Iran’s pivot to the Horn of Africa is transforming security on the ground as well as the operation of commercial routes running along the coast of the East Africa.
Iran’s growing interest toward the Horn of Africa is an expected development given the region’s global importance. Comprising Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti, the Horn of Africa is a place which serves as a chokepoint for international commerce. The Red Sea route links the Indo-Pacific region with the Mediterranean world and the EU market. Instability in the Horn of Africa therefore can potentially have a spillover effect on much wider geography such as the Middle East and more importantly the global economy. It is then no wonder that over the past few years Iran has engaged the Horn of Africa politically and economically and made special efforts to elevate bilateral relations with the region’s pivotal country – Ethiopia.
The Horn of Africa’s geopolitical importance has attracted multiple foreign powers. Iran’s greater engagement is a result of potential economic opportunities the country could garner from trading with and investing into a vast region. There is also a political momentum. Given the fact that some of the regional countries such as Sudan and Eritrea were subject to US sanctions, Iran initially managed to increase its influence among those dissatisfied with the Western approach to the region. What also eases Iran’s presence in the Horn of Africa is the local countries’ push to diversify their foreign policy as well as commercial relations in an increasingly multipolar world. Additionally, large Muslim population residing in the region makes developing closer ties with Iran more natural fostering people-to-people relations[1].
Iran regards increasing its influence in the Horn of Africa fitting into its vision of securing navigation through major trade routes which pass via the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden[2]. Unhindered navigation allows Iran to export its oil into the heart of the African continent – a sure way to limit the effects of the Western sanctions which bear heavily upon the Islamic Republic’s economy for decades. Iran also wants to enjoy sea access to the African continent as it will allow Tehran to potentially dispatch its military vessels in case of an emergency such as the ones which happened in 2021 and 2022 when the Islamic Republic sent flotillas to defend its commercial ships[3].
Iran and Ethiopia
Ethiopia is a particularly interesting case of Iran’s burgeoning ties with the Horn of Africa, and which has a potential to reshape geopolitics of the region. Ethiopia was the first country from the region to enjoy diplomatic relations with Iran back in the 1960s. The two shared similar vision during the Cold War and especially before the Islamic Revolution of 1979 when Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran shared similar anti-communist vision[4].
Therefore, when in May 2025 Tehran and Addis Ababa signed a security treaty it was based on deep historic ties between the nations[5]. The document envisions closer collaboration on issues such as prevention of cross-border crime and training in military and security domains. The security treaty indicates that Addis Ababa is maneuvering between regional competitors showcasing its pragmatic approach to foreign relations[6]. This balancing act was also well visible in 2016 when Ethiopia did not cut diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic[7], at the time when other regional countries did. Ethiopia’s balanced foreign policy proved highly beneficial to Iran especially given the latter’s disengagement from the sub-Saharan region in 2010s and the need to focus on other regions of Africa[8].
The rationale behind the closer Ethiopian-Iranian relations lies in their specific geopolitical interests. The enhanced level of military cooperation is built upon Iran’s supplies of domestically made Mojaher-6 drones to Ethiopia in 2020-2022 when the Tigray conflict was raging in the north of the country[9]. Iran’s military engagement with Ethiopia falls within the Islamic Republic’s growing profile as a major exporter of modern weapons across the globe. Ethiopia is also important for Iran as the African country’s geography allows Tehran to build political influence not only in the rest of the Horn of Africa but also in the heart of the continent itself. Moreover, Ethiopia is a rapidly growing economic power and Iranian businesses are interested in tapping into this highly lucrative market.
For Ethiopia closer ties with Iran are about diversifying its foreign policy and seeking advanced weaponry and intelligence to better deal with internal ethnic as well as external challenges. One of the areas of potential conflict is Eritrea. Though Ethiopia and Erithrea normalised relations and held common front against the Tigrayan forces, recently there has been a fallout between the the two. One of the reasons is the Pretoria peace agreement signed in 2022 which allowed Eritrea to maintain forces inside Ethiopia. Secondly, Eritrea opposes Ethiopia’s intention to pursue a port access on the Red Sea coast. Indeed, Addis Ababa’s separate agreement with Somaliland – breakaway territory of Somalia – caused concerns among Ethiopia’s neighbors[10].
Wider Security Context – Link with the Middle East
There is also a wider context driving Iran’s greater engagement with the Horn of Africa. For instance, Ethiopia and Iran have recently joined the BRICS, a mulitlateral grouping which has an ambition to reshape the present global order in a way that gives the Global South greater role in international affairs. Yet, Ethiopia is careful enough to avoid throwing its lot exclusively with any big player and instead seeks a balance in its foreign relations.
Moreover, Iran’s closer ties with the Horn of Africa should be seen in the context of Iran’s push to build tighter economic and political relations with the African continent. In 2023 the late president of Iran Ebrahim Raisi toured the countries around the Horn of Africa[11]. In early 2025 Tehran hosted its third Iran-Africa summit with a focus on fostering commercial relations – around 700 business representatives from 38 African states took in the gathering[12]. Iran’s intention to grow its profile takes place at the time when France’s influence across the Sahel has diminished, while Washington has pursued its stated goal of re-orienting its foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, the shattering of the USAID by Washington, which was heavily present across the African continent through a web of social, health and educational programs, now provides other powers with an opportunity to increase their soft power through greater spending on educational and cultural programs.
Yet another aspect of the growing Iranian engagement with Africa is the arms export to a wide variety of players. Iran also works on expanding its export of agriculture, livestock, and machinery. For instance, in mid-2023 multiple agreements were signed between the Iranian and African companies on exporting medical equipment and pharmaceuticals to Africa[13]. Additionally, seen from an interregional perspective, Iran is looking at the Horn of Africa as a possibility to build better links with Yemen. In the longer run the developments in the Horn of Africa might have a spillover effect on the Middle East as the two regions are becoming economically and diplomatically increasingly intertwined.
Recommendations
Thus, Iran’s foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa is driven by geopolitical imperatives. Tapping into the region’s growing commercial opportunities and geographic location at the crossroads of major trade routes remain two biggest incentives that drive Tehran’s outreach toward Ethiopia and the rest of the Horn of Africa. In the longer run, what makes the African continent and its eastern part a fertile ground for engagement with external powers is the region’s relatively poor economic situation. As a major recommendation for policymakers, resolving this root problem would not only make the region safer but also more immune to external influence. Given the expanding geopolitical links between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East the latter is set to benefit from a more secure East Africa. Indeed, in the era of shifting global connectivity, when new trade routes are emerging across Eurasia, sea lanes between the East Africa and the Middle East grow in importance.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
[1] Oral Toğa, “Iran's Growing Presence in the Horn of Africa and Yemen”, Iram Center, December 23, 2023, https://iramcenter.org/en/irans-growing-presence-in-the-horn-of-africa-and-yemen_en-2442
[2] Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, “Iran and the Horn of Africa: The Stakes and Hurdles of Building a Strategic Foothold”, Gulf International Forum, April 22, 2024, https://gulfif.org/iran-and-the-horn-of-africa-the-stakes-and-hurdles-of-building-a-strategic-foothold/
[3] “Iranian Navy Flotilla Wraps up Four-Month Atlantic Deployment, Pledges More International Operations”, USNI News, September 10, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/09/10/iranian-navy-flotilla-wraps-up-four-month-atlantic-deployment-pledges-more-international-operations
[4] “Ethiopia and Iran enters intel sharing agreement”, Military Africa, May 16, 2025, https://www.military.africa/2025/05/ethiopia-and-iran-enters-intel-sharing-agreemen/
[5] “Ethiopia, Iran police chiefs sign security, intelligence collaboration MoU”, Addis Standard, May 6, 2025, https://addisstandard.com/ethiopia-iran-police-chiefs-sign-security-intelligence-collaboration-mou/?amp=1
[6] Eric Lob, “Iran and Ethiopia have a security deal – here’s why they signed it”, DiA, May 15, 2025, https://democracyinafrica.org/iran-and-ethiopia-have-a-security-deal-heres-why-they-signed-it/
[7] Micheale Kihishen Gebru, “The United Arab Emirates Engagement in Ethiopia”, SWP-Berlin, March, 25, 2025, https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA-PB35_UAE_Engagement_in_Ethiopia_Gebru_Korrektur.pdf
[8] Eric Lob, “Iran and Ethiopia have a security deal – here’s why they signed it”, DiA, May 15, 2025, https://democracyinafrica.org/iran-and-ethiopia-have-a-security-deal-heres-why-they-signed-it/
[9] Zecharias Zelalem, “Deadly skies: Drone warfare in Ethiopia and the future of conflict in Africa”, ECFR, February 28, 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/deadly-skies-drone-warfare-in-ethiopia-and-the-future-of-conflict-in-africa/
[10] Micheale Kihishen Gebru, “The United Arab Emirates Engagement in Ethiopia”, SWP-Berlin, March, 25, 2025, https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA-PB35_UAE_Engagement_in_Ethiopia_Gebru_Korrektur.pdf
[11] “Iranian President Raisi begins Africa trip with visit to Kenya”, Reuters, July 12, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/iranian-president-raisi-begins-africa-trip-with-visit-kenya-2023-07-12/
[12] Danny Citrinowicz, “Iran Seeks to Expand Its Influence in Africa”, IISS, May 29, 2025, https://www.inss.org.il/social_media/iran-seeks-to-expand-its-influence-in-africa/
[13] Oral Toğa, “Iran's Growing Presence in the Horn of Africa and Yemen”, Iram Center, December 23, 2023, https://iramcenter.org/en/irans-growing-presence-in-the-horn-of-africa-and-yemen_en-2442
