During the 2010s, aging combat air fleets, higher oil prices, and changing security needs drove Gulf nations to procure new combat aircraft and expand existing inventories. Iran’s nuclear weapons programme led to heightened regional tensions and pushed governments to seek a conventional deterrence capability. Although the United States remained the region’s primary security guarantor, Gulf states still needed sovereign capability for when American interests did not fully align with their own.
The resulting rapid increase in combat aircraft drew questions from some commentators about sustainability, particularly around recruiting and training pilots. The high cost of acquiring new aircraft, with their associated weapons systems, and operations and maintenance meant that large, mixed fleets of aircraft could eventually become burdensome to operate.
Even before the 2026 war in Iran, some Gulf nations had begun cutting their fleets – notably Türkiye’s acquisition of second-hand Eurofighter Typhoons from Qatar and Oman, and the UAE’s sale of Dassault Mirage 2000s to Morocco. Despite a decade of expansion, a period of contraction may now be imminent as operators move to cut costs by reducing mixed fleets.
The key question for decision-makers raised by the 2026 war is whether expensive, exquisite platforms remain worth the investment when cheaper, attritable systems have proven able to blunt or overwhelm them.
Gulf airpower expansion, 2010-2021
Between 2010 and 2021, Gulf nations acquired a wave of new combat aircraft, with European and US manufacturers benefiting from the region’s renewed interest in military aviation.
Qatar was the largest procurer during this period, with the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF) signing agreements for 36 Boeing F-15QA Eagle II, 36 Dassault Rafale, and 24 Eurofighter Typhoon. This expansion and modernisation was intended to replace the QEAF’s Mirage 2000 fleet, first acquired in the mid-1990s, while also serving as a deterrent against regional competitors with newer combat aircraft.
Kuwait upgraded its early-1990s Boeing F/A-18C and D Hornets to the new Boeing F/A-18E Super Hornet in 2016, in a contract valued at USD1.5 billion. This was alongside a EUR8 billion (USD8.5 billion) acquisition of 28 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft that same year. Kuwait further sought to offset the Super Hornet’s cost by selling on its legacy Hornet fleet, but a proposed sale to Malaysia fell through in 2026.
The Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO) also modernised its combat air capabilities over the decade. After extensive negotiations and evaluations, the RAFO selected the Eurofighter Typhoon to replace its 1970s/80s-era SEPECAT Jaguars and to augment its fleet of Lockheed Martin F-16C/D aircraft acquired in 2005, with further aircraft added in 2011.
Türkiye’s Eurofighter Typhoon procurement
In October 2025, Türkiye announced it would acquire 20 new-build Eurofighter Typhoons for USD10.7 billion, alongside 24 used aircraft from Oman and Qatar. The acquisition addressed an emerging capability gap as older platforms such as the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II (first delivered in 1974) and the Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (first delivered in 1987) began to age out of service.
For Türkiye, the Typhoon will support fleet modernisation and interoperability with its NATO allies, after its path to fifth-generation combat aircraft was hampered by its suspension from the F-35 Lightning II program in 2020, an incident that prompted the development of the locally produced TAI KAAN. Türkiye’s need for the rapid expansion of exquisite capability – with the first newbuild Typhoons due in 2030 – gave Gulf Typhoon operators an opening to divest and consolidate their fleets.
The maintenance burden
For Qatar and Oman, disposing of their Typhoon fleets would help cut operating costs. Qatar’s multiple combat aircraft types, sourced from different suppliers and countries, mean little commonality in the component pool and a correspondingly heavy maintenance burden.
Similarly, Oman’s Typhoons – which lack some of the newer features of the comparable Qatari platforms – have proven especially costly for the RAFO. BAE Systems annual reports show a successful reduced-scope support solution for the 2020-22 period, indicating a desire to cut costs. However, the company’s 2023 annual report noted that the RAFO had “elected not to renew the current support arrangements for its Typhoon fleet. Discussions around our role in providing a level of support to the Royal Air Force of Oman continue.” As such, maintenance is likely being drawn down to essential work, with flying hours reduced accordingly.
The war in the Middle East has further delayed the transfer of the UAE’s Mirage 2000s to Morocco, as Emirati authorities opt to retain their full operational fleet until Rafale F4 deliveries are complete. Meanwhile, reports suggest Qatar’s more capable Typhoons – equipped with AESA radar and a data-link architecture suited to modern beyond-visual-range engagement – have made it the stronger candidate for Türkiye’s remaining requirement, leaving Oman’s older-standard aircraft, which would need costly upgrades to match, at a disadvantage. Once the current conflict subsides, these transfers will return to the agenda as operational concepts around domestic defence evolve.
New concepts around cost and defence
Maintenance and consolidation pressures were already pushing Gulf air forces toward leaner fleets before the war, but recent conflicts, in the Middle East and beyond, have turned the question from one of cost into one of relevance.
Switching volume for more exquisite capability has exposed some gaps in national defence that are hard to cover, particularly as exquisite offensive and defensive systems have been overwhelmed by low-cost, attritable ones. This raises some doubts about the need to field equally expensive platforms.
For the Gulf states, this may mean shifting from combat aircraft and expensive ground-based air defence towards low-cost interceptors, one-way attack munitions, and cruise missiles, reducing the need for advanced air platforms. With Iranian combat air capability reportedly greatly diminished over the past eight months, a corresponding shift toward air defence against missile and unmanned systems would allow governments to achieve defence-in-depth at a lower cost.
