Conceived as the centerpiece of Iran’s push toward a more capable and outward-looking naval force, the Soleimani-class catamaran corvettes embodied the ambitions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) to blend asymmetric warfare with limited blue-water projection. Yet, within days of high-intensity conflict, the class was effectively neutralized, exposing the structural and strategic limits of this approach.
Rise
In September 2022, the IRGC-N inaugurated the Shahid Soleimani, the lead ship of this new class of missile catamaran corvettes. With the Busher-based Shahid Mahallati Shipyard serving as the prime contractor, the vessels were constructed at multiple shipyards across Iran. Built from the keel up, the class underwent an expedited delivery schedule, with the Shahid Sayyad Shirazi and Hassan Bagheri commissioned in 2024, followed by the launch of the Shahid Rais-Ali Delvari in 2025.
The catamaran is a 65-meter, aluminum twin-hull design, with a displacement of 600 tons. The two-hull structure provides enhanced stability at high speeds and in rough seas, expanded deck space for weapon systems and aviation facilities, and superior performance in littoral waters due to its shallow draft.
Compared to conventional corvettes, which typically span 80 to100 meters and displace 1,500 - 2,500 tons, the Soleimani-class is markedly smaller and lighter, placing it closer in size and capability to a large fast-attack craft. Propulsion is provided by four diesel engines, delivering a top speed of 32 knots and a reported operational range of 5,000 nautical miles (9,300 km). The ship’s angular superstructure and sharp cross-sectional lines are intended to reduce its radar signature.
Despite its compact dimensions, the Soleimani-class carries a substantial armament suite. Notably, it is the first vessel in the Iranian fleet to incorporate vertical launch systems (VLS) for air-defense missiles on its superstructure. The configuration includes a double three-cell VLS battery and four single-cell VLS, likely housing navalized variants of the Sayyad missiles with a claimed range of up to 150 km.
For surface warfare, the ship is equipped with multiple box launchers for anti-ship missiles, including the short-range, Nasr (35 km) and long-range, Ghader (200-300 km) munitions. Close-in defense, instead, is provided by a forward-mounted 30 mm gun and four 20 mm guns distributed across the vessel. The Soleimani-class also features a small helicopter landing platform capable of accommodating light naval helicopters, such as the Bell 206 in service with the IRGC-N, as well as combat drones, chiefly the Shahed and Mohajer families.
The exact crew size of the Soleimani-class catamaran corvette is not officially disclosed. However, given the vessel’s compact platform and relatively sophisticated weapon systems, a credible complement is likely between 20 and 30 personnel. This relatively small crew underscores the ship’s design emphasis on automation and efficiency, allowing a heavily armed platform to operate with minimal manpower.
Purpose
Defined by its armament suite and design, the primary function of the Soleimani-class was to conduct littoral warfare. High speed, significant missile capability, and high maneuverability, combined with a limited crew, made the catamaran corvette an ideal platform for asymmetric naval operations. These include hit-and-run sorties or acting as a command node at sea to coordinate swarm tactics by smaller assets, chiefly fast-attack craft and one-way attack drones, while also providing intelligence support for more covert missions.
However, given its extended operational range, the Soleimani-class was also intended to project the IRGCN’s reach far beyond its traditional area of operations, typically confined to the coastal waters of the Gulf and its approaches. With an estimated range of 5,000 nautical miles, the catamaran corvette would have been capable of sustained deployments across the broader Indian Ocean basin, effectively turning it into a versatile platform for small flotilla operations and limited expeditionary missions.
In mid-February 2026, during the “Smart Control” exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, the IRGCN test-fired a navalized variant of the Sayyad-3F surface-to-air missile from the Shahid Sayyad Shirazi. The missile reportedly reaches speeds of up to Mach 7, with an engagement range of approximately 150 kilometers, making it a suitable system for high-altitude interceptions.
The integration of this Sayyad-3 variant on the Soleimani-class was intended to achieve a twofold tactical goal: to reduce the IRGCN’s dependence on shore-based air defense systems and to increase deterrence through improved area-denial capabilities. The test-fire aligns with a long-track record of Iranian efforts to equip its modern naval platforms with cutting-edge air defense solutions.
Demise
Within the first days of Operation Epic Fury, the U.S. air-delivered strikes severely targeted Iranian naval forces, sinking and incapacitating most of the country’s blue-water vessels. On March 3, the lead ship of the class, the Soleimani, was sunk. A day later, the Sayyad Shirazi was also heavily damaged, with images showing the ship ablaze at sea.
Localized flames were visible in the aft compartments, accompanied by dense black smoke, typical of hydrocarbon-rich and plastic-fed fires, suggesting damage to the engine room or machinery spaces. On 11 March 2026, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Admiral Charles B. Cooper confirmed that all four ships of the Shahed Soleimani class had been taken out of the fight during Operation Epic Fury.
Given its anti-aircraft armament package, the Soleimani class was not expected to be significantly more vulnerable to strikes than other Iranian surface combatants. Yet its lightweight construction makes it particularly vulnerable once struck by a direct hit. The aluminum hull offers less protection than steel and exhibits reduced resistance to elevated temperatures, making it more susceptible to rapid heat-induced structural weakening during onboard fires.
Even where some catamarans might have preserved buoyancy, sustained fires have most likely caused severe deformation of the structure and internal compartments, rendering the vessel inoperable. Any potential return to service would require extensive, resource-intensive repairs at specialized shipyards, an outcome made unlikely given the scale of the damage to Iranian naval production infrastructure by ongoing waves of U.S. strikes.
Beyond structural considerations, the class also illustrates systemic limitations in defensive survivability. Its air-defense suite, while present on paper, appears to have been insufficient against coordinated, multi-vectoral strike profiles, particularly those involving low-altitude or sea-skimming threats that compress detection and reaction timelines. The integration between sensors, fire-control systems, and interceptors may have been inadequate to provide a robust layered defense, leaving gaps that modern precision-guided munitions can exploit.
Additionally, reliance on a relatively compact platform constrains radar horizon, engagement range, and the number of ready interceptors, increasing the risk of saturation. Taken together, these factors suggest that the Soleimani class, despite its intended role, lacked the resilience and defensive depth required to withstand sustained high-intensity air attack.
Blue-water fleet losses
While predominantly composed of small fast-attack craft, the IRGCN fleet also includes a limited number of larger, blue-water platforms beyond the Soleimani-class, many of which were incapacitated in the opening phase of Operation Epic Fury. Among them was the drone-carrier Shahid Bagheri. Commissioned in 2025, the vessel was a converted container ship featuring a 180-meter angled flight deck with a ski-jump ramp for the operation of combat drones, such as the Mohajer-6 and Ababil-3N.
Additional assets included the replenishment vessels Shahid Roudaki and Shahid Mahdavi, both repurposed civilian cargo ships adapted for multi-role operations. These platforms combined logistics support with limited offensive capabilities, embarking drones, helicopters, and small attack craft, while also integrating missile systems. The Shahid Roudaki, for instance, has been observed fitted with a Khordad-3 air defense system and multiple cruise missile launchers. In 2024, the Shahid Mahdavi test-fired Fateh-class ballistic missiles from containers on its superstructure.
Although their exact status remains unconfirmed, both vessels were likely targeted early in the U.S. strikes. The Shahid Mahdavi had recently returned to Bandar Abbas after participating in BRICS+ naval exercises off South Africa, underscoring the IRGCN’s ambition to project naval power beyond the Gulf. The Shahid Roudaki, also homeported at Bandar Abbas, is likely to have been damaged.
A turning point?
With most larger platforms neutralized early on, U.S. operations have shifted toward systematically targeting the core of the IRGCN’s naval posture: its fleet of fast-attack craft. While several dozen have been destroyed, many are likely concealed within hardened facilities and underground tunnels scattered along the Iranian coast.
The rapid loss of the Soleimani-class catamaran corvettes, along with other blue-water assets, highlights the structural limitations of these platforms in high-intensity conflict, suggesting tactical and strategic miscalculations by the IRGCN.
While the IRGCN’s shipbuilding program showcased the technical ingenuity of Iranian industry and served as a source of prestige, these platforms ultimately proved ill-suited to withstand the pressures of high-intensity conventional warfare. When tested in combat, they lacked the survivability required against a technologically superior adversary. For a country constrained by limited financial resources and persistent sanctions on critical components, investing in vulnerable blue-water assets is a questionable allocation of scarce capabilities.
The rapid neutralization of these vessels may, therefore, prompt a strategic reassessment within the IRGCN, potentially leading to a de-prioritization of deep-water ambitions in favor of more resilient, asymmetric systems better aligned with Iran’s resource constraints and the IRGCN’s operational tactics.
