In June 2025, a Telegram account affiliated with the Wagner Group declared “[the] mission is accomplished.” The post was in reference to Mali, where the private military company (PMC) had been providing security assistance to national authorities since 2021, despite not being publically recognized by the governments in Bamako or Moscow. Diplomatic sources said that Wagner had been replaced by the Africa Corps, a paramilitary group affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defence,[1] marking the end of a period of covert operations by the Russians on African soil and the beginning of new period of institutionalised military and political support for the newly created authoritarian regimes in the Sahel.
This event should prompt a more in-depth reflection on the Russian conflict-management model (CM) among Western scholars and policymakers, many of whom consider the Russian model monolithic. As defined by David Lews,[2] the CM, known as Pax Rossica, is a form of authoritarian conflict management that prioritizes order over justice, and the push for short-term stability rather than long-term conflict resolution. Critics, however, argue that calling the CM a “Russian model” is inaccurate, as Russian actions are characterized as pragmatic, situational, and driven by power-balancing.
In the last two decades, however, Russia’s CM has exhibited substantive variations in response to the systemic changes that it helped to trigger by challenging and competing with the once hegemonic liberal international order.[3] It is possible to trace the evolution of Russia’s CM along three phases: a mimetic phase, an incognito phase, and a guardian phase, which reflect the progressive passage from covertness to anti-hegemonic overtness in the scope of Russian CM. Hence, initially, Russia tended to mirror Western approaches and operate discreetly. Over time, however, it began acting in ways that more openly challenge Western dominance. This evolution — from covert to overt anti-hegemonic action — reflects both Russia’s growing confidence and the increasingly permissive international environment that allows it to act with less restraint.
Mimetic phase (2008-2017)
In this phase, Russian-Western relations were still in the cooperation mode. Between 2010-2014, the UN launched major missions in the DRC (MONUSCO), South Sudan (UNMISS), Mali (MINUSMA) and the CAR (MINUSCA), with Russia backing (or not opposing) them. NATO’s intervention in Libya marked a turning point, yet the West remained a hegemonic force, and CM was still embedded in a liberal framework. The first test for Russia’s CM came with the dispute around the Georgian semi-autonomous region of South Ossetia. After the Rose Revolution brought to power Mikhail Saakashvili, a young pro-American politician who declared his goal of restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity, Moscow granted Russian citizenship to the South Ossetians. In 2008, Georgia attacked Tskhinvali, killing dozens of civilians and seven Russian peacekeepers. The Kremlin intervened militarily and swiftly defeated the Georgian army.[4] It recognized the independence of South Ossetia shortly after. Moscow justified its intervention through narratives that mimicked NATO’s rhetoric in Kosovo, including accusations of genocide. In 2020, in the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia negotiated a ceasefire between the opposing Armenian and Azerbaijani forces. The agreement, endorsed by the United Nations, echoed liberal rhetoric, with Russian interposition troops labelled as “peacemaking forces.” The 2014 annexation of Crimea followed a similar logic. In February 2014, the Ukrainian opposition formed an interim government but failed to include the representatives from Crimea. In the days that followed, separatist groups occupied the peninsula with the help of Russian troops. On 6 March 2014, Moscow accepted Crimea into the Federation. The Kremlin legitimized its action by alleging a request for intervention by former president Viktor Yanukovych and by recalling the principle of self-determination of the Ukrainian ethnic Russians. The 2015 intervention in Syria further consolidated this pattern, as Moscow argued that its operations were legitimised by a request from a sovereign government under the UN Charter.[5] Similarly, the Astana talks, which replaced the UN-led Geneva process in 2017, were declaredly aimed at implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2254.
Incognito phase (2017-2023)
Following the collapse of the Minsk agreements, West-Russia relations deteriorated at a steady pace, culminating in Moscow’s military operation against Ukraine in 2022. This led it to pursue more openly destabilising operations against European and United States interests, as well as to secure economic and political support to counter isolation. International encirclement forced Moscow to use deniable instruments as it remained engaged in CM. In Africa, while officially denying it, it actively supported the mercenaries of the Wagner Group, which struck deals with the governments of conflict-affected states that also saw the presence of the UN, the EU, and European states (e.g., France). Its presence has been recorded also in Mozambique, Sudan and Libya, but it is in CAR and Mali that Wagner’s engagement has been most notable.[6] In the CAR, it first arrived in 2017, filling the security vacuum left by the French. The contractors became strongly entangled with the Bangui regime, supporting pro-Touadéra and pro-Russia information campaigns, and intimidating political opposition. The extensive use of violence as an established CM policy has been defined by Spearin[7] as a “simultaneously a gruesome affront to liberal peacebuilding, [a] functionally important [strategy], and representative of non-liberal norms and policies”. In Mali, Wagner arrived in 2021 following a coup to conduct training, counterterrorism, and resource-related activities[8]. Its status as a private company gave the military junta the allure of sovereignty, while contributing to bulletproofing the regime. As in the CAR, the Group made itself indispensable to the regime, as Bamako grew increasingly isolated after leaving ECOWAS, cutting ties with the EU, and expelling UN peacekeepers.
Guardian Stage (2023-ongoing)
On 23 June 2023, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s leader, crossed from Ukraine and seized the Russian southern city of Rostov after months of increasing tensions with military leaders in Moscow. His forces began to march towards the capital, before being called off the next day. On June 27, following years of denial, President Putin stated: “I want to point out [that] the maintenance of the entire Wagner Group was fully provided by the State.”[9] Soon after, the Russian Ministry of Defence launched a plan to absorb Wagner under a new organizational structure: the Africa Corps. Although some qualified it as a simple rebranding,[10] the fact that, unlike Wagner, Africa Corps is openly run by the Russian government amounts to a de facto institutionalisation of its presence in Africa and marks a substantive foreign policy shift, from covertness to counter-hegemonic overtness. In the aftermath of Wagner’s mutiny, the Kremlin worked to reassure its African partners about the continuity of its CM programs. This has been coupled with a greater focus on expanding its military footprint in the continent, and on providing its CM policies with a clearer ideological background.[11]
Pushed by the influence gained in the previous phase, Russia achieved a dominant position in the region. This, beyond altering the African security governance configuration, also entailed a substantive shift in competitive dynamics, with Moscow becoming the target of contestation practices. In early July 2025, Rudolph Atallah, a security and counterterrorism adviser to Trump, visited Mali to offer an “American solution” to the ongoing conflict, after the Russians suffered heavy losses in Tinzaouaten (2024). William B. Stevens, the State Department’s deputy assistant secretary for West Africa, raised the possibility of private American investment in the security field in an attempt to persuade the central Sahelian juntas to change Moscow for Washington again.[12]
Conclusions
Far from configuring a fixed model, the Russian CM is adaptive and in flux. Its evolution in response to order-alteration processes is a hint at how competition can affect the competitor, which represents an interesting and unexplored research topic. For policymakers, this should increase awareness of the risks of adopting a narrow view when interpreting competitive processes and, more generally, global dynamics, which are far from becoming more intelligible. From mirroring Western doctrines, to covertly contesting them, to openly positioning itself as a guardian of sovereignty against Western “neo-colonialism,” Russia capitalized on the opportunities of the complex order it contributed to forge, an implicit warning to those who consider it a mere disruptive force.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[1] Timbuktu Institute (2025). Russia’s repositioning in the Sahel: From Wagner to Africa Corps. Report, Dakar, Senegal. Retrieved from: from https://timbuktu-institute.org/index.php/toutes-l-actualites/item/1262-report-russia-s-repositioning-in-the-sahel-from-wagner-to-africa-corps.
[2] Lewis, D. (2022). Contesting liberal peace: Russia’s emerging model of conflict management, International Affairs, Volume 98(2):653–673.
[3] Kobayashi, K., Krause, K., & Yuan, X. (2022). Pathways to socialisation: China, Russia, and competitive norm socialisation in a changing global order. Review of International Studies, 48(3):560–582. doi:10.1017/S0260210522000146.
[4] Karagiannis, E. (2014) The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea Compared: Military Performance, Legitimacy and Goals, Contemporary Security Policy, 35(3):400-420, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2014.963965.
[5] Beaujouan, J. (2025) Power Peace: The Resolution of the Syrian Conflict in a Post-Liberal Era of Peacemaking, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 19(3):309-328, DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2024.2371713.
[6] Lovotti, C. (2022). “Conflict management” à-la-russe in the Middle East and Africa. Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale - ISPI. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/conflict-management-la-russe-middle-east-and-africa-36665.
[7] Spearin, C. (2024) Russia’s Wagner Group/Africa Corps: an authoritarian conflict management examination, Conflict, Security & Development, 24:5, 479-499, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2024.2415659.
[8] Baldaro, E., & Strazzari, F. (2025) Strategic misalignment: European security and P/CVE engagement in the Sahel, Mediterranean Politics, 30(3):639-649, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2023.2289795.
[9] Maddocks, J. (2023). Putin admits to funding the Wagner Group: Implications for Russia’s state responsibility. Lieber Institute West Point. https://t.ly/NGkUR.
[10] Lechner, J. A. & Eledinov, S. (2024). Is Africa Corps a Rebranded Wagner Group? Foreign Policy, February 7, 2024
[11] Audinet M. (2025). ‘Down with neocolonialism!’ Strategic narrative resurgence and foreign policy preferences in wartime Russia. European Journal of International Security. Published online. doi:10.1017/eis.2025.10011.
[12] France 24. (2025, August 25). Washington trades military support to sahel juntas for access to mineral wealth. France 24.https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20250825-washington-extends-offer-of-military-support-to-sahel-junta-regimes
