In early July 2025, torrential rains turned highways into rivers and neighborhoods into lakes across southeastern Texas. Entire families were evacuated by boat, while emergency shelters struggled to accommodate thousands displaced by the floods. Amid the devastation, coordination between local, state, and federal agencies was uneven, some areas received swift rescue and relief, while others were left waiting amid bureaucratic confusion and logistical delays.[1] The Texas floods offered a sobering glimpse into what happens when disaster response hinges on fragmented systems rather than seamless cooperation.
In an era of rapidly evolving security threats, ranging from transnational terrorism and cyber warfare to natural disasters and public health emergencies, the ability of states to coordinate across different government agencies has become a decisive factor in the success of national and regional security responses.[2]
Interagency collaboration in the national security context is uniquely complex and distinct from other forms of collaborative governance due to the stakes involved, the secrecy of operations, and the rigid hierarchies that define security institutions. National security issues are rarely confined to a single agency’s mandate, rather, they require coordinated responses across military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, and emergency management actors.
Effective interagency coordination ensures that intelligence is shared in a timely manner, operational roles are clearly defined, and strategic decisions are based on a holistic understanding of the threat environment. However, many states, regardless of capacity, struggle with bureaucratic fragmentation, institutional rivalries, and inconsistent standard operating procedures (SOPs).[3]
Diagnosing Interagency Disunity: Why the Left Hand Doesn’t Talk to the Right
Despite the clear advantages of interagency collaboration, several challenges continue to undermine its implementation globally. Foremost among these is jurisdictional ambiguity. Agencies often have overlapping or unclear mandates, leading to turf battles, redundancies, or paralysis in decision-making.[4] For example, in the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima crisis, Japanese agencies argued over who had primary authority over nuclear safety, delaying evacuation orders and communication with the public.[5] Similarly, in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, confusion over whether central health ministries or regional governments had the final say on lockdown measures created public uncertainty in several European countries.[6]
A second major challenge is information compartmentalization, often referred to as “data silos.” In many national systems, agencies maintain their own databases and are reluctant or unable to share real-time information with others. This is often due to incompatible IT systems, legal restrictions, or institutional mistrust. The United States’ response to the Sept. 11 attacks remains the textbook case of how fragmented intelligence can lead to catastrophic failure. Fusion centers and joint information platforms have emerged in response, but implementation remains uneven and often dependent on individual leadership rather than systemic design.[7]
Third, there is the issue of inconsistent standard operating procedures and terminology across agencies. Differences in how agencies classify, respond to, or escalate security incidents can delay coordination. For instance, what one agency might treat as a public health crisis, another might see as a homeland security issue, resulting in divergent strategies. These operational mismatches are compounded by a lack of joint training, which prevents personnel from developing the trust and mutual understanding necessary for seamless coordination during high-pressure scenarios.[8]
Finally, institutional cultures and incentive structures often reinforce siloed behavior. Agencies are rewarded for internal performance, not for collaborative success, and leadership structures may discourage lateral coordination unless directed from the top. Competition for limited government funds can undermine collaborative efforts. Agencies may be reluctant to share resources or invest in joint initiatives if they perceive it as diverting funds from their core missions or if the benefits are not immediately quantifiable for their specific budget lines.[9]
Perhaps the most fundamental challenge is building and maintaining trust among agencies. Trust is built over time through shared experiences, mutual respect, and consistent communication.[10] Past rivalries, perceived slights, or concerns about information misuse can erode trust, making genuine collaboration difficult. Without deliberate efforts to change these dynamics —through joint tasking, performance metrics, or secondments —interagency cooperation will remain reactive rather than systemic.
Covid, Fukushima and 9/11: What Happens When Agencies Don’t Trust Each Other
Across the globe, several high-profile events have exposed the costs of interagency dysfunction and the benefits of collaborative structures. Perhaps the most consequential case was the intelligence failure leading to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Longstanding rivalries between the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) led to critical information not being shared. Investigations following the 2001 terrorist attacks revealed significant intelligence “stovepiping,”[11] where critical information held by the FBI was not effectively shared with the CIA, and vice versa. These agencies each had pieces of the puzzle regarding the activities of key al-Qaeda operatives, but failed to coordinate due to institutional mistrust and differing operational cultures. The subsequent creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) were major structural reforms aimed at addressing these gaps, but even these post-9/11 bodies have struggled with fragmentation and overlapping jurisdictions.
Similarly, the global COVID-19 pandemic revealed sharp contrasts in national responses that hinged on the effectiveness of interagency collaboration. South Korea and Germany were widely praised for their agile coordination between health authorities, civil protection agencies, law enforcement, and digital infrastructure regulators. These countries leveraged integrated command centers and interoperable data systems to contain the virus and inform the public. In contrast, the U.S., Italy, and parts of Latin America saw fragmented responses characterized by contradictory messaging, delays in resource deployment, and overlapping mandates between local and federal bodies. These outcomes underscore the importance of cross-sector planning and the perils of institutional silos.[12]
Japan’s experience with the 2011 “triple disaster,” a massive earthquake, followed by a tsunami and the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, offers another compelling lesson. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces, nuclear regulatory agencies, local governments, and disaster response units were all forced to operate simultaneously under extreme pressure. Although early coordination was hampered by misaligned priorities and communication barriers, the crisis catalyzed a rapid evolution in civil-military interoperability and information-sharing protocols. This event illustrated that complex, multi-domain crises demand layered yet synchronized interagency responses.[13]
Fusion centers in the U.S. and European Union provide another instructive model. These centers are designed to co-locate representatives from various agencies, intelligence, police, customs, cybersecurity, and others, to jointly assess and act on multi-vector threats. While implementation has varied in effectiveness across jurisdictions, the core principle remains critical: fusing capabilities across agencies prevents information loss and enables faster decision-making. Similarly, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions showcase how multinational, multiagency coordination can be institutionalized, especially for overseas peacekeeping and crisis management operations involving police, military, and civilian actors.[14]
Critics warn, however, that the drive for tighter interagency coordination can sometimes veer into over-securitization, where emergency management structures are used to justify excessive surveillance, bureaucratic opacity, or disproportionate responses. In the U.S., the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has faced sharp criticism for its inconsistent handling of disasters in states like North Carolina and Puerto Rico. These failures have eroded public trust to the extent that even well-coordinated efforts, such as in the recent Texas floods, were met with skepticism. Accusations of politicization, mismanagement, and budgetary neglect illustrate that coordination alone is not sufficient.[15] It must also be transparent, rights-based, and subject to public oversight. Otherwise, institutional mistrust can become a threat to national resilience in its own right.
Conclusion
Interagency coordination and collaboration are indispensable for effective security in the 21st century. The evolving nature of threats demands a networked and integrated response that transcends traditional organizational boundaries. While inherent challenges such as cultural differences, legal complexities, and technological disparities persist, the lessons learned from both successes and failures globally provide a roadmap for improvement. Through standardized protocols, technological integration, enhanced joint training, and a concerted effort to build trust respective countries will not just gain a strategic advantage but provide a fundamental imperative for safeguarding collective security and prosperity.
In addition to the importance of joint training and cross-sectoral coordination, scenario-based planning as a mechanism to build institutional resilience within security agencies is imperative. Scenario-based planning, widely adopted in NATO and by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, involves the systematic development and rehearsal of responses to a range of plausible threat scenarios, from cyberattacks to mass-casualty terrorism or critical infrastructure sabotage.[16]
For example, the United Kingdom’s “Exercise Unified Response” in 2016 simulated a large-scale urban disaster, involving over 70 agencies and resulting in the identification of critical gaps in communication and resource allocation.[17] Similarly, Singapore’s annual “Exercise Northstar” brings together police, civil defense, health, and transport agencies to test multi-agency responses to terror attacks, producing measurable improvements in interagency protocols and public communication strategies.[18]
The strategic use of advanced technologies, such as secure digital platforms, artificial intelligence (AI), and blockchain, to facilitate real-time, trusted collaboration among security agencies. Case studies from the European Union’s Europol and the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) illustrate the transformative impact of secure digital platforms. Europol’s Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) enables over 1,000 law enforcement agencies to share classified intelligence in real time, with robust audit trails and granular access controls.[19]
The systematic institutionalization of after-action reviews (AARs) and accountability frameworks as critical drivers of continuous improvement in interagency collaboration. The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) mandates AARs following every major incident, with findings disseminated across agencies to inform future planning and training.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defence Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[1] Nevitt, Mark, ‘Eight Takeaways From the Texas Flood Tragedy’, Lawfare, July 28, 2025, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/eight-takeaways-from-the-texas-flood-tragedy
[2] United States Government Accountability Office, ‘NATIONAL SECURITY Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration’, June 9, 2010, GAO-10-822T, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-822t.pdf
[3] Berkay Gülen, ‘Turf Wars in Foreign Policy Bureaucracy: Rivalry between the Government and the Bureaucracy in Turkish Foreign Policy’, Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 18, Issue 4, October 2022, orac021, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac021
[4] Jagannath, Harish Pranav, "The Illusion of Collaboration and Bureaucratic Politics in India" (2016). Dissertations - ALL. 438., https://surface.syr.edu/etd/438
[5] Nakajima Isao, Kurokawa Kiyoshi, ‘Looking Back over a Decade “Final Decision Call after the Accidents of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant”, J Multimed Inf Syst 2020;7(2):147-156.
https://doi.org/10.33851/JMIS.2020.7.2.147
[6] Mattei P, Vigevano L., ‘Contingency Planning and Early Crisis Management: Italy and the COVID-19 Pandemic’, Public Organiz Rev. 2021;21(4):647–63, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8405714/
[7] Stefan Sleep, Prachi Gala, Dana E. Harrison, ‘Removing silos to enable data-driven decisions: The importance of marketing and IT knowledge, cooperation, and information quality,’ Journal of Business Research, Volume 156, 2023, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148296322009365
[8] Steen-Tveit, K., Munkvold, B.E. & Rustenberg, K., ‘Use of Standard Operating Procedures for Supporting Cross-Organizational Emergency Management: Challenges and Opportunities Identified from a Tabletop Exercise.’, Int J Disaster Risk Sci 15, 673–687 (2024), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13753-024-00583-5#citeas
[9] Kaiser, Frederick M., ‘Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities: Types, Rationales, Considerations’, May 31, 2011, Congressional Research Service, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R41803.pdf
[10] Szayna, Thomas S., et al. “Building Interagency Collaborative Networks.” Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations, 1st ed., RAND Corporation, 2009, pp. 111–20. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg801a.13. Accessed 31 July 2025
[11] Acuff, J., Fitsanakis, J., Craft, L., Ferrero, C., Fitsanakis, J., Kilroy, R., & Smith, J. (2022), ‘Inter-agency communications,’ in: Introduction to Intelligence: Institutions, Operations, and Analysis, SAGE, https://sk.sagepub.com/book/mono/introduction-to-intelligence/chpt/10-interagency-communications
[12]Agyapon-Ntra K, McSharry PE., ‘A global analysis of the effectiveness of policy responses to COVID-19’, Sci Rep. 2023 Apr 6;13(1):5629, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10078072/
[13] World Bank (2019), “Information and Communication Technology for Disaster Risk Management in Japan: How Digital Solutions are Leveraged to Increase Resilience through Improving Early Warnings and Disaster Information Sharing” World Bank, Washington, D.C., https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/979711574052821536/pdf/Information-and-Communication-Technology-for-Disaster-Risk-Management-in-Japan.pdf
[14] Yichen Zhong (20 May 2024), ‘A principal-agent analysis of interagency cooperation in EU border management’, Journal of European Integration, https://publications.aston.ac.uk/id/eprint/46369/6/Y_Zhong_A_principal-agent_analysis_of_inter-agency_cooperation_in_EU_border_management.pdf
[15] Clark-Ginsberg A, Easton-Calabria LC, Patel SS, Balagna J, Payne LA, ‘When disaster management agencies create disaster risk: a case study of the US's Federal Emergency Management Agency’, Disaster Prev Manag, 2021 Oct 25;30(4-5):447-461, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8612464/
[16] Niekerk, Dewald et al, ‘Planning and Executing Scenario Based Simulation Exercises: Methodological Lessons’, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2014/01/02, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269325490_Planning_and_Executing_Scenario_Based_Simulation_Exercises_Methodological_Lessons
[17] Sara Waring, Iulia Moisi, Chloe Barrett, Sarah Gordts, ‘Identifying what components of full-scale emergency exercises improve disaster response learning: A rapid evidence assessment’, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, Volume 104, 2024, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212420924001523
[18] Chua, Nadine, ‘Anti-terror exercises must be taken seriously as ‘one day, we may not be lucky’: PM Lee’, The Straits Times, November 22, 2024, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/anti-terror-exercises-must-be-taken-seriously-as-one-day-we-may-not-be-lucky-says-pm-lee
[19] Europol & EU body or agency (2012) ‘SIENA: Secure Information Exchange Network Application for Law Enforcement’, Publications Office of the European Union: Belgium, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/275970/siena-secure-information-exchange-network-application/1107831/
