Introduction
Europe is facing one of its most significant intelligence challenges since the Cold War, as the war in Ukraine expands the volume, breadth, and persistence of espionage activity. According to MI5, more than 100 Britons are under investigation for spying for hostile states, and a Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) study found that between 2008 and 2024, Estonia and Germany recorded the most espionage convictions.
Across the European continent, governments are increasingly concerned about foreign espionage, influence operations, and the theft of sensitive technologies. While traditional espionage remains a concern, intelligence activities have evolved considerably, taking advantage of digital technologies, globalization, and complex international networks.
These same forces – technological competition, deepening global interconnection, and rising geopolitical stakes – are reshaping the threat landscape well beyond Europe. As Gulf states invest heavily in artificial intelligence, advanced industries, and critical infrastructure, their financial influence, economic diversification, and international partnerships position the region as a focal point of global intelligence competition.
The Gulf’s exposure, however, is not a mirror of Europe’s; its reliance on expatriate labour, concentration of foreign military bases and multinational partnerships, and distinct legal and institutional architecture mean European counterintelligence approaches cannot be transplanted. What follows is a diagnostic – an understanding of how and why foreign intelligence activities have adapted to target European states can help Gulf countries anticipate comparable risks and adapt their own defences.
The evolving nature of espionage in Europe
Recent studies suggest that espionage in Europe has become more diverse and complex than in previous decades. While Russia continues to feature prominently in many espionage investigations, other state actors have also been linked to intelligence activities targeting European governments, industries, and research institutions.
A study conducted by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), which examined espionage convictions across Europe between 2008 and 2024, highlights how intelligence operations have adapted to the modern environment. Rather than relying solely on highly placed insiders within government or military institutions, intelligence services increasingly exploit digital platforms, commercial relationships, and transnational networks.
The study identified several categories of individuals involved in espionage activities, ranging from insiders with privileged access to individuals recruited for limited tasks through online platforms. This reflects a broader shift away from traditional espionage towards more flexible and decentralized models.
The rise of outsourced intelligence networks
One of the most notable developments in recent years is the growing use of intermediaries and contractors to conduct intelligence activities. Instead of relying exclusively on professional intelligence officers, some foreign intelligence services appear to be utilizing private individuals and informal networks to gather information and conduct surveillance.
A prominent example emerged in the United Kingdom, where authorities uncovered a network of Bulgarian nationals accused of conducting surveillance activities on behalf of Russian interests. The case attracted significant attention because the network reportedly operated in a manner similar to a commercial enterprise, utilizing modern surveillance equipment and coordinating activities across several European countries.
This trend presents new challenges for security agencies. Decentralized networks can be difficult to detect, often operate across multiple jurisdictions, and provide the sponsoring states with a degree of plausible deniability.
Economic security and technological competition
Alongside traditional intelligence collection, European governments are increasingly concerned about the protection of strategic technologies and intellectual property.
Several European countries have reported attempts to obtain sensitive information related to advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, aerospace technologies, and artificial intelligence. The Netherlands, for example, has devoted considerable attention to protecting its semiconductor sector, including companies that play a critical role in global supply chains.
These concerns extend beyond economic competition. Technologies developed for commercial purposes may also have military applications, making the protection of innovation an important national security issue.
Similarly, authorities in Northern Europe have raised concerns about activities that may involve the collection of information relating to military infrastructure and strategic facilities.
Political influence and legal challenges
European governments have also faced growing concerns regarding foreign influence within political institutions and policymaking circles.
Several recent controversies including investigations into alleged foreign interference by Russia and China have highlighted the difficulties of addressing suspected foreign influence activities while preserving democratic values, transparency, and the rule of law.
In many instances, investigations have been constrained by legal limitations, evidentiary requirements, or differing national approaches to counterintelligence. The European Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference (INGE) and the European External Action Service (EUvsDisinfo) have repeatedly warned that foreign influence operations increasingly exploit democratic institutions, political parties, think tanks, academia, and digital platforms to shape political discourse and public opinion.
At the same time, significant differences exist among European countries in their ability to investigate and prosecute espionage-related offences. Some states have modernized their legal frameworks and adopted a more proactive approach to counterintelligence, while others continue to face challenges arising from outdated legislation, limited institutional capacity, or varying legal definitions of espionage and foreign interference. These disparities have prompted greater cooperation through agencies such as Europol and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), alongside broader efforts by the European Commission to strengthen resilience against foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI).
These disparities create opportunities for hostile actors to exploit legal and operational gaps across national borders.
Why the Gulf’s counterintelligence landscape is distinct
Fragmented capacity is one vulnerability Europe has had to confront directly; the Gulf faces a different set of structural exposures. The region faces comparable pressures, but not an identical threat environment, and three features stand out that the European examples above don’t capture.
Its sponsorship-based employment structures create dependencies and vulnerabilities with no close European equivalent, and its rapidly expanding higher education and research sector is still building the institutional muscle for vetting international partnerships that European universities developed over decades. A third gap is legal harmonization – unlike the EU’s shared institutions and frameworks, GCC member states approach espionage, foreign interference, and economic security legislation individually, with no equivalent to Europol or ENISA coordinating a regional response.
Lessons for the Gulf States
Addressing gaps like workforce structures, research security, and legal harmonization will require drawing selectively on Europe’s experience. As Gulf countries continue their transition toward knowledge-based and technology-driven economies, several lessons stand out.
Advanced technologies, research institutions, and critical infrastructure are increasingly attractive targets for foreign intelligence collection. The Dutch Government has responded by adopting a knowledge security approach that emphasizes close collaboration between government, universities, research institutions, and industry to identify vulnerabilities, raise awareness, and strengthen information sharing through mechanisms such as the National Contact Point for Knowledge Security and the National Knowledge Security Guidelines.
The Gulf region relies heavily on international expertise, expatriate communities, and private contractors. While this openness contributes to economic growth, it can also create opportunities for exploitation by hostile actors. Security screening processes should therefore extend beyond traditional background checks and include assessments of potential vulnerabilities that may increase susceptibility to recruitment, coercion, or manipulation.
Europe’s experience demonstrates that fragmented legal frameworks and regulatory loopholes can create vulnerabilities that foreign actors exploit for espionage, foreign interference, and hybrid threats. Given the high level of economic integration within the GCC, there is value in ensuring that legislation relating to espionage, foreign interference, cyber-enabled intelligence activities, and sensitive economic information is modern, coordinated, and adaptable. A common regional understanding of emerging intelligence threats would strengthen collective resilience.
Conclusion
Espionage is no longer confined to secret meetings, diplomatic cover, or the recruitment of high-ranking officials. Today’s intelligence activities increasingly operate through digital platforms, commercial networks, technological partnerships, and informal intermediaries. Europe’s recent experiences demonstrate how rapidly these threats are evolving and how difficult they can be to detect and counter.
For the Gulf states, the lesson is not that they face identical threats, but that economic success, technological advancement, and growing international influence inevitably attract greater intelligence attention. By strengthening cooperation between government and industry, enhancing workforce security, and modernizing legal frameworks, Gulf countries can reduce vulnerabilities and better safeguard their long-term strategic interests.
