Introduction
In its essence, the war in Ukraine is a war of attrition and the two adversaries have been focused on depleting and wearing each other down beyond their capability to replenish. Long-established traditional doctrines have proven effective in the war in Ukraine, but they have also gradually become obsolete as new, more sophisticated doctrines have emerged. This interplay has led defense professionals to ponder ways to distill these novel elements and adapt them to the next generation of warfare.
The strategic ends of the war seem to have remained constant, but the means have changed significantly to include a hybrid of traditional and “outsmarting” doctrines. On the traditional side is positional warfare, which entails defensive lines reinforced with mines, trenches, and natural barriers. On the outsmarting side, artificial intelligence-augmented targeting, drones, and precision strikes have forced changes in tactics. The outcome of the war has yet to unfold, so reaching clear judgments may be too ambitious, but the lines between old and new are increasingly blurred.
The Relevance of Traditional Doctrines
In a war of attrition, opponents attempt to drain their adversary of resources, manpower, and material. This means that the will to fight and the resolve of a society are of the utmost importance. Recent opinion polls indicate that Ukrainian public approval is lower than that of the Russian public, thereby suggesting that traditional doctrines remain relevant.[1]
In the Ukrainian war we have observed the traditional doctrine of positional warfare,[2] in which both sides are relying heavily on fortified defensive lines. Russia’s inability to reach the capital of Kyiv and inflict a regime change in the early stages of the war was largely attributable to an underestimation of Ukraine's resilience. Russia then opted to build defensive lines and seek softer fronts in pursuit of steady advances. Ukraine, on the other hand, faced a major hurdle during its counter-offensive stage as they tried to dislodge Russia’s defensive lines.
Traditionally, these defensive methods aim to impede the opponent’s advance and inflict substantial casualties, thereby exhausting their resources and compelling a strategic withdrawal. In the battle for Bakhmut, Russia employed a strategy of distraction, forcing Ukraine to move forces from other fronts while concurrently establishing defensive lines in Zaporizhzhia. This strategy not only depleted Ukrainian forces but also enabled Russia to fortify its defensive positions.[3] Ukraine’s use of Western-supplied cluster bombs to create pathways for armored operations failed because Russia fired on the incoming columns of tanks and other armored Ukrainian groups that moved into predictable pathways.[4] Expanding forces over long frontlines allows the defender to confront the incoming advance with a reduced force while providing an initiative to alter the direction of advance to softer fronts, ensuring steady consistent advances.
From a doctrinal point of view, positional warfare has worked for Russia. Ukraine would have preferred to mass-and-maneuver, that is to concentrate their combat troops and firepower, but Russia has forced them to disperse their forces.[5] Russia has capitalized on this dispersion of forces along the frontline and sought softer fronts to advance. This has yielded notable successes and proved its effectiveness, marked with steady and consistent advances to date.
Trenches and minefields have also played a significant role in Russia’s positional strategy. Ukraine’s failure to clear pathways using cluster bombs means that the maneuver and center-of-gravity concepts, which are the backbone of the traditional doctrines, are being subjected to an unprecedented test on the battleground. This prompts the question: Has the old been pushed away, and is the new about to born?
The Introduction of Outsmarting Doctrines as a Remedy
Traditional doctrines have played a significant role in this war, but novel tactics have emerged that look to leverage technology and innovation to obtain a competitive edge. These outsmarting doctrines are designed to outpace the opponent through precision, speed, and adaptability and establish knowledge-decision-action dominance. In pursuit of this superiority, Ukraine has adopted a range of advanced technologies, including drones, AI-augmented targeting systems, and precision-guided munitions, procured from Western nations to compensate for their disadvantage in resources. The outsmarting doctrines are utilized to build qualitative edge over quantitative disadvantages, as Ukraine faces delayed or intermittent shipments of weapons necessary to sustain its war-fighting capability.
Since the commencement of hostilities, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have emerged as a pivotal and highly significant asset in the military strategy employed against Russia. Drones, ranging from small repurposed commercial drones to sophisticated UAVs that incorporate reconnaissance and firing capability into a single platform, collect target intelligence, get detailed pictures of the battlefield, and strike targets within shortened cycles, giving Ukrainian forces knowledge and action superiority. Drones democratize the air domain, allowing Ukraine to inflict costs and harm on Russia and counter their larger and more powerful air force. Russians have also recognized the utility of drones and use fiber-optic cabled FPVs to mitigate Ukraine’s electronic warfare and air defense systems.[6]
The quest to leverage AI in the battlefield has transformed the conflict into a battle of algorithms.[7] AI-augmented targeting, the crux of the outsmarting doctrines, allows for the collection of a vast amount of data and shorter processing times. Technology then distills the necessary information for effective and accurate targeting, allowing for resources to be allocated elsewhere for greater impact and to offset collateral damage.[8] From the beginning of the war, Ukraine, has employed AI-augmented targeting more effectively than the Russians thanks to the involvement of Western commercial companies such as Palantir.[9] Russia has also recognized the advantage of outsmarting doctrines and accelerated its sensor-fire circle, which allows units to exploit information for effective targeting.[10]
Precision-guided munitions (PGMs), delivered either by mobile artillery systems or aircraft, rely heavily on accurate targeting. ATACMS and HIMARS are being used to strike high-value Russian infrastructure, while Russia has utilized similar AI-augmented navigation technology (e.g. Krasnopol) to hinder Ukraine’s operational tempo and effectiveness. The recent deployment of hypersonic systems such as Oreshnik along with airborne Kinzhal systems exemplifies the effectiveness of the outsmarting doctrines.
Comparative Analysis, Implications, and Prospects
The table below compares the traditional and outsmarting doctrines from distinct perspectives to illustrate their strengths and weaknesses.
Traditional Doctrines | Outsmarting Doctrines | |
Effectiveness | High in static, resource-intensive engagements | High in dynamic, precision-focused operations |
Cost | Lower technological investment, high human/resource cost | High technological investment, lower human cost |
Flexibility | Limited, due to static defenses | High, due to adaptability and technological edge |
Sustainability | Dependent on manpower and logistics | Dependent on technological infrastructure |
Conclusion
Traditional doctrines are more resilient to disruption once defendable lines have been established, offering opportunities to capitalize on softer fronts. Outsmarting doctrines are superior for attaining knowledge and offer greater flexibility in targeting, especially of forces. In that sense, we are witnessing the growing role of intelligence in attaining operational objectives.
Despite their advantages, outsmarting doctrines have limitations, especially if there is an overreliance on high-cost advanced systems and uninterrupted networks, which leave a force vulnerable to cyber operations. A further challenge in the future will likely be the integration of outsmarting doctrines with traditional legacy doctrines, as generals are reluctant to adapt to new ideas, tending to rely on what worked in previous wars. The condition of the battlefield compels armies to adopt adaptive learning, sometimes with heavy costs.
One of the anticipated implications will be the blurring of lines between commercial firms and government defense departments, as the intensive use of technology moves engineers, who are accepted as non-combatant, to the front lines.[11] Russian President Vladimir Putin’s equation of AI with the invention of nuclear weapons[12] underscores their promising future and ability to transform the character of war. Defense professionals will likely have to deal with the role of AI in building deterrence and proliferation issues in the future, like how they dealt with the proliferation of nuclear in the past.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[1] Benedict Vigers, “Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War,” Gallup, November 19, 2024, https://news.gallup.com/poll/653495/half-ukrainians-quick-negotiated-end-war.aspx.
[2] Sidharth Kaushal, “Positional Warfare: A Paradigm for Understanding Twenty-First-Century Conflict,” The RUSI Journal, 163(2), 2018, 34–40. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1470395.
[3] David J. Betz, “Russian fortifications present an old problem for Ukraine,” Engelsberg Ideas, 20 July 2023 https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/russian-fortifications-present-an-old-problem-for-ukraine/.
[4] Sam Cranny-Evans, “Russia’s Artillery War in Ukraine: Challenges and Innovations,” The RUSI Journal, 9 August 2023, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-artillery-war-ukraine-challenges-and-innovations.
[5] Amos C. Fox, “Manoeuvre is Dead? Understanding the Conditions and Components of Warfighting,” The RUSI Journal, 166(6–7), 2022, 10–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2022.2058601; Krisztián Jójárt, “The war against Ukraine through the prism of Russian military thought,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 47:6-7, 2024, 801-831, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2024.2414079, 815.
[6] Yavuz Aydin, “Fiber optic drones revolutionize combat in Russia-Ukraine war,” Anadolu Agency, January 10, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/fiber-optic-drones-revolutionize-combat-in-russia-ukraine-war/3446365.
[7] David Kirichenko, “The Rush for AI-Enabled Drones on Ukrainian Battlefields,” Lawfare, December 5, 2024, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-rush-for-ai-enabled-drones-on-ukrainian-battlefields.
[8] Max Hunder, “Ukraine collects vast war data trove to train AI models,” Reuters, December 20, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/technology/ukraine-collects-vast-war-data-trove-train-ai-models-2024-12-20/.
[9] Bruno Maçaes, “How Palantir Is Shaping the Future of Warfare,” Time, July 10, 2023, https://time.com/6293398/palantir-future-of-warfare-ukraine/.
[10] “Inside Russia’s Ratnik soldier system,” Globaldata, December 2021, https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_dec21/ratnik_soldier_system
[11] Matt Kaplan and Michael Brown, “The Private Sector on the Frontline,” Foreign Affairs, January 31, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/private-sector-frontline.
[12] “Sberbank CEO tells Putin of huge returns on its AI investments,” Reuters, July 19, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/sberbank-ceo-tells-putin-huge-returns-its-ai-investments-2023-07-19/.
