Turkish defense industrial strategy has been an integral part of its growing visibility and assertiveness in regional and global politics. In the last decade, Türkiye has taken major steps towards the advancement of its indigenous defense industry, achieved a substantial degree of self-sufficiency, and emerged as a major arms exporter, particularly in certain niche systems. As the global and regional security environment is increasingly characterized by direct threats and calls for rearmament, the Turkish defense industry now has the capacity to not only meet its own needs but become a weapons exporter, putting the country at an advantageous diplomatic position vis-à-vis its Western allies and third countries.
The Drivers behind the Development of Türkiye’s Defense Industry
The development of the country’s indigenous defense industry is mainly threat-driven and is closely associated with a reliance on hard power to manage internal and external threats- a defining element of Türkiye’s strategic culture.[1] A heightened sense of external and internal threats resulted in a tendency by Turkish security establishment to maintain a large army and security forces, which provided a justification for a large military procurement budget.[2] In the 1990s, while many of its transatlantic partners went through deindustrialization in defense sector and reduced defense budgets after the Cold War, Türkiye introduced multi-billion dollar military modernization and procurement programs. Occasionally, it had its own peace dividend and toyed with soft power as an instrument of foreign policy, but its commitment to hard power remained. In an effort to meet the requirements of the counter-terrorism operations at home and respond to the challenges emanating from regional hotspots, Türkiye procured a wide array of systems in asymmetric and conventional warfare.[3]
Türkiye’s defense industry is also strategic culture-driven, as the country’s quest for strategic autonomy and complicated relationship with the West has had a unique impact on how procurement and defense industrial policies evolved in recent decades. Türkiye’s relationship with the transatlantic community has historically been beset with contradictions both culturally and politically. Anchoring itself in the Western camp after World War II helped Türkiye secure itself and gain access to the U.S. and NATO military-industrial complex. Access to advanced weapons systems such as the hallmark F16 joint venture in the 1980s played a major role in the transformation of Türkiye’s defense sector.[4] However, it has also bred dependency and scuttled the evolution of authentic domestic arms programs, and the occasional diplomatic and political friction between Türkiye and its traditional Western partners have reminded the country of the costs of such dependence. The Johnson letter of 1964 warning Türkiye against an intervention in Cyprus and the bitter experience of the Western arms embargo in 1974 following the intervention of the Turkish army in Cyprus were important turning-points, incentivizing programs to develop independent capabilities to ensure self-reliance. Further embargoes, both declared and undeclared, and the reluctance of Western allies to export advanced weaponry to Türkiye because of its human rights record and counter-terrorism policies furthered the country’s resolve. This attitude was heightened because the West’s actions came at times when Türkiye needed help the most: in the 1980-1990s, for instance, when the country needed attack helicopters during its fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and in 2015 when Türkiye needed air defense systems to counter Daesh rockets targeting the country’s southern provinces.
As a regional power, Türkiye’s quest for strategic autonomy[5] played a large role in shaping the parameters of the country’s security and defense policies in the post-Cold War era. As Türkiye’s priorities started to diverge from its transatlantic allies, it sought to achieve greater autonomy in terms of arms procurement. While its Western partners were enjoying a peace dividend with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Türkiye continued to view itself an ‘island’ surrounded by sources of instability. The fight against PKK terrorism, the regional instability brought on by civil wars in the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East, and ongoing bilateral disputes with its neighbors led Türkiye to maintain higher levels of defense spending, modernize existing platforms, and procure advanced weapons systems to ensure security both externally and internally. These threats meant that Türkiye needed weapons that could counter both asymmetrical threats posed by non-state actors (e.g., night-surveillance equipment) and inter-state threats (e.g., missile systems, battle tanks). Türkiye’s search for domestic procurement and nationalization was accelerated by the West’s tendency to isolate their NATO partner by denying it certain platforms, limit their use, and refusing to share technology or include it in the joint production of weapons systems. The development of the drone program, attack helicopter program, and main battle tanks were motivated by this dynamic.
The evolution of defense industry was also state policy-driven. To tackle the challenge of dependence on Western arms supplies, the country’s political and military elite prioritized the development of national industry through targeted public procurement or new fund-raising programs, such as the Defense Industry Support Fund, which was established in 1985 to finance arms programs through local funds to be generated by allocations from national budgets, tax revenues, and donations. Other policy instruments included favorable financing, land allocations, tax exemptions, incentives for public-private collaboration, and facilitating access to export markets through diplomatic initiatives.[6] As such, the defense-industrial policy-making has been a major enabler of both the expansion of Türkiye’s military capacity in key land, air, naval, and electronics platforms, as well as the development of research and development, and technological innovation. The work in this field has been streamlined by the Presidency of Defense Industry, the procurement body that was restructured into its current form as part of the transition to a presidential system of government in 2017-8.[7] Through the depth and breadth of its indigenous platforms, Türkiye has made itself visible on the international stage, and moved toward developing new and more ambitious platforms, such as fifth-generation airplanes.[8]
The fourth driver of the country’s indigenous defense industry was its domestic agenda. The Turkish defense industry has had a nationalization policy since the 1970s, when it started its transformation, but the trend accelerated after 2002 with the ascendance of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.[9] 2004 was a major turning point for the industry. First, JDP government canceled multi-billion dollar modernization programs and the procurement of long-awaited helicopter, battle tanks, AWACs, and other major systems that had been delayed since the 1990s because of production, supply, and financing related issues. Then, in May 2004, it agreed to overhaul an entire range of pending defense projects, making technology sharing and local input the blueprint for future tenders.[10] The idea behind this changing priority was to elevate the domestic industry’s technological base by moving beyond joint production under foreign license to the design and production by local companies through collaboration with external partners.[11] This generated further momentum for the growth and cross-fertilization of Turkish companies, eventually paving the way for their rise as players internationally.
The JDP’s support for nationalization cannot be discussed in isolation from its domestic political agenda, whereby bolstering the defense industry was integral to the party’s efforts to transform the political-economical foundations of the country by bolstering the power of its favored business groups.[12] The localization of the defense industry has been subsumed under the government’s political platform ‘yerli ve milli’ (local and national), which made security and defense issues part of domestic politics, particularly with the transition to a presidential system in recent decade.
The transformation of defense industry was also economics- and technology-driven, as the relationship between the defense sector and the country’s overall economic transformation, industrial base, and research and development ecosystem got closer. The 2001 economic crisis undermined multi-billion-dollar projects, and the JDP’s economic platform played a part in their coming to power in the 2002 elections. As part of its domestic transformation plans, JDP governments were keen to bolster economic development through greater investments in technological innovation, and research and development activities. After 2018, as Türkiye transitioned to the current presidential system, the government announced a ‘National Technology Initiative’ with the stated objective to bolster the country’s economic and technological independence by “maximizing the ability to design, develop and produce critical technologies and products with national capabilities.”[13] This policy expanded the scope of an enabling environment for the further development of the defense industry by targeting investments in public-private partnerships and encouraging collaboration between universities, research centers, technoparks, and private enterprises. As a result, the Turkish army ended up procuring several technology-intensive systems such as UAVs and electronic warfare systems from indigenous suppliers, achieving a substantive degree of self-sufficiency.
The sixth driver of growth of defense industrial base was demand. By the 2010s, the first fruits of the cutting-edge domestic weapons programs soon demonstrated their mettle on the combat, both in counter-terrorism operations at home and later in conflicts in Syria, Libya or Azerbaijan, attracting buyers. Ankara’s relatively unrestricted policy on exports made Turkish products a favored option for countries that had problems procuring weapons through other avenues, although Western and non-Western countries were also interested. Türkiye’s quick rise as an arms exporter accelerated the growth of the military industry and increased production. This rise led to economies of scale, which reduced marginal costs.[14] Turkish defense companies also won several contracts for the modernization of aging military systems in various countries, such as Turkish STM winning the tender for the modernization of Pakistan’s Agosta 90B submarines, or Havelsan winning the tender for Romania’s integrated naval electronics surveillance system. In other words, the growth of the military industry and the expansion of export markets mutually reinforced each other; paralleling ‘push’ factors pertaining to the country’s own transformation, the outside demand also served as a major “pull factor.”
Finally, the evolution of Turkish weapons programs were partnership-driven as the diversification of external partnerships emerged as an important enabler of domestic transformation. Targeted strategic collaboration with certain countries facilitated the inflow of investments, technology transfers, licensing, joint-product development and production, and access to new markets. The diversification of international partners was a natural outcome of the country’s quest to break its overreliance on the United States. Increasingly, as Türkiye made technology transfers, joint production, offset arrangements, and export licenses a new priority, American manufacturers became unable to join Turkish modernization and procurement tenders due to U.S. export regulations. This led Ankara to build connections with new partners to reduce dependence on Washington and procure the same platforms on more favorable terms. Eventually, such deals with countries in the West, such as the United Kingdom and Italy, or within the Western military ecosystem, such as Qatar and South Korea, gave Turkish defense industry access to certain critical components whose shortage was hindering the development of major platforms. Particularly, partnerships with Italy on attack helicopters, South Korea on main battle tanks, and Ukraine on jet engines were major steps to break the deadlock in these systems.
In line with its quest for strategic autonomy, Türkiye also pursued a multi-vector policy away from transatlantic alliance commitments.[15]This opened up avenues for partnership with non-Western actors such as Russia and China in military procurement and defense industrial systems. China, for example, played an important role in the development of missile programs, while Ankara procured the S400 air defense systems from Moscow. The country’s ties with Russia and China became a source of further friction between Türkiye and its Western partners, causing its expulsion from the F35 program in 2019 by the Trump administration.
The Nexus between the Defense Industry and Security Policy and the Road ahead
As has been emphasized, defense industry evolved in close relationship with the overall trends in Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period, which has been recently reformulated as the ‘Century of Türkiye.’[16]The search for strategic autonomy and self-sufficiency in military procurement reflected Turkish foreign policy’s overall orientation in recent decades to reduce dependence on its Western alliance and forge new multi-vector partnerships in the surrounding regions and beyond.[17]The expanded hardware of Turkish military and security forces was an important factor that enabled it to defeat PKK terrorism at home and engage proactively in regional hotspots. Ankara’s militarized foreign policy orientation was facilitated in recent years by drones and other forms of electronic warfare during conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan.[18]
Moreover, the transition away from dependence on NATO and the Western arms industry facilitated the forging of new strategic relationships with major powers such as Russia and China, which were further consolidated through joint military programs. A ‘no strings attached’ policy for exporting weapons has helped consolidate Ankara’s own network of alliances; the country provides weapons systems not only to friendly countries such as Azerbaijan and Pakistan but as far afield as Africa, and, recently, Latin America. Through a combination of weapons exports, military training and aid, and defense diplomacy, Ankara complemented its soft power and economic assets in building new partnerships and penetrating into new regions strategically.
Despite major achievements towards localization and the expansion of weapons exports, many experts note that full self-sufficiency is neither realistic nor feasible, considering technical and strategic impediments.[19]Turkish government uses localization as a rhetorical tool to thwart criticism domestically and to justify investments in high-cost programs, but still major progress is needed as regards the modernization of the country’s fighter jet fleet, air defense capabilities, and long-range missile programs.
Despite many achievements since 2004, particularly in drone systems and naval platforms, the main battle tank and attack helicopter programs have encountered many hurdles and delays and only recently they are coming close to be completed. Many of the highly publicized indigenous advanced platforms are still in the design, development, or test phase, or are not thoroughly indigenous due to the persistent reliance on external partnerships for critical components such as engines. The ongoing reliance on external suppliers for critical components forces the country to depend on collaboration with the U.S. and the West’s defense industry.
Attempts to develop national combat aircraft exemplify the country’s conundrum. Turkey has been working on replacing their F16s with a fifth-generation stealth fighter jet since the 2010s. After several transitionary platforms, they launched the KAAN program in 2016. Türkiye’s expulsion from the F35 program in 2019 accelerated its development. The prototype of KAAN is currently undergoing flight tests, and the fleet is expected to be delivered to the Turkish Air Force after 2028. Several countries looking to upgrade their ageing fleets have already expressed interest in KAAN, with Indonesia signing a contract this week to procure 48 aircraft once the platform is fully operational.[20]The time needed until KAAN completes all the tests and reach the mass production phase, however, has raised concerns about how the Turkish Air Force will meet its operational needs, given its aging F16 fleet. This has forced Ankara to find stopgap measures, either by rejoining the F35 program, upgrading the country’s F16s through a deal with the United States, procuring fifth-generation Eurofighter Typhoons, or some combination of these options, all of which compromise the localization agenda.[21]
Moreover, experts warn about the sustainability of the trajectory of the country’s exports, pointing out to a number of remaining hurdles.[22]The current gains in defense exports cannot be taken for granted given the changing nature of warfare and weapons platforms and the emergence of other arms producers. Beyond Türkiye’s niche position in drones, which accounts for a large portion of exports, it does not yet command market dominance in any other major platform globally. Likewise, Turkish companies are not dominating any single market on their own, even though they are exporting to almost 200 countries or undertaking training or modernization contracts all around the world. In other words, buyers are mostly cherry-picking certain systems. Even close allies such as Qatar or Azerbaijan have not gone ‘fully Turkish’ for major platforms, let alone for their entire range of armament needs.
The Russia-Ukraine war, the conflict between Israel and Hamas since October 2023, and the recent Israel-Iran war have all underscored once again the relevance of military power in modern-day international relations and self-sufficiency. As Europe rushes for rearmament, exemplified at the recent NATO summit where allies agreed to raise their defense spending at least 5% of their national income, Türkiye finds itself at a juncture where its defense industry will play a critical role in its relations with the Western world.
Disclaimer:
The views and opinions expressed in the INSIGHTS publication series are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Rabdan Security & Defense Institute, its affiliated organizations, or any government entity. The content published is intended for informational purposes and reflects the personal perspectives of the authors on various security and defence-related topics.
[1] Şaban Kardaş, “Debating the Hard Power Turn in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 25, no. 1 (2025): 1–10.
[2] Merve Seren, “Turkey’s Military Spending Trend: A Reflection of Change in Defense Policy,” Insight Turkey 22 (September 2020): 183–214.
[3] Başar Baysal, “Evaluating the Advances and Challenges in Turkey’s Defence Industry: A Comparative Analysis,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 25, no. 1 (2025): 31–52.
[4] For an historical overview, see: Hüsnü Özlü, “The Foundation and Development of Turkey’s Defense Industry in the Context of National Security Strategy,” Perceptions 26, no. 2 (2021): 216–40.
[5] Şaban Kardaş “Quest for Strategic Autonomy Continues, or How to Make Sense of Turkey’s ‘New Wave,’” GMF On Turkey, November 28, 2011.
[6] Ayşe Özer, The Rise of the Turkish Defense Industry, (Ankara: Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı, SETA Publications , 2019).
[7] See an insider’s account of this transformation provided by the President of Defense Insdustry, İsmail Demir, “Transformation of Turkish Defense Industry: The Story and Rational of the Great Rise,” Insight Turkey 22, no. Summer 2020 (2020): 17–40.
[8] Arda Mevlütoğlu, “The Future of Turkey’s Airpower: The Fifth Generation Challenge,” Insight Turkey 22, no. Summer 2020 (2020): 131–59.
[9] Merve Seren, “Politics, Industry and Academia: Examining Dynamics of Turkish Defense Industry’s Great Leap Forward in the Post- 2002 Era,” Bilig, no. 96 (Winter 2021): 93–119.
[10] Şaban Kardaş, “Turkey Cooperates with Korea to Develop a National Main Battle Tank,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 5, no.151 (2008).
[11] Sıtkı Egeli et al., From Client to Competitor: The Rise of Turkiye’s Defence Industry, Research Paper (Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research (CFPPR), 2024), https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/05/from-client-to-competitor-the-rise-of-turkiyes-defence-industry/.
[12] Çağlar Kurç et al., “Balancing Aspiration and Reality: Autarky in Turkish Defence Industrial Policy,” Defence Studies 25, no. 2 (2025): 383–406.
[13] Mehmet Fatih Kacır et al., eds., Millî Teknoloji Hamlesi: Toplumsal Yansımaları ve Türkiye’nin Geleceği, 1. (Ankara: Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi Yayınları, 2022).
[14] For a comparative analysis of Turkey’s advances in production, research and development, and export relative to other rising exporters, see: Baysal, “Evaluating the Advances.”
[15] Şaban Kardaş and Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, “Managing the US-Turkey Security Relationship: Structured Transactionalism within a Dual Framework,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 19, no. 4 (2021): 67–86.
[16] Hakan Fidan, “Turkish Foreign Policy at the Turn of the ‘Century of Türkiye’: Challenges, Vision, Objectives, and Transformation,” Insight Turkey 25, no. Summer 2023 (2023): 11–25.
[17] Murat Yeşiltaş, “Deciphering Turkey’s Assertive Military and Defense Strategy: Objectives, Pillars, and Implications,” Insight Turkey 22, no. Summer 2020 (2020): 89–114.
[18] Can Kasapoğlu, “Turkey’s Burgeoning Defense Technological and Industrial Base and Expeditionary Military Policy,” Insight Turkey 22, no. Summer 2020 (2020): 115–30.
[19] Baysal, “Evaluating the Advances.”
[20] “Indonesia Signs Contract with Turkey to Buy 48 KAAN Fighter Jets,” Reuters, 29 July 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-signs-contract-with-turkey-buy-48-kaan-fighter-jets-2025-07-29/.
[21] “Turkey hopes for Progress on F-35 Jets after Trump Meeting, Erdogan Says” Reuters, 26 June 2025.
[22] Sıtkı Egeli et al., Adapting Security: The Intersection of Turkiye’s Foreign Policy and Defence Industrialisation, Research Paper (Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research (CFPPR), 2024), https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/06/adapting-security-the-intersection-of-turkiyes-foreign-policy-and-defence-industrialisation/.
