Historically Russia has had vast interests in the Middle East ranging from military and commercial to security spheres. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow has strived to first retain the level of influence it once enjoyed and then to expand its position in the region.
It succeeded in a way. Russia managed to insert itself into Syria amid its decade-long civil war, signed numerous military and technological cooperation agreements and in 2025 renewed a strategic partnership with Iran. It has also expanded its commercial and investment links with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Russia’s approach toward the Middle East has been rooted in pragmatism manifested in a highly transactional approach to foreign affairs with the region. For instance, Moscow has consistently avoided entering into full-scale alliances with Middle Eastern actors as this level of cooperation would have limited the room for Russia’s foreign policy. Indeed, the strategic partnership between Russia and Iran lacks a mutual defense provision providing Moscow with diplomatic flexibility.
Yet, since 2023, Russia’s position in the Middle East has started to change in significant ways. Its key partner, Iran, has come under tremendous pressure from Israel and the United States. A series of aerial campaigns on Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure in 2025 and early 2026 undermined the Islamic Republic’s capabilities. No less important has been the degradation of Iran’s Axis of Resistance – a network of non-state highly militarized entities spread from Lebanon to Iraq to Syria. Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis, all have undergone major military pressure from Israel. Their military capabilities as well as organizational structure have been severely damaged. Iran’s weakened position directly impacts Russia’s ability to project power in the Middle East.
To this should be added the fall of the Assad dynasty in Syria – another vital component within Russia’s network of allies and partners. Russia has long maintained two military bases in Syria and the Assad dynasty has served as Moscow’s natural ally since Soviet times. Genuine interests drove that alliance in the post-Cold War era as well. The Syrian territory allowed Russia to reach the African continent where Russian private military companies are increasingly present in the sub-Saharan region, Congo and elsewhere. But the end of the Assad rule in late 2024, shifted the balance of power in favor of Turkey whose support was instrumental in bringing the current leadership in Damascus to power.
In the short run, Russia has gained from the war in Iran - given the rise in oil and gas prices and the United States’ decision to temporarily lift sanctions on Russian oil. Moscow also hopes to benefit from the Western distraction with the ongoing conflict in Iran by doubling down on its war effort in Ukraine. Moreover, Moscow also hopes to link the negotiations around Ukraine with the war in Iran. Should the Western countries want cooperation from Russia on the Iran question, support for Kyiv would need to be dropped drastically.
Yet when it comes to a longer term perspective, Moscow’s position in the Middle East might not be entirely comfortable. It has lost one of its few critical allies in Syria and has witnessed weakening of its decades-long partner, Iran. This trickles down to security and commercial elements of Russia’s engagement with the Middle East. For instance, the current war in Iran and the preceding years of military clashes with Israel left the Islamic Republic with little room for viable economic cooperation with the Russian side. Russian investments (already low before the war) could possibly drop further given the protracted insecurity in the region.
Despite the obvious setbacks, Russia’s influence in the Middle East is not collapsing. Moscow attempts to adjust to a new reality, a recalibration which takes time but has already borne fruit. For instance, in Syria the new leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa, eager to balance Israel and Turkey, has moved to normalize relations with Moscow. Numerous bilateral high level meetings have taken place, including al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow in October 2025. Both sides have apparently made an agreement allowing the Russian military to extend its presence, albeit fairly limited in scope.
Russia also remains a critical player in the development of the civilian nuclear power for the Middle Eastern countries. From Iran to Iraq to Egypt, Russia’s state-run nuclear giant Rosatom, retains its prestige. Despite the war in Iran, Russia has also managed to maintain its International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which runs from the Baltic Sea to the Islamic Republic and further to the Gulf region and India. Russia also remains an important partner for the GCC countries especially in trade and investments.
Russia is inserting itself into the Middle East through carefully calibrated diplomacy and tapping into the local countries’ willingness to diversify their security, economic and diplomatic options. Russia can act as a partner in all three areas making it one of the most important players for the Middle Eastern countries.
Thus, Russia’s position of security in the Middle East has undergone significant change over the past two years, particularly in light of the political change in Syria, its deepening reliance on Iran, and the broader constraints imposed by the war in Ukraine. While Moscow continues to maintain diplomatic and security linkages across the region, through arms sales, political coordination, and limited military presence, its ability to project power and act as a decisive security guarantor has diminished. Russia is presently transitioning from a position of assertive engagement (as seen in Syria post-2015) toward a more selective, opportunistic approach, increasingly constrained by resource limitations and shifting geopolitical priorities.
