Introduction
In the modern battlespace, operational logistics remains a critical enabler of strategic success. Without effective, resilient logistics, combat power simply cannot be sustained, and any operation will likely reach its culmination point prematurely. Much commentary now emphasises the predominance of operational logistics as an enabler of strategic plans and action rather than simply as a joint function that must somehow “figure out” how to support such plans. In the distances encountered across the Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP)[1] region, the criticality of logistics to enable strategic and operational movement has become even greater. The primacy of logistics over strategy has also been demonstrated in the current Russo-Ukrainian war.[2]
At the operational level of war,[3] logistics has become a “frontline” vulnerability, primarily because of the emergence of weaponised unmanned aerial systems and the expansion of enhanced munitions and rocket systems that have enabled adversaries to fire effectively from up to many thousands of kilometres, bringing previously “safe rear areas” well within targetable ranges.
Understanding how contestation occurs against operational logistical networks and how these might be mitigated is critical to maintaining operational effectiveness. This piece will outline the principal ways in which an adversary can exert effects across the five operational domains in order to disrupt critical sustainment functions. Using examples from a hypothetical great-power conflict in the IAP region between the United States and the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC), this piece will explore the concept of multidomain contested logistics, outline how it can be mitigated, and emphasise its importance in enabling operations in major power conflict. Key strategies being adopted by each service of the U.S. military to mitigate contested logistics in the IAP region will illustrate the points made in this piece. The first section presents definitions of “logistics,” “the five operational domains,” and “contested logistics” to establish a common understanding:
Definition: Logistics
NATO’s definition of the term “logistics” is particularly useful given the general nature of this piece. Current NATO operational logistic doctrine is contained in the capstone document “Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics” (AJP-4) Edition B, Version 1 (Dec 2018). According to AJP 4, logistics is defined as:
the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations which deal with
- design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel
- transport of personnel
- acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities
- acquisition or furnishing of services
- medical and health service support.[4]
The use of the NATO definition in this piece has been deliberate to differentiate from the non-military context of “logistics,” where the term is frequently employed as a narrow synonym for transport and warehousing functions, particularly in the commercial supply chain sector.[5] [6]
Definition: The Five Operational Domains
Current U.S. and NATO military doctrine identifies five principal operational domains:[7] [8] [9] land, maritime, air, cyber and space. Logistics is “multidomain” when it is conducted across all of these operational domains. An understanding of how logistics can be contested throughout the operational domains — particularly in the newer domains of cyber and space — is critical given their potential effects on military operations. Logistics are essential to the prosecution of army operations, so adversaries might try to target logistics in any of the five domains to disrupt these operations.
Definition: Multidomain Contested Logistics
The term “contested logistics” has appeared increasingly in Western military commentary[10] but remains largely undefined. A convenient way to conceptualise contested logistics is to contrast it with the “uncontested” logistics that resulted from low-intensity counterinsurgency and peace support operations undertaken by Western militaries during the past two decades (e.g. the NATO mission in Afghanistan). Western military operations in this period were largely carried out against asymmetric non-peer adversaries who lacked the capability to effectively target soft targets such as logistic facilities and logistic transport, the majority of which were unarmoured and unarmed. Logistics to support the multinational force in Afghanistan was, therefore, “uncontested;” this does not mean it was completely uncontested, but rather that it remained free of significant disruptions throughout.[11]
The definition of contested logistics, therefore, has more to do with the adversary and their weaponry. The availability of munitions, missiles, and weaponised uncrewed combat aerial systems (UCAS) allows an adversary to contest land domain logistics at distance from any combat zone.[12] Contested logistics usually occurs in near-peer conflict and potential state-on-state war.[13] The resultant effect of these weapons on logistics has been significant. Multidomain contested logistics” occurs when logistics is contested across the five operational domains. The next section will describe the geography of the IAP and highlight the logistics important in the region.
The Geography of the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region and its Effect on Logistics
The IAP region extends for thousands of kilometres, from the east coast of Africa, over the Indian Ocean, extending through Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea, the coastlines of China, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula, then ending on the west coast of the Americas across the Western Pacific ocean. The IAP region is characterised by large maritime distances with comparatively few terrestrial areas on which to locate logistic assets.[14]
Source: Wikipedia Commons, downloaded 30 July 2025.
The Southeast and East Asian areas are the location of the first and second island chains. Both are notional concentric rings that transect key land masses forming “chains” separated by ocean.[15] Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan, or continental Europe, the IAP region lacks land corridors by which to conduct logistics and sustainment support, so the only option for the large-scale movement of logistic items is by sea.[16] A U.S. Brigade Combat Team requires between 500-600 tons of supplies per day in intense combat, substantial quantities which would require maritime replenishment. The discussion will now describe how contested logistics in each operational domain could be exerted by China in a hypothetical IAP regional major conflict with the U.S.
Contested Logistics: The Chinese Rocket Force
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF)[17] and the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zone resulting from its arsenal of ballistic and hypersonic missiles is a major instrument of contestation to U.S. logistics in the IAP region in land, maritime, and air operational domains. The number, range, and speed of these weapons places major U.S. logistic hubs, including the major U.S. air base in Guam and land targets as far away as Darwin, Australia, in range of direct targeting. Logistics is directly contested at distances which have hitherto been outside effective ranges. The estimated Chinese missile threat currently consists of between 980-2,110 short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles with ranges of up to 5,500 km.[18] It is the threat from these weapons, launched from both land- and sea-based platforms, that has been the principal factor provoking U.S. military counter-measures in the three operational domains listed previously.
Contested Logistics: Land Domain
Logistics is contested in the land domain principally through direct targeting by offensive fires from stand-off, distant-strike missiles delivered remotely to shorter range unidirectional UAS. China’s latest PLAN Type 076 amphibious carrier, for example, carries a number of weaponised, one-way UAS intended to be launched en masse against land targets.[19] China’s capabilities have led to a significant restructure of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) though Force Design 2030,[20] resulting in the raising of three Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR), deployable forces intended to manoeuvre, conceal and survive across the first island chain and within the Chinese A2/AD zone. The Marine MLRs form part of a detachment called Stand In Forces (SIF), which are intended to operate within the first island chain..[21] Similar to the MLRs, the U.S. Army has raised new units called Multi Domain Task Forces (MDTF), which are intended to function close to, or within, the first island chain.[22] As at the time of writing, three U.S. Army MDTFs have been raised, two based in the continental U.S. and one based in Germany.
Contested Logistics: Maritime Domain
China’s A2/AD zone also affects U.S. Navy logistics in the maritime domain of a potential IAP region conflict. The USN has followed a strategy of dispersal, seeking to make task groups less concentrated and less vulnerable to targeting. Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is the U.S. Navy’s warfighting concept for projecting power and winning fleet battles against adversaries such as China with advanced anti-ship missile capabilities.[23] DMO aims to disperse naval units across larger areas, reducing the risk of accumulations of large targets, such as a Carrier Strike Group, and increasing resilience. DMO is intended to facilitate the movement of U.S. naval forces into the Chinese A2/AD zone. The logistics required to support DMO are centred around nodes known as Expeditionary Sea Bases, which are afloat sustainment vessels based on converted Alaska-class oil tankers.[24] U.S. maritime logistics in the IAP region can potentially be contested by up to three non-PLAN Chinese forces, all of which are not readily identifiable as potential combatants. These forces have been optimised to carry out operations considered below what would be “warlike” or overtly offensive adversary operations, and, hence, unlikely to trigger major state-on-state conflict.[25] [26] These forces include up to 2,000 Chinese distant water fishing (DWF) vessels [27] and Peoples’ Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).[28] The China Coast Guard, unlike its U.S. counterpart, is also included amongst the military tools that China can apply to contest U.S. maritime logistics in the IAP region.
In terms of contested maritime logistics, China has a number of options, none of which involve direct military action, but which consist of operations considered below what would be “warlike” or overtly offensive adversary operations. These extend to the potential blockage or interdiction of U.S. ports by third parties acting for China. The 26 March 2024 ship collision incident at the Francis Scott Key bridge in Baltimore illustrates how easily certain maritime chokepoints in key U.S. ports could be targeted by actors with hostile intent.[29] It is also conceivable that containerised missile launch platforms could be deployed from vessels flagged as non-combatant container ships and lacking any features identifying them as potential combatants. Given the current volume and number of Chinese-owned container ships, it would be difficult to identify the relatively few vessels that could deploy vertical launch systems fromshipping containers.[30] [31]
Contested Logistics: Air Domain
The lack of U.S. air force bases in the IAP region means there are relatively few targets for logistics. Andersen Airforce Base on the island of Guam is currently the sole USAF logistic node in the Western Pacific located on U.S. sovereign territory.[32] Territory designated as “sovereign” in nature is a defined area over which a state possesses supreme authority without interference from other nations.[33] This status allows the U.S. to use such bases as they deem fit. This does not apply to bases that the U.S. currently enjoys access to outside sovereign U.S. territory: Okinawa, Japan and Tindal, Australia, for example. The USAF employs the operational doctrine of Agile Combat Employment (ACE), which seeks to make the air force more resilient through dispersal and the reduction of potential air targets, similar to the USN’s DMO. In ACE dispersed elements are networked and connected through communications and command systems, as the doctrine aims to achieve the right mix of force preservation, resilience, and mission capability to balance force integrity with mission integrity.[34]
The Chinese could target key logistic enablers such as flying tankers from the USAF, USAF Reserve and US Air National Guard[35] with longer range air-to-air missiles such as the Chinese PL17, which has been reported to have a range of 400 km.[36]
Contested Logistics: Cyber Domain
Offensive cyber action is a potent tool for contesting logistics. A relatively recent example has been the 2017 Maersk cyber incident. Thought to be a collateral result of cyber action between Russia and Ukraine, the “notpetya” ransomware infiltrated the computer systems of one of the world’s largest shipping lines and destroyed its server network. Only a single server that had been temporarily offline in Lagos, Nigeria protected Maersk’s data.[37] Chinese cyber operations are multifaceted, encompassing state-sponsored espionage, disinformation campaigns, and infrastructure infiltration to advance various objectives, such as technological dominance and reducing foreign influence.[38] These activities are carried out by a complex network of state and private institutions. The U.S. military’s networks are well-protected, but the Chinese could contest U.S. logistics through commercial shipping networks, whose logistics are contracted to the U.S. Department of Defense. Commercial providers employ insecure networks, so their vulnerability to cyber interdiction represents potential logistic contestation in a future, hypothetical IAP-region great power conflict.
Contested Logistics: Space Domain
The space domain is critical for effective logistics. Satellites in various orbits, such as the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), provide critical Position-Navigation-Timing (PNT) functions that are essential in coordinating diverse logistic functions. These range from managing lubrication schedules on machinery to maintaining the temperature of refrigerated fresh-food containers. The range of functions mediated and enabled by GPS is wide and the potential effects of disruptions on logistics are apparent. Contested logistics in the space operational domain can also occur when satellite operations are disrupted. This can be done via direct Ascent Satellite attacks (ASATs), exemplified by the successful 2017 ASAT conducted by China in 2007.[39] Other methods include destroying the internal circuitry of satellites or altering the course of satellites with mechanical arms, potentially disrupting their orbit and literally throwing them into a terminal pattern. These latter methods avoid creating excess space debris, which could lead to a catastrophic chain reaction that would shut down a section of space to all space traffic for generations.[40]
Conclusion
This piece has outlined how a peer adversary could exert effects across the five operational domains to disrupt logistical continuity and undermine operational effectiveness. A future hypothetical peer-to-peer conflict in the IAP region between the U.S. and China has been used to illustrate these ideas as well as provide examples of how each service in the U.S. military is currently addressing multidomain contested logistics. It should be apparent that logistics is much more than mere sustainment. In a challenging theatre of operations where operations are challenged by distance, time, and adversary action, systems and personnel become even more sensitive to logistic shortfalls in terms of supplies, sustainment, and the availability of critical logistic functions such as maintenance, repair, and overhaul. In this situation, resilient, robust operational logistics is itself the ultimate strategic deterrent.
[1] This is the standard United Kingdom acronym for the Indo-Pacific area as used currently at the UK Defence Academy, Shrivenham.
[2] For examples from the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict, see: Ronald Ti and Christopher Kinsey, “Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict : The Primacy of Logistics over Strategy,” Defence Studies 23, no. 3 (2023): 381–98, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2023.2238613.
[3] For a graphical explanation, see: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/5/5/the-institutional-level-of-war accessed 15 March 2022.
[4] NATO doctrine, Allied Joint Publication “AJP- 4 Logistics” (2018).
[5] For examples of current commercial sector use of the word ‘logistics’ see: Mark Anthony Vita et al., “ ‘Repurpose Your Supply Chain,’ ” 2020, at: https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-121/Accenture-COVID-19-Repurpose-Supply-Chain.pdf This is a document produced by Accenture, a global business with interests in transport logistics. The concepts of logistics as being centred on transport, warehousing, and stockkeeping are heavily emphasised in this document, which is a typical example of the use of the term ‘logistics’ in current supply chain business literature.
Also see: Accenture, “COVID-19: Maintaining Supply Chain Resilience in Times of Uncertainty,” 2020, at: https://www.accenture.com/pt-pt/about/company/coronavirus-supply-chain-impact
This document originating from a commercial ‘logistics’ business demonstrates the business sector’s much narrower concept of logistics when compared to AJP 4’s definition of military logistics.
[6] An important update here are about recent changes in higher NATO logistic policy initiated in early 2023 but which have not yet been promulgated in the form of updated logistic doctrine. The reference is: “Logistic Committee Working Paper AC/305-WP(2023)0002 (INV), MC 319-4: “NATO policies and principles for logistics” dated10 February 2023. At the time of writing, NATO logistic doctrine is in a state of flux with substantial changes made at the higher logistic policy level in February 2023. These changes have not yet been executed at the operational level, and in particular the relevant (now outdated) Allied Joint Doctrine document remains the principal reference in this chapter. The doctrine described here remains extant at the NATO operational level for now, but will be revised sometime in the next 1-3 years.
[7] NATO=the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
[8] HQ US Army, “Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations,” 2022, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36290-FM_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf See pp 1-16 to 1-21 for a summary of the five domains.
[9] https://www.act.nato.int/article/mdo-in-nato-explained/
[10] For example, see Ronald Ti, “The Contested Logistic Triangle” from https://mwi.westpoint.edu/sustaining-an-indo-pacific-fight-the-contested-logistics-triad/ dated 4 June 2025.
[11] Dave Clemente and Ryan Evans, “Wartime Logistics in Afghanistan and Beyond Wartime Logistics in Afghanistan and Beyond,” Chatham House, no. January (2014), see: http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/196913
[12] Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia‘s Invasion of Ukraine : February – July 2022,” RUSI Special Report, no. 30 November (2022): 69.
[13] See: Watling and Kaushal, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/democratisation-precision-strike-nagorno-karabakh-conflict
[14] See: US Army Logistics https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA404441.pdf
[15] See: https://www.andrewerickson.com/2016/02/why-islands-still-matter-in-asia-the-
enduring-significance-of-the-pacific-island-chains/
[16] As opposed to air movement which is limited in the absolute amount that can be moved.
[17] See: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/China-Reader-Special-Edition-September-2021/Mihal-PLA-Rocket-Force/
[18] For details, see: https://missilethreat.csis.org
[19] From April 2025, see: https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/chinas-type-076-amphibious-carrier-what-it-does-and-why-it-matters/
[20] See: https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/marine-force-design-is-four-decades-in-the-making/
[21] ‘Stand in Forces’ are a functional grouping of units that include the MLR’s but also U.S. Naval elements and Special Forces from all services. See:https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCU-Journal/JAMS-vol-15-no-2/Bringing-Clarity-to-Stand-in-Forces/
[22] https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11797
[23] For a summary (April 2025) ,see: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12599
[24] See: https://warontherocks.com/2023/04/sustaining-distributed-forces-in-a-conflict-with-china/
[25] One example of these “sub-threshold” operations would be internet cable-cutting incidents occurring worldwide that were causally linked to Chinese non-military vessels, but which could not be clearly identified as hostile action by China. One such incident occurred in the Baltic Sea in late 2024, see: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/baltic-subsea-sabotage-were-letting-russia-and-china-undertake-target-practice/
[26] For a regional Indo-Pacific discussion focussed on operational logistics, see: https://logisticsinwar.com/2019/09/11/planting-the-right-trees-logistics-and-its-role-in-the-phase-zero-campaign/
[27] See: https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/9df19f53-b931-4d04-
acd3-58a71c6b1a5b/content/sofia/2022/fishing-fleet.html#:~:text=
At%20an%20estimated%20564%20000,sector%20(FAO%2C%202022a)
[28] See: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/backgrounder-the-peoples-armed-forces-maritime-militia-pafmm/
[29] See: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68664664
[30] See: https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/04/japan-could-licence-produce-mk70-containerized-missile-launcher
[31] Operation Spiderweb, launched by Ukraine against Russian air bases on 3 June 2025 is an example from the Russo-Ukrainian war of such an action, see: https://thebulletin.org/2025/06/ukrainian-attack-on-russian-bombers-shows-how-cheap-drones-could-upset-global-security/
[32] https://www.andersen.af.mil/
[33] See: https://library.fiveable.me/key-terms/ap-hug/territorial-sovereignty
[34] For a primer on ACE, see links: https://www.dvidshub.net/video/872198/ace-concepts and https://www.dvidshub.net/video/868719/visualizing-agile-combat-employment
[35] The 2025 fleet of approximately 480 flying tankers is currently managed by these three bodies.
[36] See: USAF China Aerospace Studies Institute on PL 17 missile at: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/
[37] See: https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-maersk-cyberattack-20170817-story.html
[38] From the US Cyber defence agency. For an account of current threats, see: https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/nation-state-cyber-actors/china
[39] See: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-03/chinese-satellite-destruction-stirs-debate
[40] This is known as ‘Kessler’s’ syndrome’, see: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/space-technologies/articles/10.3389/frspt.2023.1309940/full
