Introduction
The leadership transition in Syria following the end of the Assad era and the rise of President Ahmed al-Sharaa has introduced new diplomatic opportunities, particularly with key international partners such as China. As Syria seeks to stabilise and rebuild, one of the critical issues facing the new government is how to manage the presence of foreign fighters, especially those originating from Central and East Asia, in a way that enhances national security while maintaining constructive ties with external stakeholders.
The new Syrian administration is swiftly positioning itself as a responsible regional actor by tightening control over non-state armed groups and pledging that Syrian territory will not be used as a platform for transnational militancy. Particular attention is paid to how these internal security reforms may address the concerns of international partners, including China, regarding the presence of foreign militants. By embedding foreign fighters in top Defence Ministry roles and even offering them citizenship, al-Sharaa finds himself walking a tightrope, juggling Beijing’s security interests while confronting the stringent demand by United States President Donald Trump’s administration to expel all foreign fighters.[i]
Rather than focusing on past alignments, al-Sharaa’s stance on the international stage highlights the pragmatic recalibration of Syria and China’s foreign policy as they seek to build a forward-looking relationship based on pragmatic mutual security and economic interests. There is potential for expanded cooperation between the two countries in reconstruction, counterterrorism, and regional connectivity initiatives, in line with China’s broader engagement across the Middle East and its Belt and Road Initiative. This could reignite China’s investments in the region[CC1] .[ii] The new Syrian Army’s attempts at dismantling laboratories and illegal smuggling routes to contraband Captagon, a highly addictive amphetamine-like pill, which once generated some US$5 billion annually for Assad’s regime under sanctions[CC2] ,[iii] is also a positive sign for Beijing. Despite the Levant’s dominance in trafficking, rising anxiety in Beijing reflects the possibility of a Central Asian spillover route, with potential to trigger cross-border confrontations and destabilise local economies along China’s periphery.
Post-Assad Era
The Syrian civil war brought an influx of foreign combatants into the country, and absorbing them back into society has created challenges for the new administration, including concerns by China about the issue. Addressing this problem is necessary to convince China to play a proactive role in financing Syria’s reconstruction.
These fighters were instrumental in the lightning rebel offensive that ousted Bashar al-Assad in less than two weeks; however, when they were given key military posts in the new government, it prompted fears of anti-Chinese threats emerging from Syrian territory by Beijing.
To ease these anxieties, President al-Sharaa’s new government has promised to integrate foreign militants while ensuring they pose no threat to Chinese interests abroad. Beijing initially sought the extradition of these “irregular fighters,” but it now appears willing to accept Syria’s strategy of containment and assimilation over forced repatriation. Still, Damascus faces a delicate balancing act. It must satisfy its foreign fighters who paid a blood toll for the victory, without alienating China, all while deflecting Western pressure and preventing sectarian tensions from reigniting. Integrating ex-fighters without proper vetting or defined chains of command can leave them beholden to patrons or external sponsors, undermining the state’s control of force and public confidence in government. Alternatively, government disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) schemes that aim to transition ex-combatants into civilian life can be thwarted when returnees are stigmatised as threats, which can fuel community resentment, impeding social reintegration and risking renewed cycles of violence.[iv][CC5] Some foreign fighters, for example, are concentrated in specific enclaves that are of a different ethnicity or sect. They can face slurs such as “Turkistani,” complicating efforts at full integration.
In the wake of Damascus’s power shift, China’s diplomats at the United Nations have urged respect for the Syrian people’s choice while warning of the security dangers posed by foreign jihadists operating in the country. In his meeting with the new Syrian government, the Chinese Ambassador in Damascus, Shi Hongwei,[v] was reassured that Syria would not serve as a safe haven for any kind of attacks against Chinese personnel or infrastructure. Al-Sharaa has influence on the former semi-independent groups, as he rewarded them for fighting against Assad. In return, they have accepted his ban on all online propaganda by these groups.
At the same time, regional dynamics, particularly Ankara’s evolving role as a security guarantor, will influence Syria’s stabilisation under this new leadership. China is quietly urging Turkey to pressure Al-Sharaa to suppress any actions that could threaten Chinese presence in the region, though Ankara’s ability to enforce this remains untested. In the medium term, the greatest risks to China are mainly related to lone-wolf attacks by battle-hardened veterans who left Syria and whose combat capabilities are sharp after the long civil war, especially in the use of improvised explosive devices or FPV kamikaze drones.
Reconstruction with Chinese characteristics?
Damascus’s rapid collapse took Beijing by surprise and left Zhongnanhai[CC6] [AA7] [AA8] uncertain about its next steps. In the short term, however, China will almost certainly maintain its “wait-and-see” stance and proceed cautiously. Yet, alongside the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, China stands among the few nations with the financial resources and technical expertise to support Syria’s reconstruction. Until now, Syria has ranked below other Middle East priorities for Beijing. Nevertheless, the recent government turnover in Damascus compels Beijing to sharpen its focus on Syrian stabilisation, especially around the two strategically vital ports of Tartus[vi] and Latakia, which anchor China’s Belt and Road Initiative’s maritime network to Piraeus, Haifa, and Tripoli.
The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey have vowed to transform Syria into a regional hub connecting ports, roads, and hydrocarbon pipelines, as Damascus, whose economy has been shattered by the war, lacks the means to meet the estimated $400 billion cost of rebuilding.[vii] After Trump vowed to suspend sanctions on Syria, Qatar and Saudi Arabia stepped in to erase Syria’s $15.5 million World Bank debt, unlocking crucial grant funding to rebuild the country after more than a decade of civil war.[viii]
The disintegration of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and loss of its key Arab ally, Syria, marks a watershed moment that will define Middle Eastern geopolitics for years to come. As Iran’s influence wanes, the contours of a new Middle East are coming sharply into focus, just as China reevaluates its short-term projects and long-range ambitions in the region. Chinese diplomats insist that Beijing, unlike Russia and Iran, has consistently upheld its non-interference principle, even as Moscow and Tehran sent bombers and militias to shore up Assad’s military defences. Therefore, Syria’s rebuilding offers a window into China’sgeoeconomic strength: leveraging trade and investment rather than military force.
As Beijing courts leadership of the Global South through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), its role in Syria will test how far economic clout can translate into diplomatic and strategic influence. In April, during a meeting with China’s UN ambassador Fu Cong at Security Council headquarters in New York, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani affirmed that Damascus is eager to forge a “strategic partnership” with China.[ix] By aligning its strategy with the Gulf states, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, China could secure a measured, low-risk pathway into Syria’s reconstruction. The coalition strategy will enable China to share the risk and avoid competition with its key Middle Eastern allies.[x] Ultimately, how the Gulf states support Syria’s transition will offer a path to Beijing’s next moves from direct economic engagement to multilateral diplomatic support.
With Gulf monarchies shifting from balancing powers to forging regional bridges, China’s engagement in a new Middle East will be a key indicator of whether its foreign policy in the region will evolve into concrete influence.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[i] Louisa Loveluck and Zakaria Zakaria, Syrian leader faces challenge of foreign militants who helped him win power. The Washington Post. May 31, 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/05/31/syria-sharaa-foreign-fighters-militants/
[ii] Xinhua, Xi urges greater efforts to build China-Arab community with shared future. People’s Republic of China State Council, May 30, 2024 https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202405/30/content_WS665889d7c6d0868f4e8e7acb.html
[iii] Karam Shaar, Captagon in 2024: Implications After the Fall of the Syrian Regime. New Lines Institute. February 25, 2025 https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/20250225-Captagon-in-2024_Intelligence-Briefing-nlisap.pdf
[iv] United Nations Development Programme, Practice Note: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants,UNDP, January 21, 2012, https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/UNDP%20DDR%20Practice%20Note.pdf
[v] Laura Zhou, Syrian leader Sharaa meets Chinese envoy in first bilateral exchange since fall of Assad. South China Morning Post, February 22, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3299738/syrian-leader-sharaa-meets-chinese-envoy-first-bilateral-exchange-fall-assad
[vi] Khitam Al Amir, DP World, Syria sign $800 agreement to strengthen ports infrastructure. July 13, 2025. https://gulfnews.com/business/markets/dp-world-syria-sign-800-agreement-to-strengthen-ports-infrastructure-1.500196760
[vii] Joseph Daher, Three Requisites for Syria’s Reconstruction Process. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. May 8, 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/05/three-requisites-for-syrias-reconstruction-process?lang=en
[viii] Vivian Nereim, Gulf States Lead Push to Invest in New Syria. The New York Times, June 30, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/30/world/middleeast/gulf-states-invest-syria-iran.html
[ix] Agence France-Press, Syria’s foreign minister wants to ‘strengthen relations’ with China. South China Morning Post, April 29, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3308273/syrias-foreign-minister-wants-strengthen-relations-china
[x] Jesse Marks, China‘s first post-Assad Syria meeting. February 22, 2025. Substack https://jessemarks.substack.com/p/chinas-first-post-assad-syria-meeting
[CC1]
[CC2]Could you please explain further how stopping Captagon is a step toward cooperation with China?
[CC3]
[CC4]This subhed should address Syria’s dilemma with irregular fighters
[CC5]Not exactly sure what is meant by this sentence: "They frequently undercut post-conflict stability by perpetuating parallel power structures and security dilemmas.[1]" The second way explains it far more clearly
[CC6]Could you please give this person’s full name and title?
[AA7]Zhongnanhai is the area of the Forbidden City in Beijing where top Chinese Party officials meet, basically the equivalent of Capitol Hill for the US
[AA8]Basically ‘’the power behind the wall’’
