Irregular warfare is not a new phenomenon, but the means and the strategic logic behind it have changed considerably over time. Both states and non-state actors increasingly combine measures such as cyber and information operations, coercive economics, proxy forces, and deniable maritime activity to achieve strategic effect, without crossing a threshold that would trigger a conventional military response.
The appeal of this approach has grown in recent years as technology advances rapidly and direct military confrontation becomes more costly and dangerous, giving states a way to pressure adversaries and advance their interests while limiting the risk of open war.
For policymakers in the Gulf region, where uncertainty over long-term security and the durability of external security guarantees already strains planning, understanding how adversaries can exploit the grey zone between peace and war is essential.
Irregular Warfare – Exploiting Ambiguity
Its historical roots can be traced to ancient conflicts, where deception and indirect methods were often used alongside conventional military force. During the Cold War, irregular warfare became closely associated with proxy forces, guerrilla warfare, and insurgencies, particularly those linked to communist revolutionary movements. And following the 9/11 attacks, greater attention was given to irregular threats posed by non-state actors, with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency becoming central concerns for governments and armed forces.
What distinguishes many irregular threats from conventional forms of state aggression is their ability to exploit ambiguity. Instead of relying on clearly identifiable military forces operating across recognised borders, states and non-state actors can combine overt and covert activities, military and non-military tools, and state and civilian resources - pursuing strategic objectives while making attribution difficult and reducing the likelihood of conventional military retaliation.
These methods are increasingly visible in the maritime domain, where states make use of commercial vessels, shadow fleets, flags of convenience, and gaps in maritime monitoring to conceal activities or circumvent sanctions. The December 2024 Eagle S incident in the Baltic Sea demonstrates the challenges this creates for governments. The vessel was suspected of damaging the Estlink 2 electricity cable and several telecommunications cables after dragging its anchor across the seabed.
Regardless of the wider questions surrounding responsibility and intent, the incident illustrates why events involving civilian infrastructure are so hard to attribute or classify as an accident, criminal activity, or deliberate state-linked disruption.
These conditions of ambiguity are reinforced by three converging trends: the actors involved are blending together, the technology required is becoming cheaper, and the legal frameworks meant to assign responsibility are struggling to keep pace. Together, they lower the cost of hostile action while raising the cost of attributing and countering it.
Blurring the boundaries
Irregular threats also increasingly blur the boundaries between organised crime, violent extremism, and state competition. Criminal activities involving natural resources, smuggling networks, and illicit trade can provide armed and extremist groups with sources of revenue and access to established networks.
At the same time, states can employ non-military measures including the manipulation of migration flows, interference with navigation systems, cyber activities, and disinformation to place pressure on other governments and societies. Individually, these activities may fall below the threshold that would normally justify a conventional security response. When used together, however, they can disrupt critical infrastructure, deepen political and social divisions, weaken confidence in public institutions, and gradually increase pressure on the targeted state.
For policymakers and security professionals, the central challenge is therefore not simply identifying individual hostile acts but recognising when seemingly separate activities form part of a broader effort to achieve strategic objectives without resorting to conventional warfare.
Cheap Technology, Disproportionate Effect
Technological change has made relatively sophisticated military capabilities more accessible and affordable. Commercial drones, cyber capabilities, sea mines, and small unmanned or crewed vessels can enable states and non-state actors to impose costs that are disproportionate to the resources required to employ them.
This is particularly important in strategically sensitive areas such as the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran has developed a range of comparatively low-cost capabilities including mines, drones, missiles, and small naval craft that could threaten commercial shipping and disrupt global energy flows. Such capabilities demonstrate that states do not necessarily require large and expensive conventional forces to create significant strategic and economic pressure.
Exploiting Legal Grey Zones
Even where actors and capabilities are identifiable, legal frameworks often are not built to assign responsibility quickly. Irregular actors can exploit gaps between national and international legal frameworks. Maritime security provides a useful example. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), vessels operating on the high seas generally fall under the jurisdiction of their flag state, subject to important exceptions.
The widespread use of open registries, complex ownership structures, and commercial intermediaries can therefore make it difficult for governments to establish responsibility and respond quickly to suspicious activities. This creates opportunities for states and their proxies to operate through civilian and commercial networks while making attribution and enforcement more difficult.
Conclusion
Finally, changes in the regional security environment are encouraging states to reconsider how they manage threats that fall below the threshold of conventional warfare.
In regions such as the Arabian Gulf, uncertainty surrounding the long-term nature of external security commitments, combined with persistent threats to maritime trade, critical infrastructure, and national security, has increased the importance of developing stronger domestic and regional capabilities.
For policymakers, this means that irregular warfare should not be understood simply as an alternative form of military conflict. It is increasingly part of a broader approach to statecraft in which political influence, economic pressure, technology, intelligence, information, proxies, and limited military capabilities can be combined to achieve strategic objectives without resorting to full-scale war.
