One of the more interesting features of BRICS in 2026 is the evidence that minilateralism can still function in the midst of global disorder and disagreement among its members.
On 12-13 September 2026, BRICS leaders met in New Delhi for the 18th BRICS Summit and adopted the New Delhi Declaration. The outcome, however, was not a given. BRICS foreign ministers, meeting in New Delhi in May, had failed to agree on a joint statement over the war in the Middle East and India had to issue a chair’s summary instead.
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and the outbreak of the US/Israel war on Iran in late February 2026 certainly pose a challenge to BRICS as an emerging minilateralism set-up. BRICS was originally created as an economic platform for five developing economies to unite against western domination of international trade.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine led to condemnation and economic sanctions against Russia, which then implicated BRICS cohesion. President Putin could not attend the 2023 BRICS forum in South Africa in person. Instead, the President attended remotely via a video call from his own country, due to an arrest warrant issued against him by the International Criminal Court (ICC), of which South Africa is a member. In 2026 he sat at the table in New Delhi, India not being a party to the ICC.
With the ongoing conflicts as background, the Summit, through its Declaration, has managed to obtain consensus on matters pertaining to security, geopolitics and the world order. This development would not have taken place were it not for the growing strength BRICS has accumulated since its establishment.
Why the bloc could reach consensus
BRICS was originally established to converge the voice of the Global South, acting as a forum for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and, later, South Africa. It has since expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, while other countries (Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam) hold partner status.
Members are drawn by dissatisfaction with dollarisation and with US tariffs perceived as unfair to their economic development. That same dissatisfaction led the original members to form a minilateral organisation to increase trade access among themselves.
Its strength lies in two things. The first is scale. Its combined membership now accounts for 25% of world GDP and, in 2024, 3.5 billion people (45% of the world’s population). With oil-producing nations like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as members, the group produced 44% of the world’s crude oil. A bloc with this population and resource base, united around a focused agenda of wider trade access for economic development, gives its members a stake in keeping it intact.
The second strength is a limited ambition. Instead of trying to be a challenger to the established global economic order, BRICS works on producing consensus and working towards unification, and treats every country equally and inclusively, whatever its economic growth and contribution. The 2026 Summit shows this as an emerging norm. In New Delhi, it meant a text that kept to restraint, dialogue, and diplomacy rather than attributing responsibility.
How India secured the consensus
India’s chairship succeeded because New Delhi ran BRICS as a forum for multi-alignment, not as a bloc against the West. That required versatility in advancing its national interest. Despite the fragmented world order and the unilateral tariff moves of the Trump 2.0 administration, India needs US support as a trading partner and, at the same time, needs China as the same kind of partner. BRICS is therefore not a zero-sum game for India. It was not created to be an antagonist group to the Western economy, especially the US, and Modi stressed at the summit that it is not a counter to the West.
The same logic applies to China. It is within India’s national interest to maintain a good trade relationship with Beijing and to neutralise its bilateral conflict with it. From 2020 to 2024, Beijing and New Delhi were in a standoff over one of their border conflicts, with 100,000 military personnel stationed along the border at Ladakh. BRICS is a catalyst for both countries to normalise the conflict and to focus on bilateral trade. President Xi’s attendance in New Delhi (his last visit to India was in 2019) indicated China’s normalisation approach towards the 2020 tension.
The same balancing shaped the Joint Declaration. It touched upon geopolitical and international security issues, and India had to balance contested claims from other member countries in responding to the War on Iran. Work on the text ran up to the deadline, and back-channel talks helped bridge the differences between members. To India, BRICS should not be seen as a platform to reinforce the political aspirations of certain member states. Instead, it should be pragmatic and welcoming to the principle of multi-alignment in the interest of cooperation, trade and social mobility.
There are no losers. China and India are the biggest winners.
China sees that the border issues with India will bring no advantage in the long run, and treats BRICS as a channel to tap into the potential of the Global South economies. Its decision to extend zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries, announced in February and in force from 1 May 2026, is the clearest example. It will open more doors for trade between China and African countries, and it lets China be seen as a global trade defender while the global order is fractured. Strategically, it helps keep China’s global supply and value chains intact despite that fragmentation.
Critics will argue that zero-tariff treatment is also China’s trade defence, with Africa as a buffer zone for its supply and demand chains. It secures upstream supply of critical minerals and creates a more solvent market for Chinese goods. If China faces dumping allegations elsewhere, African markets could absorb contested goods and fulfil local demand.
Conclusion
BRICS 2026 managed to project consensus despite the tough global environment preceding the summit. The New Delhi Declaration is remarkable, considering that it intersects with geopolitics and international security, having gathered the consensus of member countries. What is more remarkable is that the aspirations of the Global South are now being heard more. That is, they do not wish to be caught in the middle of great-power rivalry at the expense of their economic well-being.
Instead, they are committed to trade and bilateral relations that will enhance every state’s national agenda, for the betterment of its people and economy. The caveat is that this consensus rested on language that named no one, which keeps the bloc together but leaves its hardest disagreements for the next chair.
