Since the onset of Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Ukraine has turned to asymmetric and cost-effective technological innovations to counterbalance its conventional military inferiority vis-à-vis Russia. Chief among these are uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), which have transformed naval engagements in the Black Sea, enabling Ukraine to partially erode the maritime power of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) while operating under persistent air and missile threats.
The rapid integration of sea drones into the Ukrainian military doctrine has increased both precision and range of the strike capability of Kyiv and given its forces a fighting chance against a quantitatively superior and more powerful opponent on paper. This underlines the transformative role that unmanned platforms are poised to play in modern naval warfare.[1] However, while USVs have the potential to maximize the combat power of a smaller or less well-resourced navy, their effectiveness ultimately depends on integration into coherent operational doctrines, robust command-and-control systems, and sustained logistical and intelligence support.
Building a Fleet of USV
In building its fleet of naval drones, Ukraine has primarily relied on domestically developed systems. Among these, the Sea Baby and the Maritime Autonomous Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus (MAGURA) are the most notable and most significant USVs.
The Sea Baby drone has been developed by and for the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), also known by its Ukrainian acronym SBU. The Sea Baby is a 6-meter drone powered by two 200-horsepower inboard motors, which enable it to reach a maximum speed of 90 km/h (49 knots). With a payload capacity of about 850 kg of explosives, an operational range of up to 1,000 km, and a low-profile hull, this USV is primarily designed for conducting precision kamikaze missions against static targets, such as ships docked in port and critical infrastructure.[2] However, the SBU has also deployed different variants of the drone, for instance, equipping it with additional external fuel tanks for long-range one-way operations, bottom mines for submarine warfare, as well as rockets or a remote weapon station for surface and aerial combat. United24, Ukraine's official fundraising platform, is actively seeking donations to support the purchase of a fleet of 35 USVs, valued at approximately $221,000 each unit.[3]
The multi-purpose Magura V-type, on the other hand, is the brainchild of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR), which operates primarily through Group 13, a specialized unit for USV operations.[4] The naval drones are manufactured by the Ukrainian state-owned company SpetsTechnoExport, which is part of the defense giant Ukroboronprom.[5] The Magura V5, the most common configuration in the Magura family, is a 5.5-meter unmanned vessel with an operational range of 830 km, a top speed of 78 km/h (42 knots), and a payload capacity of 320 kg. Contrary to the Sea Baby, the Magura V-type is designed to counter moving targets, primarily warships at sea. Yet, additional suites have also been developed for the drone to perform intelligence, surveillance, and recognition (ISR) roles as well as combat operations.[6] More recently, Ukraine has also fielded the Magura V7, an upgraded version featuring a longer hull and a reshaped bow for enhanced seakeeping performance.[7] Therefore, the Magura V-type stands out as a multi-role USV capable of executing a broad array of maritime security functions, from ISR roles to search-and-rescue operations and combat missions.
Timeline of Attacks
The first recorded use of USVs in combat by Ukraine against Russian forces was on October 29, 2022, in a multi-pronged attack on the Sevastopol Naval Base in Crimea.[8] Historically, the Crimean port of Sevastopol has played a strategic role in Moscow’s regional naval posture, as a sizable part of the Russian Navy's BSF was anchored there.[9] The operation featured a mix of surface and aerial drones deployed in “suicide” or “one-way” mode. The attack reportedly inflicted limited damage on the Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate Admiral Makarov and the Natya-class minesweeper Ivan Golubets, but it did not cause any Russian warships to sink.[10] The success of the October 2022 Ukrainian attack on Sevastopol can be attributed to three key converging factors. First, Ukraine’s use of swarm tactics – deploying multiple naval drones simultaneously – saturated defensive capacity, forcing Russian responders to triage threats under intense time pressure. Second, the integration of USVs and UAVS to conduct a multi-domain attack exploited defensive gaps by dividing sensor and fire-control attention between air and sea vectors. Third, the physical characteristics of the craft – low radar cross-section and minimal visual profile – reduced detectability of sea drones, making sustained, employment both feasible and tactically advantageous.
Although the Russian Navy remained largely intact after the operation, the October 2022 attack had lasting effects on Russia's regional naval strategy. First, it called into question the Black Sea Fleet’s ability to translate its military superiority on paper into actual action, compelling the Russian Navy to reduce its activity outside port and adopt a more defensive approach.[11] Secondly, it led Moscow to reduce its dependence on Sevastopol as the primary base for maritime activities in the area, moving naval assets to more remote military facilities in eastern Crimea and southern Russia.[12] Ultimately, it compelled Russia to acknowledge the underlying vulnerabilities of its fleet and military facilities, prompting it to take concrete steps to enhance the defenses of its warships and near its naval installations. Despite Russia accelerating the deployment of multi-layered defenses to block Ukrainian sea drones,[13]the ongoing success of Ukrainian USV attacks highlights Moscow’s difficulties in creating effective counters. In mid-July 2023, Ukrainian naval drones successfully conducted an attack on the Kerch Bridge, in Crimea's easternmost corner. The naval sortie caused significant structural damage to the bridge, severely disrupting road traffic.[14] The Kerch Bridge directly links the Russian mainland to the Crimean Peninsula, playing a crucial role in Russian military logistics by serving as the main supply line for command facilities, air defense systems, and troops stationed in Crimea.[15] The successful targeting of the bridge, which is located about 320 nautical miles from the Ukrainian-controlled coast, sheds light on the long-range strike capability of its sea drone fleet.
While alternatives for rerouting road and railway traffic exist via land routes along the Azov coast and ferry crossings, these options present significant risks for Russia due to the proximity to the front lines and increasing Ukrainian attacks on logistics ships. Given its vital function in the logistical security of the Russian military in Crimea, the Kerch Bridge has been targeted multiple times by Ukraine, with Kyiv first attacking the bridge in October 2022 with an explosive-laden truck.[16] More recently, in early June 2025, Ukraine conducted a submarine assault against the bridge’s underwater supports.[17]
On November 10, 2023, Ukrainian USVs sank two Russian landing crafts, a Project 1176 Akula and a Project 11770 Serna, berthed at the Russian Naval base of Chornomorske.[18] Located in Western Crimea, about 110 miles from Ukrainian-controlled coastlines, Chornomorske is a medium-sized facility mainly home to small vessels like corvettes and transport ships. The rationale behind Ukraine's choice to strike a secondary facility within Moscow's network of military bases is twofold. First, it signals that any Russian installation, regardless of its size and role, represents a potential target. Second, it aims to disrupt Russian logistics activities necessary to support combat operations, especially considering that landing crafts play a key role in the amphibious transport and resupply of troops, military equipment and munitions, as well as air defense systems.
Following these successful operations during the first two years of the conflict, the Ukrainian maritime drone campaign intensified markedly in early 2024. On February 1, a swarm of Ukrainian Magura V5s launched a coordinated attack on the Ivanovets, a Tarantul-class missile corvette stationed near Lake Donuzlav in western Crimea. The warship sustained multiple direct strikes from explosive-laden drones and ultimately sank as a result.[19]
Two weeks later, the Ropucha-class landing ship Cesar Kunikov met a similar fate. The vessel was attacked by a small flotilla of Magura V5 while transporting military cargo between the Russian naval bases in Novorossiysk and Sevastopol.[20] With a total cargo capacity of 450 tons and up to 630 square meters of cargo deck, the Cesar Kunikov was a roll-on/roll-off vessel specialized for beach landings. Its loss dealt another severe blow to the Russian military logistics machine, which was already weakened by the demise of three other Ropucha-class ships in previous months.[21]
While the sinking of the Ivanovets and Cesar Kunikov confirmed the lethality of naval drones against high-tonnage warships, Ukrainian unmanned vessels also proved particularly effective against smaller ships, as showcased by the destruction of a Mangust-class patrol boat in May 2024 and of a Saturn-class tugboat in June 2024.[22]
While previously deployed primarily in suicide version, Ukraine has more recently succeeded in deploying surface drones in anti-air mode, further denting the operational freedom and survivability of Russian helicopters and fighter jets. In this context, a kamikaze USV refers to the one-way, explosive-laden configuration of a surface drone. It functions as a loitering munitiond esigned to travel directly to its target and detonate on impact, thereby destroying itself in the process. These USVs carry a warhead integrated into the hull or bow section and are guided into targets, making them a loitering munition.[23] The newer anti-air mode uses the same basic surface platform but replaces the explosive payload for sensors and a weapon system capable of engaging aircraft, such as a short-range man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) or similar launcher. In this role, the drone positions itself at sea in areas where Russian helicopters or low-flying aircraft operate, using radar, optical, or infrared sensors to cue the weapon. This shift essentially transforms the sea drone from a one-time strike asset into a reusable, mobile anti-aircraft firing position, extending its tactical value.
In early December 2024, Ukraine fielded machine gun-armed Sea Baby USVs during an attack on Russian military targets in the Kerch Bay, Crimea. The machine gun-toting uncrewed crafts exchanged fire with Mi-8/Mi-17 Hip helicopters. The surface drones were equipped with large-caliber machine guns, electro-optical and IR cameras, as well as automatic guidance systems generally fitted on remote weapon stations.[24] While the rotorcrafts survived the engagement with marginal damage, the episode revealed a new layer of threat to Russian air platforms operating in the Black Sea.
On December 31, 2024, a Magura-5 USV downed two Russian Mi-8 Hip helicopters in the vicinity of Cape Tarkhankut, 60 kilometers (100 miles) from Sevastopol. The episode marked the first recorded combat kill of a military rotorcraft by a surface drone.[25] The vector used in the attack was the “Sea Dragon” infrared (IR)-homing surface-to-air missile (SAM), a ground-launched variant developed by Ukraine based on the Soviet R-73 air-to-air missile. The Sea Dragon is a "heat-seeker" missile, meaning it relies on the IR light emission generated by a target to track and hit it. The surface drone’s rear was modified to mount two launch rails, each capable of accommodating a SAM.
Ukrainian unmanned vessels achieved another world first on May 2, 2025, when Magura-7 surface drones downed two Su-30 Flanker multirole fighters with AIM-9 Sidewinder IR-guided air-to-air missiles in the vicinity of the Russian naval base of Novorossiysk, eastern Black Sea. This event was a significant milestone for Ukraine, representing two main achievements: first, the first combat kill of a Russian combat aircraft by a USV; second, the first instance of a surface drone equipped with an AIM-9 missile, a U.S.-made heat-seeking missile mainly used by fighter aircraft for short-range engagements.[26]
In addition to its proven success in countering Russian assets at sea and in the air, Ukraine has also deployed sea drones against ground-based military targets in Russian-controlled coastal areas.
More recently, in early July 2025, Ukraine launched a high-precision attack on Russian radar installations in Crimea using low-altitude, low-endurance UAVs equipped with bomb-drop systems that took off from unmanned surface vessels. Although the total damage from the attack is hard to determine, it appears that the Nebo-M long-range radar system was probably the intended target.[27]
This radar complex generally comprises a mobile command post module and up to three multiple truck-mounted radars.[28] According to Russian sources, the Nebo-M is a multi-purpose radar system capable of detecting stealth aircraft and long-range ballistic missiles up to a maximum distance of one thousand kilometers.[29] These features together make the Nebo-M a critical asset in Russian air defense architecture.
Since the start of the conflict, Moscow has stationed several Nebo-M radars in the Black Sea region to enhance radar coverage against incoming aerial threats from Ukraine.[30] However, these radars have become more frequently targeted by Ukrainian air raids aimed at weakening Russian detection capabilities before launching precision strikes on air defense systems or other military targets.[31]
Notably, the use of unmanned vessels as UAV motherships for conducting strikes on Russian targets ashore is not isolated. In early January 2025, one-way first-person view (FPV) drones launched from Ukrainian USVs were first employed to attack Russian short-range air defense systems in the Kherson oblast.[32] Besides, sea drones are suspected to be behind a similar sortie in March 2025.[33]
The innovative use of drones launched from unmanned vessels to neutralize strategic air defense assets poses an insidious challenge to the Russian capacity to spot, track, and intercept incoming aerial threats, thereby increasing the ability of the Ukrainian forces to strike critical Russian objectives. Continuous Ukrainian assaults on Russian strategic air defense systems in Crimea force Moscow to accelerate replacements by reallocating assets from other fronts, which could leave those areas more exposed.
For Ukraine, converting uninhabited boats into UAV motherships greatly expanded the striking range of its low-altitude, low-endurance drones. These drones typically need continuous line-of-sight communications to operate, making them unsuitable for long-distance missions. However, radio or fiber-optic communication systems installed on the USV help overcome this limitation by establishing a direct line-of-sight link between the controller and the drone.
Assessing Pros and Cons
Strengths
First, the Ukrainian sea drone campaign has demonstrated that unmanned boats are scalable solutions capable of swiftly adjusting to the new realities of high-intensity naval warfare. The evolution of unmanned vessels from their initial employment as kamikaze boats to more advanced roles, such as anti-aircraft and UAV-launch platforms, demonstrates the versatility of USVs in meeting the rapidly changing operational needs required to succeed in modern naval warfare.
Second, USVs represent a cost-effective asset to extend maritime strike capabilities and maintain sustained operational pressure. Although combining advanced military-grade tech and commercial-off-the-shelf components, the sea drones fielded by Ukraine are expensive platforms, each costing approximately between $221,000 and $250,000 apiece. However, they remain comparatively cheaper than other vectors used by the Ukrainian forces to attack similar targets, such as warships, military facilities, and critical infrastructure. For instance, the Ukrainian-developed R-360 Neptune anti-ship all-weather missile, known for sinking the Slava-class guided missile cruiser Moskva (the flagship of the Russian BSF) in April 2022, has an estimated unit cost of $1.5 million.[34] Besides, the deployment of sea drones for combat roles other than one-way strike operations allows for maximizing the lifespan of these platforms, thereby maximizing cost-effectiveness, preserving force availability, and enhancing overall campaign sustainability.
Third, the use of unmanned vessels has helped Ukraine level the playing field with Russia in the maritime theater, but not solely. Despite the coastal nature of its naval forces, Kyiv’s intensified resort to USVs has helped offset its on-paper military imbalance vis-à-vis Russia by either destroying enemy warships or significantly constraining the operational freedom of the Russian fleet. Furthermore, the proliferation of machine gun-equipped and missile-toting surface drones, combined with the increased use of unmanned vessels as drone-launch motherships to conduct fast sorties on ground-based targets, has also contributed to denting the Russian military advantage in the air and land domains, restricting the ability of Russian air assets to operate and exposing Russian air-defense and radar systems to unprecedented threats. While Ukraine is unlikely to secure a decisive military victory on the battlefield in contested mainland regions, sea drones have enabled it to attain “local superiority”[35] against a more powerful opponent on the Black Sea front.
Limitations
First, most of the Ukrainian successful strikes have targeted aging Soviet-era warships. Despite periodic upgrades, these vessels remain poorly adapted to modern, low-signature threats, such as unmanned vessels. Rather than striking at the heart of Russia’s most advanced naval capabilities, which are instead deployed in the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet far from the battlefield,[36] Ukraine’s sea drone campaign has largely neutralized ships already on the lower end of the threat spectrum, platforms that were never designed to withstand the swarm tactics and remote precision of 21st-century warfare. Different operational results might be expected against more modern naval assets, which are significantly better equipped with sensors, countermeasures, and layered defenses to repel such asymmetric threats.
Second, Ukrainian unmanned boats are far from a silver bullet against Russian high-cost, crewed weapons systems. While Ukraine has achieved a series of world-first combat successes using USVs, effectively pioneering their application in modern naval warfare, these victories were preceded by numerous failed attempts, including missions that ended in the destruction of assets before impact or drones washed ashore due to a loss of contact. This mixed operational record reflects the limitations inherent in deploying relatively new tech and emerging weapon systems in high-intensity warfare settings. Moreover, although proceeding at a slow pace, Russia is gradually adapting to neutralize asymmetric threats by integrating improved defenses and electronic countermeasures.[37] These include improving early detection of incoming threats through the deployment of helicopters and fast-attack boats to patrol approaches to strategic assets and expanding the array of kinetic defense measures, especially interceptor UAVs for drone-on-drone warfare.[38] Therefore, as Russia strives to develop a multi-layered defense system, the effectiveness of Ukrainian USVs may diminish unless accompanied by parallel innovations in tactics, coordination, and survivability.
Finally, naval drones are finite, prized assets. While less expensive than more sophisticated weapon systems, Ukrainian USVs are understood to cost over $ 220,000 each, an estimate that does not include additional expenses related to integrating missile systems or onboard FPV drones. For instance, the United24 crowdfunding campaign proved successful in raising much-needed funds to finance the construction of several sea drones, but this kind of success is not easily replicable. Moreover, the looming uncertainty surrounding continued Western defense aid, combined with the shifting needs of the battlefield, may influence Ukrainian decision-making regarding the allocation of limited financial resources. Kyiv might increasingly prioritize the procurement of interceptor missiles to defend critical military infrastructure and civilian areas, potentially at the expense of further investments in naval drones.
Conclusions
Ukraine’s intense use of USVs in combat has fundamentally altered the operational environment in the Black Sea. By converting relatively low-cost, domestically produced platforms into multi-role strike assets, Kyiv has offset critical disadvantages in conventional naval power. The campaign has imposed persistent costs on the Russian BSF, disrupted logistics, and limited Moscow’s operational freedom at sea and in the air. Yet, this strong track record of world-first military successes also highlights key constraints: most successful strikes have targeted aging platforms, and Russia is incrementally improving its counter-drone defenses. The sustainability of Ukraine’s maritime drone campaign will depend on continued innovation, reliable resource flows, and Western support in both technology and funding. Regardless of its ultimate effectiveness in the current conflict, Ukraine’s campaign has underscored the disruptive potential of USVs in modern naval warfare – a development with broad implications for future force planning and maritime security strategies.
Building on the lessons learned from the Black Sea battlefield, the integration of sea drones into naval warfare operations by other small and mid-tier navies is already underway,[39] potentially widening the spectrum of littoral conflict and challenging existing maritime security regimes. Countries with a conventionally superior naval force are also taking concrete steps to leverage low-cost, modular maritime systems to generate outsized strategic effects, thereby broadening the deterrent value of their traditional fleets.[40] Such diffusion could spur both innovation in countermeasures and proliferation risks, making USV doctrine a pressing issue for force planning and arms control debates globally.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[1] Peter Dickinson, ‘Ukraine is shaping the future of drone warfare at sea as well as on land’, Atlantic Council, June 12, 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-is-shaping-the-future-of-drone-warfare-at-sea-as-well-as-on-land/.
[2] H I Sutton, ‘Ukraine's Sea Baby Maritime Drone (USV)’, Covert Shores, March 30, 2025. http://www.hisutton.com/Ukraine-Sea-Baby-USV.html.
[3] United24, ‘This is Battleship. Your donation is your play’, https://u24.gov.ua/seababy.
[4] Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, ‘The Era of Magura: Defence Intelligence of Ukraine Unveils Revolutionary Naval Drones Capable of Destroying Enemy Ships and Aircraft’, May 15, 2025. https://gur.gov.ua/en/content/era-maury-komanda-hur-vpershe-prezentuvala-novitni-morski-drony-zdatni-nyshchyty-vorozhi-korabli-ta-litaky.
[5] Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, ‘Ukraine seeks upper hand in cat-and-mouse game of naval drones’, C4ISRNET, September 14, 2023. https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2023/09/14/ukraine-seeks-upper-hand-in-cat-and-mouse-game-of-naval-drones/.
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[7] H I Sutton, ‘First Image Of Ukraine’s Sidewinder-Armed Magura V7 Surface Drone’, Naval News, May 4, 2024. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/05/first-image-of-ukraines-sidewinder-armed-magura-v7-surface-drone/.
[8] Elise Vincent and Emmanuel Grynszpan, ‘Ukraine uses naval suicide drones for the first time against Russian fleet in Crimea’, Le Monde, November 4, 2022. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/11/04/ukraine-uses-naval-suicide-drones-for-the-first-time-against-russian-fleet-in-crimea_6002946_4.html.
[9] Steven Wills, ‘Why Sevastopol is Important to the Russian Black Sea Fleet’, Center for Maritime Strategy, August 4, 2023. https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/why-sevastopol-matters-to-the-russian-black-sea-fleet/.
[10] The Insider, ‘GeoConfirmed: Drones struck at least three Russian ships in Sevastopol harbor’, October 31, 2022. https://theins.ru/en/news/256556#:~:text=Six%20to%20eight%20sea%20drones,at%20the%20Sevastopol%20naval%20base.
[11] Colin Flint, ‘Bottled up in the Black Sea: Russia is having a dreadful naval war, hindering its great power ambitions’, The Conversation, October 3, 2024. https://theconversation.com/bottled-up-in-the-black-sea-russia-is-having-a-dreadful-naval-war-hindering-its-great-power-ambitions-238195.
[12] H I Sutton, ‘Russian Navy Pulls Warships from Black Sea into Port After Attacks’, USNI News, November 7, 2022. https://news.usni.org/2022/11/07/russian-navy-pulls-warships-from-black-sea-into-port-after-attacks.
[13] Boyko Nikolov, ‘Russia’s new defense thwarts Ukraine’s naval drone strikes’, Bulgarian Military, April 7, 2025. https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2025/04/07/russias-new-defense-thwarts-ukraines-naval-drone-strikes/.
[14] Howard Altman, ‘Drone Boats Used In Kerch Bridge Strike: Reports (Updated)’, The War Zone, July 17, 2023. https://www.twz.com/drone-boats-used-in-kerch-bridge-strike-reports.
[15] Brigadier General a. D. Heinrich Fischer, ‘The Kerch Bridge – An Achilles heel of Russian logistics’, Europäische Sicherheit & Technik, March 11, 2024. https://esut.de/en/2024/03/fachbeitraege/47124/die-kertsch-bruecke-eine-achillesferse-der-russischen-logistik/.
[16] Glanz and Marco Hernandez, ‘How Ukraine Blew Up a Key Russian Bridge’, The New York Times, November 17, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/11/17/world/europe/crimea-bridge-collapse.html.
[17] Veronika Melkozerova, ‘Ukraine launches explosive underwater attack on Crimean bridge’, Politico, June 3, 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-launches-explosive-underwater-attack-crimean-bridge/.
[18] Reuters, ‘Ukraine sinks two Russian landing boats in Crimea, military says’, November 11, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-damages-two-small-russian-landing-boats-crimea-kyiv-says-2023-11-10/.
[19] Peter Felstead, ‘Ukrainians sink Russian missile corvette in USV attack’, European Security & Defence, February 1, 2024. https://euro-sd.com/2024/02/major-news/36283/ukraine-sinks-russian-corvette/.
[20] The Economist, ‘How Ukraine sank the Caesar Kunikov—and is beating Russia at sea’, February 4, 2024. https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2024/02/14/how-ukraine-sank-the-caesar-kunikov-and-is-beating-russia-at-sea.
[21] Thomas Newdick, ‘Ukrainian Drone Boats Sink Another Russian Navy Landing Ship’, The War Zone, February 14, 2024. https://www.twz.com/sea/ukrainian-drone-boats-sink-another-russian-navy-landing-ship.
[22] Kateryna Denisova, ‘Ukraine war latest: Russian Mangust-class vessel destroyed in Crimea, military intelligence says’, The Kyiv Independent, May 6, 2024. https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-russian-mangust-class-vessel-destroyed-in-crimea-military-intelligence-says/; Vadim Kushnikov, ‘Ukrainian naval drone destroys raid tugboat in Crimea’, Militarnyi, June 6, 2024. https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukrainian-naval-drone-destroys-raid-tugboat-in-crimea/.
[23] OCIMF, ‘Loitering Munitions – The Threat to Merchant Ships’, August 2023, https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/db1onvme/loitering-munitions-the-threat-to-merchant-ships.pdf.
[24] Joseph Trevithick, ‘Ukraine’s Drone Boats Are Now Shooting Machine Guns At Russian Helicopters, Boats’, The War Zone, December 9, 2024. https://www.twz.com/sea/ukraines-drone-boats-are-now-shooting-machine-guns-at-enemy-helicopters-boats.
[25] Peter Felstead, ‘Ukraine’s GUR claims Russian Mi-8 kills using missiles fired from MAGURA V5 USVs’, European Security and Defence, January 3, 2025. https://euro-sd.com/2025/01/major-news/41911/magura-v5-mi-8-kills/.
[26] Howard Altman, ‘Two Russian Su-30 Flankers Downed By AIM-9s Fired From Drone Boats: Ukrainian Intel Boss’, The War Zone, May 3, 2025. https://www.twz.com/news-features/two-russian-su-30-flankers-downed-by-aim-9s-fired-from-drone-boats-ukrainian-intel-boss.
[27] Howard Altman, ‘Ukraine’s Uncrewed Surface Vessels Are Now Launching Bomber Drones To Attack Crimea’, The War Zone, July 3, 2025.
[28] Luke Diaz, ‘How Does Russia's $100 Million Nebo-M Counter-Stealth Radar Work?’, Simple Flying, January 26, 2025. https://simpleflying.com/how-russia-100-million-nebo-m-counter-stealth-radar-works/.
[29] TASS, ‘Russia’s Nebo-M radars can detect F-22, F-35 warplanes — developer’, May 23, 2021. https://tass.com/defense/1292733.
[30] Luke Diaz, ‘How Does Russia's $100 Million Nebo-M Counter-Stealth Radar Work?’, Simple Flying, January 26, 2025. https://simpleflying.com/how-russia-100-million-nebo-m-counter-stealth-radar-works/.
[31] David Axe, ‘Russia Built A Dozen Nebo-M Mobile Radars To Detect Ballistic Missiles. Ukraine Keeps Blowing Them Up ... With Ballistic Missiles.’ Forbes, October 4, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/10/04/russia-built-a-dozen-nebo-m-mobile-radars-to-detect-ballistic-missiles-ukraine-keeps-blowing-them-up--with-ballistic-missiles/.
[32] Thomas Newdick, ‘Ukraine Claims Its Drone Boats Are Now Launching Kamikaze FPV Drones At Russian Shore Targets’, The War Zone, January 7, 2025. https://www.twz.com/news-features/ukraine-claims-its-drone-boats-are-now-launching-kamikaze-fpv-drones-at-russian-shore-targets.
[33] Howard Altman, ‘Ukraine Launches FPV Drone Attack On Russia’s Air Defenses In Crimea’, The War Zone, March 19, 2025. https://www.twz.com/news-features/ukraine-launches-fpv-drone-attack-on-russias-air-defenses-in-crimea.
[34] Interesting Engineering, ‘The future of cruise missiles: What you need to know’. https://interestingengineering.com/videos/ep-8-the-future-of-cruise-missiles-what-you-need-to-know.
[35] David Kirichenko, ‘Ukraine’s Marauding Sea Drones Bewilder Russia’, Center for European Policy Analysis, January 30, 2025. https://cepa.org/article/ukraines-marauding-sea-drones-bewilder-russia/.
[36] Gonzalo Vázquez, ‘Russia’s Bloodied Navy Remains a Threat’, Center for European Analysis, October 11, 2023. https://cepa.org/article/russias-bloodied-navy-remains-a-threat/.
[37] Boyko Nikolov, ‘Russia’s new defense thwarts Ukraine’s naval drone strikes’, Bulgarian Military, Apr 7, 2025. https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2025/04/07/russias-new-defense-thwarts-ukraines-naval-drone-strikes/.
[38] Howard Altman, ‘Russian FPV Drone Seen Attacking Ukrainian Uncrewed Surface Vessel For The First Time’, The War Zone, May 30, 2024. https://www.twz.com/news-features/russian-fpv-drone-seen-attacking-ukrainian-uncrewed-surface-vessel-for-the-first-time; Army Recognition Group, ‘Russia creates Kinzhal interceptor to prevent Ukrainian kamikaze drones from hitting key targets’, July 14, 2025. https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/russia-creates-kinzhal-interceptor-to-prevent-ukrainian-kamikaze-drones-from-hitting-key-targets.
[39] Dylan Malyasov, ‘Turkish Navy to get drone boats’, Defence Blog, Mar 6, 2025, https://defence-blog.com/turkish-navy-to-get-drone-boats/; Royal Navy, ‘New uncrewed boat to boost Royal Navy minehunting operations’, March 17, 2025, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2025/march/17/20250317-ariadne-arrival-to-mine-counter-measures-programme; Dr Lee Willett, ‘From lab to ship: Portuguese Navy charts course towards integrated MUS operations’, European Security and Defence, March 27, 2025, https://euro-sd.com/2025/03/articles/43365/from-lab-to-ship-portuguese-navy-charts-course-towards-integrated-mus-operations/.
[40] Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, ‘Navy Seeks New Fast Attack Surface Drone Design’, USNI News, July 28, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/07/28/navy-seeks-new-fast-attack-surface-drone-design; Alex Luck, ‘Chinese Experimental Aviation Platform And Combat USV Emerge In Detailed New Imagery’, Naval News, November 7, 2024, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/11/chinese-experimental-aviation-platform-and-combat-usv-emerge-in-detailed-new-imagery/.
