of February, resuming routine flight operations.[16]
Investigations by the U.S. Navy’s 6th Fleet are still ongoing, but it is reasonable that a number of factors concurred with the collision. Undoubtedly, the Truman approaching the Suez Canal with its AIS disabled was a major concurring factor. Navigating at night without AIS poses significant risks due to the lack of real-time vessel tracking. Without AIS, other vessels cannot see a ship's location, course, and speed on their navigation systems, increasing the chances of collisions, especially in high-traffic areas. Besides, the limited visibility at the time of the incident, which occurred at approximately 11:45 p.m., made it harder to avoid the collision. At night, visual detection is severely reduced. Without AIS, ships must rely solely on radar and lookout crews.
Nevertheless, both the Truman and the Besiktas-M sustained only minor damage. The aircraft carrier had to make only a short stop at port, while the Panama-flagged merchant vessel was able to continue its journey to Constanta, Romania. Two main mitigating factors contributed to the incident being classified as a low-order collision. First, the collision occurred at a low cruising speed (under 5 knots), causing damage to the hull above the waterline. Second, measuring 188.5 meters in length and with a deadweight of 53,000 tons, the Besiktas-M qualifies as a small bulk carrier. Had a larger ship collided with the Truman, the impact could have led to more significant damage, possibly further jeopardizing the hull’s integrity.
The USNS Big Horn: The Fuel Supply Line’s Predicament
On September 23, 2024, the Kaiser-class oiler USNS Big Horn suffered an underwater allision with its stern after completing an underway replenishment operation with the USS Lincoln CSG in the Arabian Sea off Oman’s coast.[17] While circumstances surrounding the accident remain unclear, the allision led to flooding in an aft machinery space and damage to one of the ship’s rudders, causing the oiler to run aground. Ultimately, tugs rescued the Big Horn the day after, escorting it to the port of Duqm, Oman, for repairs.[18]
The Big Horn was forward-deployed in the Mideast waters to support operations of the two CSGs, the USS Lincoln and USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), which were on station in the Arabian Sea as part of Washington’s naval activities to deter and counter Houthi attacks on international shipping.[19] With the USS Roosevelt departing CENTCOM’s AOR after an eight-month deployment in mid-September 2024,[20] the Kaiser-class oiler’s core task was resupplying jet fuel for the embarked air wing on the USS Lincoln and the aircraft carrier’s escorts.
With the Big Horn out of the picture, the USS Lincoln CSG’s combat operational readiness was severely compromised, forcing Washington to hastily recalibrate its forward naval posture. Some escorts of the USS Lincoln CSG transited the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait northbound a few days after the incident, taking station in the Red Sea in close vicinity to Saudi fuel terminals.[21] While the USS Lincoln kept operating in the Arabian Sea, the lack of a reliable supply of jet fuel impacted its routine flight operations, most likely reducing the number and range of daily air sorties.
With the USS Lincoln’s at-sea fuel supply line in jeopardy, the U.S. patched up a stopgap solution by combining temporary remedies. First, it mobilized two Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ships assigned to the 5th Fleet, the USNS Amelia Earhart (T-AKE-6) and Alan Shepard (T-AKE-3), to conduct at-sea fueling operations. However, albeit timely, they could hardly keep up with the volumes of jet fuel transported by the Big Horn. While the latter can carry up to 28,300 m3 of fuel, the cargo fuel volume capacity of the dry cargo ships is limited to about 2,900 m3, forcing the Earhart and the Shepard to spend extra hours at sea in order to meet Lincoln’s jet fuel needs. Second, the U.S. Navy resorted to a commercial tanker chartered by the Military Sealift Command (MSC), the national organization responsible for providing sealift and ocean transportation for deployed U.S. forces,[22] to deliver jet fuel to the USS Lincoln CSG.[23] Although effective, the ship required specialized modifications to conduct at-sea replenishment operations, delaying its deployment on station.[24] Finally, the USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204), a replenishment oiler attached to the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet (Pacific), was reassigned to CENTCOM’s AOR.[25] Yet, it took weeks before the Rappahannock could redeploy from its station at Yokosuka, Japan, to the Arabian Sea and relieve the Big Horn.
Strategic Implications for the U.S. Navy
These crises have shed some light on the strengths of forward-deployed forces, especially the response and professionalism of its military and civilian personnel. Strategic planners swiftly adapted to emerging challenges to maintain operational effectiveness, highlighting how pre-deployed assets and personnel in different operational theaters can enhance responsiveness. Besides, the support teams of FDRMC and NSA Souda Bay displayed a relentless commitment, working around the clock to have an aircraft carrier back on station in the Red Sea. Similarly, the civilian merchant mariners aboard the MSC replenishment ships supporting the USS Lincoln CSG demonstrated exceptional competence while performing double duty in a high-threat environment.
However, although the incidents involving USS Truman and USNS Big Horn have not irreparably compromised the U.S. Navy’s operations in the Middle East, they exposed underlying vulnerabilities in its regional defense architecture and fleet support capabilities. These episodes offer significant lessons for the military and political establishment in Washington on how to strengthen America’s forward naval presence.
As one of the most powerful tools in America’s military arsenal, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier plays a crucial role in Washington’s force projection and deterrence. Therefore, having such a strategic asset forcibly removed from the station delivers a severe blow to U.S. defensive posture. Fortunately, the Truman incident coincided with a lull in Houthi attacks on international shipping and a calm phase in the Israel-Iran tit-for-tat missile confrontation. However, if the aircraft carrier had departed the region during the peaks of the military escalation between Tel Aviv and Tehran on the occasion of the missile and drone strikes in April and October 2024, it would have jeopardized the security of forward-deployed U.S. military assets and those of its regional allies. Additionally, the necessity of transporting an FDRMC team from Naples to Crete for repairs on the Truman highlighted the dependence on external personnel, which may cause delays. In contrast, the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet seems better positioned, thanks to NSA Bahrain, which hosts a permanent FDRMC detachment.
Ultimately, the grounding of the Big Horn revealed significant deficiencies in the U.S. Navy’s ability to carry out sustained naval deployments within U.S. CENTCOM’s AOR, highlighting the strong connection between force projection and at-sea refueling operations. With insufficient fuel to sustain fighter jets and escorting warships, the CSG’s operational readiness is severely undermined, exposing warships and military personnel to hostile threats. To mitigate the shortage of replenishment ships, the U.S. has aimed to expand the MSC’s fleet by acquiring several units of modern double-hull logistics ships, referred to as John Lewis-class oilers.[26] However, despite these efforts, naval experts argue that the U.S. Navy’s tanker capacity will remain far below its operational needs.[27] Besides, the structural lack of qualified merchant mariner crews further complicates the MSC’s capacity to sustain long-term replenishment operations.[28]
Addressing these worrisome gaps will prove crucial to preserve the U.S. Navy’s global reach and combat readiness. Logistical and repair capabilities are pivotal to ensuring the sustainability of current naval operations and the security of the U.S. Navy’s civilian and military personnel in the Middle East waters. Yet, they will prove even more vital in case of conflict in the Indo-Pacific, where oil supply lines stretch for thousands of nautical miles and maintenance facilities are scattered over a broad operational theatre. Although often operating behind the frontline and out of the spotlight, the incidents involving USS Truman and USNS Big Horn have highlighted to what extent the U.S. Navy’s repair support teams and MSC’s civilian merchant mariners are the backbone of Washington’s capacity to conduct long-duration operations far from home ports. With military logistics and fleet sustainment services already stretched thin, the U.S. risks struggling to retain critical operational flexibility at sea.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[1] U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa / U.S. Sixth Fleet, “USS Harry S. Truman Involved in Collision at Sea,” February 13, 2025, https://www.c6f.navy.mil/Press-Room/News/Article/4065260/uss-harry-s-truman-involved-in-collision-at-sea/
[2] Sam LaGrone, “Oiler USNS Big Horn Damaged off the Coast Of Oman, No Fuel Leak Detected,” USNI News, September 24, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/09/24/oiler-usns-big-horn-damaged-off-the-coast-of-oman-no-fuel-leak-detected
[3] Maya Salam, “Previous Collisions Involving U.S. Navy Vessels,” The New York Times, August 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/us/navy-collisions-history-mccain-fitzgerald.html
[4] Heather Mongilio, “Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group In Middle East,” USNI News, December 16, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/12/16/harry-s-truman-carrier-strike-group-in-middle-east.
[5] Alison Bath, “US forces strike Houthi command hub in Yemen; USS Truman sails in Middle East,” Stars and Stripes, December 17, 2024, https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2024-12-17/houthis-yemen-truman-strikes-16192963.html; United States Africa Command, “STRIKE USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75),” February 1, 2025, https://www.africom.mil/images/35703/strike-uss-harry-s-truman-cvn-75.
[6] Heather Mongilio, “Carrier USS Harry S. Truman Back in Mediterranean After 50 Days in Red Sea,” USNI News, February 6, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/02/06/carrier-uss-harry-s-truman-back-in-mediterranean-after-50-days-in-red-sea
[7] NSA Souda Bay, “About,” https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSA-Souda-Bay/About/.
[8] U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa / U.S. Sixth Fleet, “USS Harry S. Truman Involved in Collision at Sea,” op. cit.
[9] What's Going on With Shipping?, “Naval Collision: Aircraft Carrier USS Truman & Panama-flag Bulk Carrier Collides Off Egyptian Coast,” February 13, 2025, https://youtu.be/OqRe-ouavjw?si=8xm6sSN6rHsftKUk.
[10] Sam LaGrone, “Carrier USS Harry S. Truman Hull Pierced in Collision, Heading to Port for Repairs,” USNI News, February 14, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/02/14/carrier-uss-harry-s-truman-hull-pierced-in-collision-heading-to-port-for-repairs
[11] U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa / U.S. Sixth Fleet, “USS Harry S. Truman conducts emergent repair availability,” February 16, 2025, https://www.c6f.navy.mil/Press-Room/News/Article/4068846/uss-harry-s-truman-conducts-emergent-repair-availability/
[12] Naval Sea Systems Command, “Forward Deployed Regional Maintenance Center,” https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/RMC/FDRMC/.
[13] U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa / U.S. Sixth Fleet, “USS Harry S. Truman conducts emergent repair availability,” February 16, 2025, https://www.c6f.navy.mil/Press-Room/News/Article/4068846/uss-harry-s-truman-conducts-emergent-repair-availability/
[14] U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa / U.S. Sixth Fleet, “Mission and purpose on full display as Truman returns to sea,” February 24, 2025, https://www.c6f.navy.mil/Press-Room/News/Article/4075822/mission-and-purpose-on-full-display-as-truman-returns-to-sea/
[15] America’s Navy, “Commanding Officer of USS Harry S. Truman Relieved,” February 20, 2025, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/4072087/commanding-officer-of-uss-harry-s-truman-relieved/
[16] Heather Mongilio, “USS Harry S. Truman Back Underway After Repairs Following Collision,” USNI News, February 24, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/02/24/uss-harry-s-truman-back-underway-after-repairs-following-collision
[17] Sam LaGrone, “Oiler USNS Big Horn Damaged off the Coast Of Oman, No Fuel Leak Detected,” op. cit.
[18] Sam LaGrone, “Oiler USNS Big Horn Now in Port in Oman as Congress Raises Questions Over Logistics Fleet,” USNI News, September 25, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/09/25/oiler-usns-big-horn-now-in-port-in-oman-as-congress-raises-questions-over-logistics-fleet
[19] Jim Garamone, “USS Lincoln Strike Group Arrives in U.S. Central Command,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 22, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3882120/uss-lincoln-strike-group-arrives-in-us-central-command/
[20] Sam LaGrone, “USS Theodore Roosevelt Leaves Middle East, Carrier Back in Pacific After 8 Months Deployed,” USNI News, September 12, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/09/12/uss-theodore-roosevelt-leaves-middle-east-carrier-headed-home-after-8-months-deployed
[21] Heather Mongilio, “U.S. Warships Fire a Dozen Interceptors Against Iranian Missile Attack,” USNI News, October 1, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/10/01/u-s-warships-fire-a-dozen-interceptions-against-iranian-missile-attack-against-israel
[22] U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command, “MSC Mission,” https://www.msc.usff.navy.mil/About-Us/Mission/.
[23] Salvatore R. Mercogliano, “For Want of an Oiler: The Fragile State of America’s Afloat Logistics Fleet,” gCaptain, December 2, 2024, https://gcaptain.com/for-want-of-an-oiler-the-fragile-state-of-americas-afloat-logistics-fleet/
[24] John Konrad, “US Navy Oiler Runs Aground, Forcing Carrier Strike Group to Scramble for Fuel,” gCaptain, September 24, 2024, https://gcaptain.com/us-navy-oiler-usns-big-horn-aground-forcing-carrier-strike-group-to-scramble-for-fuel/
[25] Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, “Abraham Lincoln conducts a fueling-at-sea with Rappahannock,” October 21, 2024, https://www.dvidshub.net/image/8730963/abraham-lincoln-conducts-fueling-sea-with-rappahannock
[26] Conrad Waters, “Sustaining the fleet: current logistic support ship acquisitions,” European Security and Defence, November 4, 2024, https://euro-sd.com/2024/11/articles/41272/sustaining-the-fleet-current-logistic-support-ship-acquisitions/
[27] Stephen M. Carmel, “Tankers For The Pacific Fight: A Crisis in Capability,” Center for International Maritime Security, January 23, 2023, https://cimsec.org/tankers-for-the-pacific-fight-a-crisis-in-capability/; John Konrad, “US Navy Oiler Runs Aground, Forcing Carrier Strike Group to Scramble for Fuel,” op. cit.; Salvatore R. Mercogliano, “For Want of an Oiler: The Fragile State of America’s Afloat Logistics Fleet,” op.cit.
[28] Sam LaGrone, “Navy Could Sideline 17 Support Ships Due to Manpower Issues,” USNI News, August 22, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/08/22/navy-could-sideline-17-support-ships-due-to-manpower-issues
