The designation of Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations(FTOs) in early 2025 represents a watershed moment in U.S.-Mexico security relations. Although it resembles conventional counterterrorism policy, it is better understood as coercive diplomacy—the strategic use of U.S. domestic terrorism law to pressure an allied nation toward institutional reform. The early results are significant: the recent capture and killing of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known as “El Mencho,” leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and one of the most powerful criminal figures in the Western hemisphere. This success, alongside the extradition of 92 cartel operatives over the past year—including an FBI Ten Most Wanted fugitive—points to real momentum, yet it also obscures a deeper risk. This approach can continue to yield results only so long as it operates below the threshold of overt U.S. military escalation. Cross that line, and the bilateral cooperation that enabled El Mencho’s elimination could rapidly unravel—potentially transforming these criminal organizations from profit-driven enterprises into groups animated by broader political grievances and anti-American nationalism.
Two Decades of Institutional Infiltration
The FTO designation reflects two decades of American frustration with Mexico's institutional corruption problem. While cartel infiltration at the local level has long been documented, its capture of the apex of political power proved persistent across administrations of different ideological orientations.
During the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) administration (2000-2012), intense bilateral cooperation culminated in the U.S.-backed war on drugs, with Genaro García Luna serving as the vetted architect of Mexico's security strategy. His 2023 conviction for accepting Sinaloa Cartel bribes exemplified the core dilemma—even trusted and vetted officials proved vulnerable to corruption.
The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)'s return (2012-2018) promised change, yet cooperation declined. The 2020 arrest in Los Angeles of Mexico's former defense minister—a PRI-era official—initially appeared to mark a turning point, exposing deeper institutional vulnerabilities that reached the highest levels of government. Yet the case unraveled in revealing fashion: the FBI ultimately dropped charges, the minister was transferred to Mexico where López Obrador’s own Morena government—politically opposed to the PRI—exonerated him after he accused the DEA of fabricating the evidence. That a left-wing anti-corruption administration would shield an official from a rival party suggested that the imperative to contain U.S. prosecutorial reach transcended ideological difference. Morena's rise under López Obrador (2018-2024), built on anti-corruption rhetoric, nonetheless failed to prevent institutional compromise, further straining bilateral cooperation. This sequence—from high-profile U.S. arrest to quiet Mexican exoneration—demonstrated how cartel influence transcends party lines and presidential terms. For U.S. policymakers, the conclusion was clear: systemic cartel embeddedness lay beyond the reach of traditional diplomacy.
Trump's response was to escalate legally rather than militarily, transforming U.S. counterterrorism statutes into instruments of bilateral pressure. This represents an evolution in coercive diplomacy—leveraging domestic legal authorities (FTO designations, Treasury sanctions, visa revocations, expanded prosecutorial reach) to achieve foreign policy objectives without military intervention. Because these measures operate through U.S. legal processes, Mexico cannot challenge them internationally, yet they create costs for non-cooperation that incentivize reform.
Early Returns on Legal Pressure
Initial results suggest this approach yields tangible benefits. Treasury sanctions targeting former President López Obrador's inner circle created immediate compliance costs. Visa revocations reportedly affected approximately 50 politicians, primarily from Morena, creating personal consequences for political elites. Expanded prosecutorial authority enabled more aggressive cross-border action.
Most significantly, renewed intelligence cooperation produced concrete outcomes: the arrest of Ryan Wedding (on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted), the transfer of 90 high-value criminals to the United States, and the destruction of 1,887 narcolabs under President Sheinbaum—86% of her predecessor's six-year total achieved in just 15 months. Illegal border crossings reportedly fell to 50-year lows, with fewer than 9,000 per month during Trump's first eight months.
These developments demonstrate that coercive pressure through domestic legal channels can generate substantive cooperation while allowing Mexico to frame actions as sovereign decisions rather than capitulation. The killing of El Mencho is currently the clearest expression of this dynamic. What began as a tactical victory enabled by U.S.-Mexican intelligence cooperation now carries strategic potential: if Mexico sustains the dismantling of the protection networks that shielded Oseguera Cervantes—and prevents their reconstitution under new leadership—this moment could mark the beginning of genuine structural disruption to the criminal governance networks that have long embedded themselves within the Mexican state.
The Critical Threshold
Yet the strategy depends on maintaining a "scalpel versus hammer" approach. The FTO designation functions as a precision instrument—operating through legitimate legal channels rather than military force. This allows President Sheinbaum to claim voluntary cooperation, preserves the legitimacy of García Harfuch—her security minister who has overseen a more confrontational stance against criminal organizations and earned U.S. trust—and prevents opposition parties from weaponizing sovereignty violations.
The equilibrium is fragile. If the United States crosses into unilateral military operations on Mexican soil, the entire structure would collapse. Political backlash would be swift, cooperation would halt, and current dynamics would unravel. Trump's January 2026 remarks about "hitting land, with regard to the cartels" illustrate precisely the rhetoric that risks triggering this collapse. For now, Washington appears to recognize this boundary: Trump has publicly praised President Sheinbaum and has not followed through on threatened tariffs or military strikes against cartels, suggesting that Mexico’s security concessions are currently viewed as sufficient to justify restraint. That calculus, however, remains subject to change.
The Transformation Trap
Most dangerously, military escalation risks transforming the adversary's nature—and here lies the central paradox. The FTO designation is effective precisely because Mexican cartels do not fit the classical model of terrorism: they lack a coherent ideological project and do not seek political transformation. Their violence is instrumental and commercial, designed to protect revenue streams and territorial control rather than advance doctrine—cartels engage in politics to secure operational space, not to advance ideology. In this sense, the designation functions as a strategic legal reframing—an instrumental application of counterterrorism authorities against actors whose objectives remain fundamentally economic. Military escalation, however, risks collapsing that distinction. If U.S. action undermines Mexican institutional legitimacy or triggers nationalist backlash, cartels such as Sinaloa and Cartel Jalisco New Generation could be incentivized to move beyond transactional politics and adopt broader political positioning as a survival strategy. In a high-end contingency scenario, sustained external pressure could encourage greater coordination among major FTO-designated cartels.
Escalation could incentivize cartels toward nationalist rhetoric, anti-American narratives, and genuine political ambitions as survival strategies. This could begin with support for anti-interventionist parties and escalate toward insurgent tactics if Sheinbaum appears bypassed or weakened. What began as useful legal classification could become dangerous reality—transforming profit-driven criminals into ideologically motivated adversaries with popular resonance. Put simply, military intervention risks creating the very enemy it seeks to defeat.
Lessons for Global Policy
For policymakers globally, the Mexican case demonstrates how domestic legal frameworks can augment bilateral cooperation without military force. The FTO designation represents enhanced legal leverage—adding terrorism statutes, financial sanctions, and expanded prosecutorial authority to long-standing law enforcement cooperation. Outcomes such as 1,887 destroyed narcolabs, 90 transferred criminals, and the killing of a major cartel leader suggest that well-calibrated legal pressure can achieve results that traditional cooperation alone could not.
The central lesson is one of threshold management. This strategy succeeds by building upon existing partnerships while creating new incentives—operating between traditional law enforcement cooperation and counterproductive military escalation. However, the Mexican experience reveals critical thresholds: cross into unilateral military action, and profitable criminals may transform into ideologically motivated adversaries.
Sustainability depends on recognizing that effectiveness lies not in escalation, but in strengthening cooperation while preserving partner legitimacy. For states confronting transnational organized crime, Mexico offers promise and warning—demonstrating that innovative domestic legal tools can enhance bilateral partnerships, but only when applied with careful attention to political dynamics that make cooperation possible.
