The conventional understanding of border security focuses heavily on visible frontiers: patrols, border fences, and immigration counters. While physical infrastructure remains important, the majority of modern threats bypass these frontlines entirely.[1]In countries where land borders are limited and the primary movement of goods and people occurs through airports, seaports, and digital systems, border violations are often invisible.[2]
In the United States, for example, the majority of undocumented immigrants are not individuals who cross the southern land border illegally, but those who overstay legally issued visas.[3] Similarly, in the Schengen Area within the European Union, which allows freedom of movement between member countries, human traffickers and smugglers often exploit the lack of internal border controls by using legitimate travel documents and fabricated job offers to shift victims across borders undetected.[4] In Australia, the government has faced challenges with maritime arrivals of asylum seekers on unseaworthy boats, prompting a shift from land and sea patrols to intelligence-led interventions upstream in transit countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka.[5]
These examples illustrate how modern border violations frequently exploit bureaucratic, legal, or logistical loopholes rather than physically breaching a guarded perimeter. Smugglers manipulate paperwork and cargo manifests, traffickers operate through legitimate recruitment agencies and student visa programs, and overstayers integrate into informal economies. Once the victims are inside the country, it is difficult to distinguish who is legal or illegal.[6]
In effect, the border has migrated inward. It no longer located solely at national entry points but dispersed across airports, cyberspace, labor markets, and visa systems. This shift demands a strategic transformation in how border security is conceptualized and enforced, emphasizing internal intelligence coordination, digital monitoring tools, inter-agency collaboration, and early intervention capabilities. As Klaus Dodds argues in Border Wars, borders are no longer static lines on a map but fluid processes shaped by identity, surveillance, and technology. The modern border is less about geography and more about processes of exclusion, monitoring, and geopolitical signalling.[7]
Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: The Shadow Side of Legal Entry
Human trafficking victims often arrive through legal channels, including tourism, domestic work, or student visas, only to find themselves trapped in coercive or exploitative conditions.
In Malaysia, for example, widespread abuse has been documented in the recruitment of Bangladeshi and Nepali workers, who are promised factory or plantation jobs, only to face exploitative labor conditions, passport confiscation, and changes to the terms of their contracts upon arrival.[8] Similarly, in Canada, temporary foreign workers in the agriculture and care sectors have reported wage theft, dangerous working conditions, and threats of deportation, often after entering through completely legal work permit programs.[9] In Japan, the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) has faced international criticism for allowing employers to exploit foreign trainees through excessive work hours, intimidation, and restricted mobility despite its appearance as a legitimate skills exchange initiative.[10]
What these cases illustrate is a global pattern: traffickers and unscrupulous recruiters increasingly exploit legal entry systems, manipulating visa regimes and labor sponsorship structures to facilitate exploitation. Recruitment agencies operating across South Asia, East Africa, and Southeast Asia often promise workers high wages and safe conditions, only to deliver recruits into underpaid or abusive environments where they may be physically confined, denied wages, or psychologically coerced into silence. Victims may be reluctant or unable to report abuses, especially if they fear arrest, deportation, or retaliation, making detection at the point of entry nearly impossible without behavioral screening protocols, access to complaint mechanisms, and coordination between immigration, labor ministries, and consular services.[11]
The Shapeshifters: How Legal Entrants Use Visa Fraud or Exploit Loopholes to Overstay
While human trafficking tends to dominate public discourse, visa fraud and overstaying are far more routine, yet equally consequential, security issues. Individuals often exploit tourist, student, or employment visa schemes to enter a country legally, only to remain beyond the authorized period, disappearing into informal economies or establishing untraceable identities.[12] Some may take advantage of administrative backlogs, weak enforcement, or inconsistent visa monitoring systems, while others use forged documents, counterfeit IDs, or fraudulent sponsorship letters orchestrated by criminal networks and complicit intermediaries.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has consistently reported that visa overstays account for roughly 40% of the undocumented immigrant population, with many entering through legal tourist or student visas and failing to depart.[13] The United Kingdom has also faced difficulties tracking overstayers, particularly among non-EU nationals on visitor or short-term work visas. A 2020 report noted that authorities had “lost track” of tens of thousands of individuals.[14] Thailand, too, has become a transit and destination country for foreign nationals overstaying visas to engage in criminal activities, including cyber fraud, trafficking, and document forgery.[15] This has prompted the government to intensify biometric screening and cross-checking with INTERPOL databases.
Overstaying is not merely an administrative offense. It can become a conduit for larger security concerns, from participation in underground labor markets to involvement in organized crime or terrorism. The case of Mohammed Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers who overstayed his visa in the U.S., illustrates how visa violations can have catastrophic implications when exploited by malign actors.
The Hidden Frontiers: Maritime and Air Cargo Vulnerabilities
Another underexplored but increasingly critical dimension of border security lies at sea and in the sky. In Europe, the Port of Rotterdam, one of the busiest in the world, has become a major entry point for South American cocaine shipments, often hidden in refrigerated containers of fruit or seafood. In West Africa, the port of Cotonou in Benin has been exploited for the trafficking of illegally logged timber and ivory, which is then shipped to Asia under fraudulent documentation. In East Asia, Chinese authorities have repeatedly seized endangered species products, including pangolin scales and rhino horn, smuggled via maritime routes from Africa, highlighting the transnational nature of environmental crime. Weak inspection regimes, reliance on manual processing, and understaffed customs units all contribute to the persistence of maritime smuggling.[16]
In terms of air cargo, biometric-enabled e-gates and facial recognition have become a core part of border control, reducing processing time while enhancing identity verification. Singapore’s Changi Airport andAmsterdam’s Schiphol Airport are examples of large airports using cutting-edge technology to detect human trafficking and air cargo smuggling operations. Schiphol employs risk-based screening protocols that integrate behavioral detection techniques, such as monitoring passengers for stress, inconsistent travel patterns, or unusual luggage behavior, practices that have helped authorities intercept drug couriers and human traffickers.[17]
As Gulf Countries Grow, Visa Fraud and Trafficking Grow Too
Many Arabian Gulf countries have a large expatriate population, so even a small percentage of overstayers may translate into tens of thousands of undocumented residents, creating challenges for labor market regulation, housing, and internal security. Visa fraud and overstaying must be seen not as isolated violations but as strategic vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a range of threat actors, from economic opportunists to transnational criminal networks. Authorities in the United Arab Emirates have made progress through blacklisting mechanisms, biometric entry systems, and periodic amnesty programs that encourage voluntary repatriation without penalty.[18]
The UAE’s ports and maritime corridors are vital economic arteries, linking global supply chains through strategic hubs such as Jebel Ali Port and Khalifa Port. These nodes of commerce, however, are vulnerable to illicit activity, including the smuggling of weapons, narcotics (e.g., captagon), counterfeit goods, and endangered wildlife. Criminal networks frequently exploit loopholes in maritime logistics through container mislabeling, tampered manifests, or misdeclared cargo, often slipping contraband into legitimate commercial shipments with little detection.[19]
The Gulf region, while increasingly vigilant, has also been exposed to maritime piracy, illegal fishing, and the use of weaponized drones and naval mines, particularly in the volatile waters near Yemen, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz.[20] These threats are not merely criminal but also geopolitical, with direct implications for energy exports, maritime trade, and regional stability. To manage these risks, the UAE and other coastal states have invested heavily in coastal surveillance systems, Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), drone-based monitoring, and maritime domain awareness (MDA) platforms that enable real-time situational tracking.
Given the sheer volume and velocity of packages moving through major hubs like Dubai International Airport and Jebel Ali Port, manual inspection alone is not feasible. This underscores the urgency of deploying AI-enhanced cargo profiling, radiation scanners, tamper-evident seals, blockchain-backed shipping records, and smart customs analytics to better screen, trace, and intercept high-risk shipments without disrupting legitimate commerce. The integration of real-time data sharing between customs, port authorities, and global law enforcement networks is equally vital in addressing these vulnerabilities across both maritime and air corridors.[21]
In many Gulf states, airports function as the true national border, processing millions of international passengers annually. The UAE has led the region in integrating biometrics, e-gates, iris scanning, andautomated passenger screening systems into its airport infrastructure, initiatives aimed at identifying high-risk individuals, flagging forged documents, and detecting indicators of human trafficking, smuggling, or visa fraud.[22]
Conclusion
Border security in many countries can no longer be seen through a narrow lens of physical control or geographic proximity. The nature of borders has expanded, becoming more dispersed, digital, and dynamic. The threats are not merely at the edge but embedded within global trade, legal migration systems, and digital infrastructure. The challenge is to build a border security strategy that is holistic, data-driven, and anticipatory.
“Smart borders” are part of a broader shift toward “digital bordering,” where surveillance, big data, and artificial intelligence form the new perimeter of the state. These technologies allow governments to extend their control far beyond territorial boundaries, into cyberspace, mobile networks, and the private sector.[23]
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[1] Canham, James and Alexander de Voet,’ The invisible and secure border of the future’, 17 June, 2020, Accenture, The invisible and secure border of the future – WCO
[2] Flynn, Stephen E. “Beyond Border Control.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 6, 2000, pp. 57–68. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/20049967.
[3] Center for Migration Studies, ‘Correcting the Record: False or Misleading Statements on Immigration’, July 24, 2024, Correcting the Record: False or Misleading Statements on Immigration - The Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS)
[4] RUSI, ‘Evaluating Schengen’, 19 November, 2007, Evaluating Schengen | Royal United Services Institute
[5] Reilly, Alex, ‘The boats may have stopped, but at what cost to Australia?’, 28 August, 2014, The Conversation, The boats may have stopped, but at what cost to Australia?
[6] Zard, Monette, ‘Smuggled or trafficked?’, Forced Migration Review, Smuggled or trafficked? - Forced Migration Review
[7] Klaus Dodds (2021) Border Wars. The Conflicts That Will Define Our Future, Random House: UK, pp.1-35
[8] OHCHR, ‘Malaysia: Bangladeshi workers must be protected from exploitation and criminalisation, say UN experts’, 19 April, 2024, Malaysia: Bangladeshi workers must be protected from exploitation and criminalisation, say UN experts | OHCHR
[9] Human Rights Research Center, ‘The Exploitation of Migrant Workers Around the World’, 22 April, 2025, The Exploitation of Migrant Workers Around the World
[10] Onuki, H. (2023),’ Informalization and Temporary Labor Migration: Rethinking Japan’s Technical Intern Training Program From a Denationalized View, ‘Critical Sociology, 51(1), 35-53. https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205231209535
[11] Kelly, June and Judith Burns, ‘Domestic-abuse victims fear deportation if they go to police’, 9 November, 2023, BBC News, Domestic-abuse victims fear deportation if they go to police
[12] Government Accountability Office (GAO), ‘Border Security. State Could Enhance Visa Fraud Prevention by Strategically using Resources and Training, ‘ September 2012, GAO-12-888, BORDER SECURITY: State Could Enhance Visa Fraud Prevention by Strategically Using Resources and Training
[13] Spagat, Elliot, ‘More than 700,000 foreigners overstayed visas last year’, AP, August 8, 2018, More than 700,000 foreigners overstayed visas last year | AP News
[14] Center for Migration Control, ‘Home Office has lost track of thousands of asylum seekers’, 25 June, 2025, Home Office has lost track of thousands of asylum seekers
[15] Benoit & Partners, ‘Visa Overstay in Thailand’, May 1, 2024, Visa Overstay in Thailand : Regulations and Solutions
[16] 2021 Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program (AEP) ‘EMERGING THREATS TO CARGO AND PORT SECURITY A Practical, Risk-Based Approach to Prioritizing Resources to Detect, Deter, and Mitigate Drug Trafficking Operation’, Emerging Threats to Cargo and Port Security
[17] Duarte Amorim da Cunha et al, Keeping cargo security costs down: A risk-based approach to air cargo airport security in small and medium airports,’ Journal of Air Transport Management, Volume 61, 2017, Pages 115-122, Keeping cargo security costs down: A risk-based approach to air cargo airport security in small and medium airports - ScienceDirect
[18] IDEMIA Group, ‘UAE’s multi-biometric entry/exit program enabling seamless border crossing while ensuring maximum security’, UAE’s multi-biometric entry/exit program enabling seamless border crossing while ensuring maximum security | IDEMIA
[19] Rankin, Will, ‘DP World's Jebel Ali port achieves UN security standard’, Seatrade Maritime, May 29, 2013, DP World's Jebel Ali port achieves UN security standard
[20] CIMSEC, ‘Diversifying Threats to Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean Region’, June 16, 2025, Diversifying Threats to Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean Region | Center for International Maritime Security
[21] TFI World, ‘New AI Tool Revolutionizes Cargo Handling in DXB and DWC’, New AI Tool Revolutionizes Cargo Handling in DXB and DWC
[22] ID Techwire, ‘Dubai’s New Mega-Airport to Feature Borderless Biometric Travel System’, May 8, 2025, Dubai's New Mega-Airport to Feature Borderless Biometric Travel System - ID Tech
[23] Klaus Dodds (2021) Border Wars. The Conflicts That Will Define Our Future, Random House: UK, pp.171-192
