Introduction
Along China’s immediate periphery, instability has intensified in Pakistan[i] and Myanmar,[ii] two nations currently facing severe economic and security challenges. Chinese personnel and investment projects in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have been attacked, and the ongoing civil conflict in Myanmar has substantially slowed the progress of Chinese infrastructure projects due to heightened insecurity. In recent years, the rising violence in China’s immediate neighbourhood has jolted Zhongnanhai’s strategic calculus, compelling it to throttle back on significant investments.
Central to China’s immediate regional priorities are two critical economic corridors: the $15 billion China-Myanmar Economic Corridor[iii] (CMEC) and the $63 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Both have come under heightened scrutiny amid reports suggesting Beijing may officially deploy Chinese private security firms[iv] to protect its investments and citizens abroad. In Myanmar, Chinese private security companies are already present, but discussions of a joint security enterprise between China’s private security sector and Myanmar’s military junta signal an imminent escalation in the scale of Chinese security operations in the region. Islamabad remains steadfast in its refusal to permit Chinese PSCs to establish wholly owned subsidiaries on Pakistani soil. Yet, in practice, several Chinese PSCs have discreetly embedded themselves within key CPEC investment zones, operating alongside armed Pakistani private counterparts. These joint ventures attempt to safeguard Chinese personnel and critical infrastructure, effectively reshaping the security landscape along the corridor.
New Regulations and Old Problems
Traditionally, Chinese PSCs have provided a wide range of services to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), private corporations, and diplomatic missions overseas, including managing the deployment of foreign armed personnel for the protection of Chinese workers and projects, and information collection and cybersecurity support in complex environments. Beijing has come to rely more heavily on private security firms as a key tool to safeguard its overseas investments and personnel since the inception of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Rising anti-Chinese sentiment and instability, such as targeted attacks in Pakistan and political turbulence in Myanmar, have compelled Beijing to enhance its protective measures. In both countries, Chinese consulates have been targeted. In October 2024, the Chinese diplomatic mission in Mandalay[v] was bombed, while in 2018, the Chinese consulate in Karachi[vi] came under direct attack by gunmen.
Domestically, Beijing has developed a highly detailed legal and regulatory framework governing the private security sector. China’s latest national standard for the security services industry, the Security Service Management System Requirements and Use Guide (GB/T 42765-2023), which came into effect on June 1, 2024[vii] is a case in point. However, as Chinese PSCs expand their operations beyond national borders, they confront a far more complex legal terrain. The extraterritorial growth of these firms exposes significant gaps in China’s own regulatory mechanisms and in the broader international legal architecture, which has struggled to keep pace with the sector’s rapid evolution. Existing legal definitions are increasingly ill-suited to the nuanced realities of contemporary privatised security.[viii]
Unlike United States or Russian private military contractors, Chinese PSCs[ix] operate under a far more restrained mandate, focusing narrowly on defensive functions rather than offensive or kinetic engagements. This cautious posture reflects Beijing’s determination to tightly regulate its security footprint while avoiding the reputational and strategic risks associated with direct military involvement. China’s model of privatised security is integrated into a state-centric framework that prioritises economic protection over military adventurism.
Rising Toll on Chinese Workers Highlights Strategic Vulnerabilities of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CPEC remains a cornerstone of China’s global infrastructure and connectivity ambitions, however, the corridor is increasingly marred by instability,[x] revealing the operational fragility of China’s overseas economic presence. While the world’s attention remains fixated on the recent military escalation between India and Pakistan, the sustained pattern of lethal attacks targeting Chinese nationals along the CPEC underscores the persistent and escalating security risks associated with Beijing’s US$63 billion connection project. A growing list of violent episodes highlights the regional spillover of militant activity and the complex threat environment in which Chinese personnel operate.
• In October 2024, a Pakistani separatist group, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that targeted a convoy of Chinese nationals near Karachi’s main airport. The attack killed two Chinese workers and injured eight others.
• In March 2024, a suicide bomber struck a Chinese convoy near Besham, in Pakistan’s restive Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The attack resulted in the deaths of five Chinese engineers and their Pakistani driver.
The recurrence of high-casualty attacks on Chinese nationals presents a direct challenge to the viability of the BRI’s infrastructure projects in volatile regions. It also raises critical questions regarding the host nation’s capacity and political willingness to secure foreign investment against non-state armed actors. For Beijing, the deaths of Chinese personnel abroad are not only a humanitarian tragedy but also a political liability and a potential source of domestic and international scrutiny.
In this respect, Beijing fears the resurgence of Islamist militancy, an influx of refugees, and a spike in cross-border trafficking of narcotics and weapons. These threats pose a direct challenge to China’s national security interests, particularly in its western frontier regions.
Myanmar: Non-Interference vs. Operational Security
At the same time, along the southeastern frontier regions, reports[xi] suggest that Chinese PSCs are already operating inside Myanmar. The possible formation of a joint security venture between the Myanmar military junta and a Chinese PSC, indicating that China is quietly recalibrating its approach to non-interference, is far more consequential.
Nowhere is this quiet expansion more evident than in the CMEC. Once touted as a flagship BRI project, CMEC now exposes China’s deepening vulnerability to regional unrest. The corridor was politically fragile even before the 2021 military coup, and it is now enmeshed in two of Myanmar’s most volatile dynamics:[xii] the ethnic fault lines dividing the central Bamar government and minority regions; and the ongoing power struggle between civilian leadership and the military.
This makes CMEC, and its keystone, the Kyaukphyu Port, a powder keg. Much like Pakistan’s Gwadar Port under CPEC, Kyaukphyu has become a contested zone, attracting both geopolitical manoeuvring and local resistance. Anti-Chinese sentiment is rising, criminal networks are proliferating, and control over revenues and infrastructure has become a battleground between ethnic militias, local power brokers, and the junta itself.
Unlike in Pakistan, where the government has consistently denied granting full operational control to Chinese PSCs, Myanmar’s junta openly welcomes Chinese security involvement. For Beijing, such an arrangement could be tactically ideal; it allows plausible deniability if things go wrong while projecting power without the complications of formal military deployment. For the junta, it offers external support without conceding sovereignty.
Conclusion
The official request to incorporate Chinese private security companies in two regions close to the Chinese borders and strategic interests reinforces a critical reality — infrastructure-led foreign policy and development cannot be sustained in isolation from robust, adaptive security strategies. As instability radiates outward from Afghanistan into CPEC’s operational zones and the ongoing civil war in Myanmar, Beijing’s strategic calculus is evolving. For Zhongnanhai, a reassessment of its overseas risk tolerance, protection mechanisms, and long-term engagement models is a priority. Failure to address these vulnerabilities could jeopardise not only CPEC and CMEC but also the broader credibility of the BRI. In this respect, Chinese PSC have emerged as a pragmatic mechanism to bridge critical security gaps without contravening China’s diplomatic posture.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[i] BBC News. “What’s Going on in Myanmar’s China-Backed Cities?” BBC News, accessed May 28, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0r84p0dp1jo.
[ii] International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Analysis.” Myanmar Conflict Monitor, accessed May 28, 2025. https://myanmar.iiss.org/analysis.
[iii] Abb, Pascal. “The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Limits of China’s BRI Agency.” The Diplomat, February 2025. https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/the-china-myanmar-economic-corridor-and-the-limits-of-chinas-bri-agency/.
[iv] Arduino, Alessandro. Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones, and the Future of War. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2024. https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War.
[v] Reuters. “China Condemns Attack on Myanmar Consulate.” Reuters, October 21, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-condemns-attack-myanmar-consulate-2024-10-21/.
[vi] Reuters. “Gunmen Attack China’s Consulate in Pakistan as Violence Flares across Region.” Reuters, November 23, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/gunmen-attack-chinas-consulate-in-pakistan-as-violence-flares-across-region-idUSKCN1NS0AP/.
[vii] Zhanggui Zhou, Yan Cui, ICoCA Blog Jan 15, 2025. This standard represents a modified adoption of ISO 18788:2015 and is designed to improve the management and operational practices of Chinese security service providers, particularly in the context of international engagements. By incorporating advanced management methodologies, the standard carries substantial economic and social implications for the development of the industry within China. It has been specifically adapted to reflect domestic conditions and regulatory frameworks. https://blog.icoca.ch/the-new-chinese-national-standard-on-private-security/
[viii] Avant, Deborah D. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/market-for-force/0EAE220EDCBF4ADF88F97B6F7B1BDD10.
[ix] Arduino, Alessandro. “Chinese Private Security Companies: Neither Blackwater nor the Wagner Group.” War on the Rocks, December 2023. https://warontherocks.com/2023/12/chinese-private-security-companies-neither-blackwater-nor-the-wagner-group/.
[x] Arduino, Alessandro. “Pakistan, Afghanistan, China: Grappling with Rising Terrorist Threats.” ThinkChina, accessed May 28, 2025. https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/pakistan-afghanistan-china-grappling-rising-terrorist-threats.
[xi] BBC Burmese. “မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် တင်းမာနေဆဲအခြေအနေများ.” BBC Burmese, accessed May 28, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/burmese/live/cq8v47l998pt.
[xii] Abb, Pascal. “The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Limits of China’s BRI Agency.” The Diplomat, February 2025. https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/the-china-myanmar-economic-corridor-and-the-limits-of-chinas-bri-agency/.
